Attorney General v Kabuga & 2 others (Anti Corruption and Economics Crime Miscellaneous Application 38 of 2016) [2023] KEHC 3666 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes) (27 April 2023) (Ruling)
Neutral citation:
[2023] KEHC 3666 (KLR)
Republic of Kenya
Anti Corruption and Economics Crime Miscellaneous Application 38 of 2016
EN Maina, J
April 27, 2023
Between
The Attorney General
Applicant
and
Felician Kabuga Also Known As Kabuga Faracean
1st Respondent
Mukazitoni Josephine Also Known As Mukaziton Josephin
2nd Respondent
Kenya Trust Company Limited
3rd Respondent
Court issues preservation orders under international law for property owned by a fugitive and non-fugitive
The case arose from an application by the Attorney General of Kenya, seeking preservation orders against property jointly owned by Felician Kabuga, an internationally wanted fugitive, and his spouse. Kabuga, indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, was using his Kenyan assets to evade capture. The case hinged on Kenya's international obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions to freeze the assets of international fugitives, specifically under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The court had to determine whether Kenya's domestic laws could support such asset freezing in the absence of specific legislation at the time the proceedings were initiated. The court upheld the State's obligation to comply with international treaties, despite the constitutional protection of property rights, holding that freezing orders were necessary to support international justice.
International Criminal Law – international obligations – duty to assist international criminal tribunals – international responsibility and cooperation in pursuing fugitives indicted for war crimes - freezing orders - preservation of property under international law, enforcement of Security Council resolutions - freezing of property jointly owned by a fugitive and spouse – applicable law - whether Kenya’s domestic laws in 2008 (before the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act) allowed for the preservation, freezing, or seizure of property belonging to a fugitive against whom there was a valid warrant of arrest - Constitution of Kenya, 2010 articles 2(5)(6), 25, 39, 40, 49, and 60; Geneva Convention Act (Cap 198) section 60; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articles 26,27, and 46; United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004); Proceeds of Crime And Anti-Money Laundering Act (Cap 59A) section 115(1)(2).Land Law – joint ownership – freezing orders against joint property – where a fugitive and a non-fugitive jointly owned land – rights of non-fugitive where an order freezing the fugitive’s land was to be enforced - whether the court could properly order the freezing, preservation, attachment or seizure of property where doing so will affect a joint owner, who had equal right to the property and who was not a fugitive against whom there was a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest - whether the court could freeze property that was jointly owned by a fugitive and a non-fugitive and that had already passed to the non-fugitive via death of the fugitive - Land Act (Cap 284) section 2.
Brief facts
The Attorney General of Kenya sought orders to preserve property jointly owned by Felician Kabuga, who was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for genocide-related crimes, and his spouse. The application relied on Kenya's international obligations under several United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring member states to freeze assets of individuals aiding fugitives from international justice. Kabuga had evaded capture by using his wealth, including proceeds from Kenyan properties, to finance his flight and interfere with the ICTR’s proceedings. The property in question was jointly owned by Kabuga and his wife, and managed by Kenya Trust Company. The Attorney General argued that the funds from this property were being used to evade justice.
Issues
- Whether Kenya’s domestic laws in 2008 (before the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act) allowed for the preservation, freezing, or seizure of property belonging to a fugitive against whom there is a valid warrant of arrest.
- Whether the court could properly order the freezing, preservation, attachment or seizure of property where doing so will affect a joint owner, who had equal right to the property and who was not a fugitive against whom there was a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest.
- Whether the court could freeze property that was jointly owned by a fugitive and a non-fugitive and that had already passed to the non-fugitive via death of the fugitive.
Held
- Unlike the section 115(1) and (2) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, (POCAMLA) as at the time of institution of the instant proceedings there was no legislation in Kenya specifically providing for preservation of the property of a fugitive hence the reason for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 60 of the Repealed Constitution. Sections 115(2) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act as read with section 82 of the POCAMLA now cloth this court with the requisite jurisdiction to issue such orders. The application would be ex parte and hence the preservation order would be issued ex parte but for a limited period of ninety days.
- Kenya being a member state of the United Nations it was legally obligated to observe the United Nations Resolutions. Section 6 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 provided that all rights and obligations, however arising, of the Government or the Republic and subsisting immediately before the effective date shall continue as rights and obligations of the national government or the Republic under the Constitution.
