



**REPUBLIC OF KENYA**  
**IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI**  
**MILIMANI LAW COURTS**  
**IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION**  
**(Coram: A. C. Mrima, J.)**

**CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 301 OF 2019**

**BETWEEN**

**MUSANKISHAY KALALA PAULIN.....PETITIONER**

**AND**

**THE DIRECTOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.....1<sup>st</sup> RESPONDENT**

**THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE.....2<sup>nd</sup> RESPONDENT**

**THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION.....3<sup>rd</sup> RESPONDENT**

**THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION.....4<sup>th</sup> RESPONDENT**

**THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.....5<sup>th</sup> RESPONDENT**

**JUDGMENT**

**Introduction:**

1. The Petitioner herein, *Musankishay Kalala Paulin*, is a foreign National from the Democratic Republic of Congo. He was arrested and charged in *JKIA Law Courts Criminal Case 121 of 2019 Republic versus Joyce Akinyi & 2 Others*, (hereinafter referred to as '***the criminal case***') with the offence of trafficking in narcotic drugs.
2. His application to be released on bond was rejected by the trial Court. He filed for revision on the denial to grant bail to the Criminal Division of the High Court. The Court upheld the decision not to admit the Petitioner to bail.
3. The Petitioner is now before the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court in a bid to secure his release from custody on bail and the termination of the criminal case.
4. The Petition is anchored on two main grounds. They are that the Petitioner's right to be released on bail pending the hearing and determination of the criminal case continues to be violated as well as that he was injured during the arrest thereby subjected to cruelty, inhuman and degrading treatment, which acts are a further violation of his rights as guaranteed under the Constitution.
5. The Petition was vehemently opposed.

**Preliminary issues:**

6. Before I deal further with the Petition herein, I will interrogate two issues raised by the Respondents which are preliminary in nature. The issues are: -

*(i) Whether the Petition is res judicata.*

(ii) Whether the Petition ought to be dismissed.

**Whether the Petition is res judicata:**

7. The Respondents contended that the issues raised in the Petition herein was dealt with in the criminal case before the trial Court as well as by the Criminal Division of the High Court in *Nairobi Misc. Criminal Application No. 441 of 2019* (hereinafter referred to as '**the criminal revision**').

8. It was contended that the Petitioner's request to be admitted to bail was, in the first instance, made before the trial Court and was declined.

9. Being dissatisfied, the Petitioner filed the criminal revision in the High Court challenging the trial Court's decision not to admit him into bail. The criminal revision was disallowed.

10. The foregoing facts were not disputed by the Petitioner. As such, I will consider whether the legal bar raised by the doctrine of *res judicata* applies to this matter.

11. The doctrine of *res judicata* is not novel. Its genesis is in *Section 7* of the *Civil Procedure Act*, Cap. 21 of the Laws of Kenya which provides that: -

*No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such court.*

13. The Supreme Court in a decision rendered on 6<sup>th</sup> August, 2021 in ***John Florence Maritime Services Limited & Another v Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure & 3 Others [2021] eKLR*** comprehensively dealt with the different facets making up the doctrine of *res judicata*.

14. In the first instance, the Apex Court framed the issues for determination as follows: -

a) *Did the High Court procedurally consider the plea of res judicata?*

b) *Did the finding by the High Court on res judicata infringe on the Petitioner's right to fair hearing condemning them unheard?*

c) *Were the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal justified in holding that the doctrine of res judicata applied to the current case; was the Paluku case the same as the Appellants' herein?*

d) *Is this doctrine of res judicata applicable to constitutional litigation and interpretation, just as in other criminal and civil litigation?*

e) *If the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to constitutional matters with the rider that it should be invoked in constitutional litigation only in the rarest and clearest of cases, on whom lies the burden of proving such rarest and clearest of cases?*

f) *What constitutes such "rarest and clearest" of cases?*

g) *Who bears the costs of the suit.*

15. On the procedure for raising the plea of *res judicata*, the Supreme Court alluded to the position that the plea is anchored on evidential facts and that such facts ought to be properly raised in a matter. In that case, the plea of *res judicata* had been raised by way of Grounds of opposition and in the Replying Affidavit.

16. The Court, in dismissing the argument that the issue was improperly raised before Court, stated as follows: -

*[53] Instead, and contrary to the Appellants submissions, the plea of res judicata was raised through both grounds of opposition and replying affidavits in response to the Appellants application. It is also evident that through the Replying Affidavits of the 3rd and 4th Respondents, evidence by way of the Judgment of JR No. 130 of 2011 was introduced through an affidavit to bolster the plea of res judicata.*

*[54] It is further evident that the Appellants were not condemned unheard or shut out from the proceedings. The proceedings demonstrate that the Court accorded the Appellants the two justiciable elements of fair hearing: (i) an opportunity of hearing must be given; and (ii) that opportunity must be reasonable.*

*[55] This ground of appeal must therefore fail.*

17. Applying the foregoing to this case, this Court finds that the plea of *res judicata* was properly raised by way of a Notice of Motion. The application was heard *inter partes* by way reliance on the application, affidavits, written submissions and oral highlights on the submissions.

