Kibutiri (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Loise Wanja Kibutiri) v Njoro, Kibutiri & Kibutiri (Sued as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of James Njoro Kibutiri) & another (Application E017 of 2024) [2024] KESC 70 (KLR) (22 November 2024) (Ruling)

Kibutiri (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Loise Wanja Kibutiri) v Njoro, Kibutiri & Kibutiri (Sued as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of James Njoro Kibutiri) & another (Application E017 of 2024) [2024] KESC 70 (KLR) (22 November 2024) (Ruling)

1.Upon perusing the originating motion by the applicant dated May 9, 2024 and filed on May 13, 2024 pursuant to article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution, section 15 of the Supreme Court Act, cap 9B, and rules 33 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2020 seeking: review of the ruling of Court of Appeal (Musinga, Kantai & Gachoka, JJ A) dated April 26, 2024 denying certification of the intended appeal as one involving matters of general public importance; and certification of the intended appeal (against the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Ouko (P) (as he then was), Okwengu & Makhandia, JJA) delivered on September 25, 2020 in Civil Appeal No 156 of 2019, David Muthee Kibutiri (suing as the legal representative of the estate of Loise Wanja Kibutiri) v Thomas Kibutiri Njoro & others as consolidated with Civil Appeal No 192 of 2019, David Kibutiri Njau (suing as the legal representative of the estate of Loise Wanja Kibutiri) v David Muthee Kibutiri & others; and
2.Upon perusing the grounds on the face of the application, the affidavit in support sworn by David Muthee Kibutiri on May 9, 2024, wherein it is urged that the intended appeal raises the following questions of general public importance: what is the nature of a resulting trust?; whether a resulting trust is essentially a property concept; whether, under the resulting trust doctrine, a person can be taken to have made a gift of his/her money without saying so; whether the underlying principle of a resulting trust is that it is, the intention of the guarantor or contributor alone that counts; whether, according to the doctrine of a resulting trust, ownership vests when the purchase takes place and cannot be extinguished or suspended; and whether the resulting trust doctrine is of general interest to the present and other generations of Kenyans; and
3.Upon considering the applicant’s submissions dated May 9, 2024 and filed on May 13, 2024, wherein he restates his arguments for certification, and in addition, urges that the application meets the requirements for certification as restated by this court in Shah & 7 others v Mombasa Bricks & Tiles Ltd & 5 others (Application 3 (E008) of 2022) [2022] KESC 25 (KLR). Furthermore, the applicant contends that the appellate court misapplied and misapprehended the nature of the doctrine of a resulting trust as described in the 27th Edition of Snell’s Principles of Equity on page 179 and illuminated in the cases of Re Golcar Sick and Funeral Society of St Johns Sunday School [1972] 2 All ER 439, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] 2 All ER 961, Pettitt v Pettitt [1969] 2 All ER 385, Kerr v Baranow and Vanasse v Sequeine [2011] AC 10; and
4.Noting that the respondents did not file any response to the application; and
5.Bearing in mind the provisions of article 163(5) of the Constitution, section 15B of the Supreme Court Act and rule 33(1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Rules 2020, and this court’s guiding principles on certification of a matter as one involving general public importance set out in Hermanus Phillipus Steyn v Giovanni Ruscone, SC Application No 4 of 2013 [2013] eKLR and Malcolm Bell v Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi & another, SC Application No 1 of 2013; [2013] eKLR;
6.We now opine as follows:i.The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for certification upon finding that the same was filed out of time. In its determination, the appellate court pronounced itself as follows;We note that this application was filed on November 5, 2020, forty-one (41) days after delivery of the impugned judgment. No extension of time was granted by the court prior to the filing of the application. We note that this is an anomaly that renders the entire application incompetent. The rule is clear on the timelines and if the applicant had good reasons to explain the delay it ought to have invoked the relevant provisions for the extension of time. In view of this glaring anomaly, we cannot take any other step.”ii.From the foregoing, it cannot be said that the appellate court declined to certify the appeal as one involving a matter of general public importance. What the court did was to strike out the application on grounds that the same was incompetent, having been filed out of time. As such, we have no basis upon which to interfere with Court of Appeal’s invocation of its rules to strike out an incompetent motion.
7.Consequently, and for the reasons aforesaid, we make the following orders:i.The originating motion dated May 9, 2024 and filed on May 13, 2024 is hereby dismissed.ii.We make no order as to costs there having been no opposition by the respondents.It is so Ordered.
DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 22ND DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2024.…………………………………………………M. K. KOOMECHIEF JUSTICE & PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COURT……………………………………………………M. K. IBRAHIMJUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT……………………………………………………S. C. WANJALAJUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT……………………………………………………NJOKI NDUNGUJUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT……………………………………………………I. LENAOLAJUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT**I certify that this is a true copy of the originalREGISTRARSUPREME COURT OF KENYA
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