- Resolution 1503 (2003) which was adopted by the Security Council urged member states to consider imposing measures against individuals and groups or organizations assisting indictees at large to evade justice including measures designed to restrict the travel and freeze the assets of such individuals, groups of organizations. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations a special obligation was placed on Kenya, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo to intensify co-operation to bring the 1st respondent and all other indictees to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
- The impugned resolutions did not conflict with Constitution and the law as to warrant the court not to apply them. Although the 1st respondent had been brought to book and was facing trial at the ICTR, it was necessary to issue a preservation/freezing order on the property so as to assist to bring him to book and to aid Kenya in meeting its international obligation noting that the monies collected from the property was his property albeit jointly with his spouse, and was most likely being used to assist him to evade arrest. The question of whether or not the property was lawfully acquired was immaterial.
- The property in issue was jointly owned by the 1st respondent and his spouse who was named in the proceedings as the 2nd respondent though deceased. As the proprietorship was a joint tenancy the rights of the proprietors were indivisible as per section 2 of the Land Act. It was not possible to divide the ownership so as to freeze or preserve only that portion of the property that belongs to the 1st respondent. As such, the 1st respondent being a proprietor with equal rights to the property, the court was entitled to freeze/preserve the whole of the property
- It was unfortunate that the 2nd respondent’s rights were affected. It was instructive that that was not a matrimonial property where the court would have been obligated to consider the plight of the 1st respondent’s spouse as such. It was also not lost to the court that as at the time of writing this ruling the rights of the 2nd respondent to the property had been extinguished by reason of her demise and the property now solely belonged to the 1st respondent.
Application dismissed.
Orders
2nd respondent ordered to pay the costs of both.
Citations
Cases
- Mary Rono v Jane Rono (Civil Appeal 66 of 2002) — Mentioned
- Mongare v Attorney General & 3 others (Civil Appeal 123 of 2012; [2014] KECA 887 (KLR)) — Mentioned
- Muslims for Human Rights (Muhuri) & Another v Inspector General of Police & 5 Others (Petition 19 of 2015; [2015] KEHC 5143 (KLR)) — Mentioned
- Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (Const2010) — article 2(5)(6);25;39;40;49;60 — Interpreted
- Geneva Convention Act (Cap 198) — section 60 — Interpreted
- Land Act (No. 6 of 2012) — section 2 — Interpreted
- Proceeds of Crime And Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 9 of 2009) — section 115(1)(2) — Interpreted
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties — article 26;27;46 — Interpreted
Ruling
1.On 5th May 2008, the Attorney General, through the Director of Public Prosecutions filed an Originating Motion dated 5th May 2008 which is supported by the affidavit of Thomas Khamala Bifwoli, State Counsel sworn on even date. The application seeks orders as follows:-
2.The Originating Motion was made ex parte under Section 60 of the repealed Constitution, the Geneva Convention Act Cap 198, Kenya’s obligations under International law and the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and was premised on grounds that: -
3.The Originating Motion was heard ex parte by the Hon. Muga Apondi J (Retired), who by his ruling delivered on 6th May 2008, allowed the Application in the following terms:-
4.Subsequently the 2nd Respondent filed a Notice of Motion dated 28th July 2008 and sought to set aside the above orders and the maintenance of status quo ante. Simultaneously with that application, the 2nd Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection which was premises on the following grounds:-
5.The Preliminary Objection was heard inter partes and by a ruling delivered on 30th June, 2009 the Hon. Muga Apondi J, (Retired), dismissed the Preliminary Objection and held:-
6.Being aggrieved by the above ruling, the 2nd Respondent appealed against the ruling. However, in a judgment delivered on 25th September 2015 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on grounds that the Preliminary Objection did not raise a purely point of law and that there were several contested facts that required to be heard at the trial. The court observed that: -
7.The Court upheld the direction of the Hon. Muga Apondi J (Retired) to consolidate the Originating Motion and the Notice of Motion seeking to set aside the orders of the court and have them heard together. The court also directed that the proceedings now pending before the High Court between the parties hereto be concluded taking into account sections 6 and 7 of the Sixth Schedule and article 2(5) and (6) of the 2010 Constitution. It further observed that the pertinent question in dispute between the parties was whether the laws of Kenya allow preservation, attachment, freezing or seizure of property of a fugitive on the run against whom there was a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest and concluded that in answering that question, the nationality or citizenship of the fugitive was irrelevant.
8.Parties were then directed by this court to file written submissions in respect to the two applications.
9.Learned counsel for the ODPP/Applicant begun by describing the role suspected to have been played by the 1st Respondent in the Rwanda genocide which took place between 6th April, 1994 and 17th July, 1994. Counsel submitted that following the genocide the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, which was to operate pursuant to the statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (The statute). Amongst the persons indicted under the Statute was the 1st Respondent who was on the run and against who a warrant of arrest had been issued.
10.Counsel submitted that following the indictment of the 1st Respondent and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations more specifically Resolutions No 955 of 1994, 978 of 1995, 1165 of 1998, 1503 of 2003 and 1534 of 2004, the United Nations Security Council called upon member states, including Kenya, to co-operate with the ICTR in tracing and freezing the assets of the 1st Respondent; that it was with a view to implementing the aforesaid United Nations Security Council Resolutions that the Applicant filed the Originating Motion herein in order to preserve the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ property LR No.1/1154 (Spanish Villas) House No. 6 pending hearing and determination of the ICTR case No. ICTR-97-22-1.
11.Counsel contended that the application was brought under section 60 of the repealed Constitution of Kenya, the Geneva Convention Act, Cap 198, Kenya’s International law, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the inherent powers of the court and all enabling provisions of the law and practice.
12.On the issue of jurisdiction, learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Preliminary Objection where it stated:-
13.As to whether the law of Kenya allows for preservation of the property of a fugitive, Counsel asserted that as Kenya is a member of the United Nations and hence a State Party to the United Nations Charter it is bound by articles 25, 39, 40 and more especially 49. Counsel stated that the issue of the applicability and enforceability of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Kenya was also considered by the Court of Appeal.
14.Counsel asserted that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003) which was adopted by the security Council at its 4817th meeting on 28th August, 2003 stated:-
15.Quoting article 26, 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), Counsel stated that a party to a treaty cannot invoke the provisions of its municipal (domestic) law as justification for a failure to perform its obligations and urged this court to grant prayers 2 and 3 of the Originating Motion.
16.It is to be noted that the 2nd Respondent passed away before these proceedings could be concluded and was substituted by her son Nshimyumuremyi Donatien who is the administrator of her estate.
17.The 2nd Respondent who was represented by the firm of Ogetto Otachi & Company Advocates vehemently opposed the application and urged this court to set aside the ex parte order of preservation. Learned Counsel submitted that it was not proved that income from the property was being used to aid the 1st Respondent to avoid capture and substantially interfere with prosecution witnesses; that in fact the 2nd Respondent has proof that the funds were actually wired into the 2nd Respondent’s account. Counsel reiterated that the Applicant has not demonstrated that there is any Kenyan legislation that authorizes freezing of the assets of a suspect or fugitive; that the Constitution provides for the sanctity of property as a fundamental right and the resolutions relied upon by the Applicant are inconsistent with the Constitution and that furthermore there was no allegation that the property was unlawfully acquired or that it related to any crime. Learned Counsel cited several cases to support the Respondent’s submission that the Resolution are not binding on Kenya and as such this court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
18.Citing the case of Muslims for Human Rights (Muhuri) & Another v Inspector General of Police & 5 others [2015] eKLR Counsel contended that the right to property can only be limited when acquired in furtherance of an offence; that in this case there is no basis for such limitation as there are no criminal proceedings against the 2nd Respondent. Further that the limitation of the 2nd Respondent’s right is misinformed as the same is only prejudicial to herself and no other party. Counsel urged this court to dismiss the Applicant’s Originating Motion and in its place allow the 2nd Respondent’s Notice of Motion to lift the preservation order and to award the costs of both applications to the 2nd Respondent.
19.In its judgment on the Preliminary Objection the Court of Appeal dealt substantially with the issue of the enforcement and applicability of the United Nations Resolutions and whether or not they are binding on Kenya and concluded as follows:-
20.The Court of Appeal went further and found that the security Council Resolutions were obligations of Kenya as at the effective date of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. It observed however that this case was initiated in 2008 prior to the effective date and noting that article 2(5) and (6) of the 2010 Constitution makes International law part of Kenya law, it directed this court to conclude the proceedings taking into account sections 6 and 7 of the Sixth Schedule and article 2(5) and (6) of the 2010 Constitution.
21.Given the aforegoing finding of the Court of Appeal the issue of whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings is behind us. As was held by that court the Resolutions create a binding legal obligation for Kenya they should be accorded respectful consideration within Kenya’s domestic system and while they cannot be accorded the status of being a source of law in the absence of implementing legislation Kenyan courts can make reference to them, inter alia, to determine rights and obligations under Kenyan law or to fill a gap or ambiguity where domestic law is ambiguous, uncertain or totally lacking. However as was held by the Court of Appeal and given the hierarchy of our law they apply only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the constitution or any other written law.
Issues for determination: -a.Whether the laws of Kenya allow preservation, attachment, freezing or seizure of property of a fugitive on the run against whom there is a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest;b.Whether the court can properly order the freezing, preservation, attachment or seizure of property where doing so will affect a person who has equal right to the property and who is not her/himself a fugitive against whom there is a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest;c.Whether the order issued by this court ought to be set aside; andd.Who shall bear the costs.
Issue (a) Whether the laws of Kenya allow preservation, attachment, freezing or seizure of property of a fugitive on the run against whom the is a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest;
22.Unlike the current section 115(1) and (2) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, (POCAMLA) as at the time of institution of these proceedings there was no legislation in Kenya specifically providing for preservation of the property of a fugitive hence the reason for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 60 of the Repealed Constitution. Sections 115(2) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act as read with Section 82 of the POCAMLA now cloth this court with the requisite jurisdiction to issue such orders. Indeed, the application would be ex parte and hence the preservation order would be issued ex parte but for a limited period of ninety days. Be that as it may as was stated by the Court of Appeal Kenya being a member state of the United Nations it was legally obligated to observe the United Nations Resolutions. Section 6 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 provides: -
23.Resolution 1503 (2003) which was adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 28th August 2003 urged member states to consider imposing measures against individuals and groups or organizations assisting indictees at large to evade justice including measures designed to restrict the travel and freeze the assets of such individuals, groups of organizations. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations a special obligation was placed on Kenya, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo to intensify co-operation to bring the 1st Respondent and all other indictees to the ICTR.
24.As already pointed out there was a gap in our law as there was no legislation to freeze the known assets of the 1st Respondent in Kenya so as to comply with the above obligation. It is for that reason that the Hon Muga Apondi, J (Retired) invoked the unlimited jurisdiction of this court under the new repealed Section 60 of the Constitution to fill in the gap, a thing which even the Court of Appeal recognized is permissible. (See the case of Mary Rono v Jane Rono Civil Appeal No. 66 of 2002 [2005] eKLR and the case of Dennis Mogambi Mongare v The Attorney General & others Civil Appeal No 123 of 2012 [2014] eKLR. See also paragraph 81 of the Court of Appeal Judgment where it held:-
25.I have considered the impugned resolutions and it is my finding that there is no conflict between them and our Constitution and the law as would warrant this court not to apply them.
26.Although the 1st Respondent has now been brought to book and is currently facing trial at the ICTR I agree with and adopt the ruling of Muga Apondi J (Retired), that it was necessary to issue a preservation/freezing order on the property so as to assist to bring him to book and to aid Kenya in meeting its international obligation noting that the monies collected from the property was his property albeit jointly with his spouse, and was most likely being used to assist him to evade arrest. The question of whether or not the property was lawfully acquired is immaterial.
27.I would be reluctant to set aside the preservation order in view of the grave charges against the 1st Respondent and the fact that the trial is yet to be concluded.
Issue (b) Whether the court can properly order the freezing, preservation, attachment or seizure of property where doing so will affect a person who has equal right to the property and who is not her/himself a fugitive against whom there is a valid and enforceable warrant of arrest;
28.It is not in doubt that the property in issue is jointly owned by the 1st Respondent and his spouse who is named in these proceedings as the 2nd Respondent though now deceased. The question that arose is whether the court could properly freeze/preserve the property yet she has an equal right to the property. My finding on this issue is that as the proprietorship is a joint tenancy the rights of the proprietors are indivisible – see section 2 of the Land Act. That being the case, it is not possible to divide the ownership so as to freeze or preserve only that portion of the property that belongs to the 1st Respondent. As such, the 1st Respondent being a proprietor with equal rights to the property, the court was entitled to freeze/preserve the whole of the property and it is unfortunate that the 2nd Respondent’s rights were affected. It is instructive that this was not a matrimonial property where the court would have been obligated to consider the plight of the 1st Respondent’s spouse as such. It is also not lost to this court that as at the time of writing this ruling the rights of the 2nd Respondent to this property had been extinguished by reason of her demise and the property now solely belongs to the 1st Respondent.
Issue (c) Whether the order issued by this court ought to be set aside;
29.Having found that this court has jurisdiction to freeze/preserve the property and that the ownership thereof is indivisible in view of the joint ownership, I think I have said enough to show that the order ought not to be set aside.
Issue (d); who shall bear the costs?
30.Costs follow the cause and in this case the 2nd Respondent not being successful in both applications is ordered to pay the costs of both.
31.Orders accordingly.
SIGNED, DATED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON THIS 27TH DAY OF APRIL 2023E N MAINAJUDGE