18. On whether the doctrine of *res judicata* applies to constitutional Petitions, the Supreme Court endeavoured an extensive discussion and comparative analysis in various jurisdictions. It also captured the various opposing schools of thought on the issue.

19. In the end, the Court found that the doctrine, rightly so, applies to constitutional Petitions. This is what the Court partly stated: -

*81. We reaffirm our position as in the Muiri Coffee case that the doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle of finality which is a matter of public policy. The principle of finality is one of the pillars upon which our judicial system is founded and the doctrine of res judicata prevents a multiplicity of suits, which would ordinarily clog the Courts, apart from occasioning unnecessary costs to the parties; and it ensures that litigation comes to an end, and the verdict duly translates into fruit for one party, and liability for another party, conclusively.....*

*[82] If we were to find that the doctrine does not apply to constitutional litigation, the doctrine may very well lose much of its legitimacy and validity. We say this in light of the fact that constitutional tenets permeate all litigation starting with the application of Article 159 of the Constitution in both civil and criminal litigation, and its application now embedded in all procedural statutes. Further Article 50 on right to fair hearing and Article 48 on access to justice are fundamental rights which every litigant is entitled to. Such a holding may very well lead to parties, that whenever they need to circumscribe the doctrine of res judicata, they only need to invoke some constitutional provision or other.*

20. The Apex Court went ahead and rendered itself on the threshold for proving the applicability of the doctrine. The Court stated as follows: -

*[86] We restate the elements that must be proven before a court may arrive at the conclusion that a matter is res judicata. For res judicata to be invoked in a civil matter the following elements must be demonstrated:*

*a) There is a former Judgment or order which was final;*

*b) The Judgment or order was on merit;*

*c) The Judgment or order was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and*

*d) There must be between the first and the second action identical parties, subject matter and cause of action*

21. On the commonality of the parties, the Court noted as follows: -

*[93] The commonality is that the Appellants herein and the Applicants in Jr 130 of 2011 were persons, juridical and natural, engaged in the business of clearing and forwarding of goods for various importers of goods destined to the Democratic Republic of Congo. They have the same interests and therefore they raise the complaints regarding the two certificates, FERI & COD. The answer is in the affirmative and we find we cannot fault the High Court or the Court of Appeal for concluding as such.*

22. In dealing with the contention as to whether the issues raised in the two suits therein were directly and substantially the same, the Supreme Court noted that the initial suit was instituted by way of a judicial review application whereas the subsequent suit was by way of a constitutional Petition. The Court also noted that the issues raised in the constitutional Petition were more than those decided in the judicial review application.

23. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal and found that the doctrine was not applicable in the matter. The Court held that: -

*[97] From the face of it, it would appear that the issues in the present suit and JR 130 of 2011 are directly and substantially the same. However, the Appellants herein predicated their petition on inter alia grounds that the bilateral agreement should have been approved by Parliament in order to form part of Kenyan law and in failing to do so, the Respondents contravened Article 2. They further alleged that the Respondents herein purported to usurp to the role of Parliament and in doing so contravened Articles 94(5) and (6) of the Constitution. They further alleged that the FERI and COD certificates threatened to infringe their right to property under Articles 40(1)(a) and (2)(a) when the Respondents threatened to arbitrarily deprive them of their property. **The Court sitting in determination of a judicial review application did not have jurisdiction to render itself on these issues.** We therefore find that the principle of res judicata was wrongly invoked on this ground. (emphasis added).*

24. On the competency of the Court deciding the matters in issue, the Supreme Court noted the close relationship between the issue as to whether the current suit had been decided by a competent court and whether the matter in dispute in the former suit between the parties was directly or substantially in dispute between the parties in the suit where the doctrine is pleaded as a bar.

25. The Apex Court had a lengthy discussion on the matter. It made reference to several decisions and in the end rendered itself as follows: -

*[107] The Court when determining a constitutional petition is empowered to look beyond the process and not only examine but delve into the merits of a matter or a decision. The essence of merit review is the power to substitute a decision which the Court can do when determining a constitutional petition. Further the Court is further empowered to grant not just judicial review orders but any other relief it deems fit to remedy any denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights. This Court in its decision in **Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v. Kenya Airports Authority & 2 others; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (Amicus Curiae) [2021]** eKLR went ahead to reaffirm use of structural interdicts and supervisory orders to redress the violation of a fundamental right in order to allow the development of Court-sanctioned enforcement of human rights as*

envisaged in the Bill of Rights.

[108] We arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the High Court in determining a judicial review application, exercises only a fraction the jurisdiction it has to determine a constitutional petition. It therefore follows that a determination of a judicial review application cannot be termed as final determination of issues under a constitutional petition. The considerations are different, the orders the court may grant are more expanded under a constitutional petition and therefore the outcomes are different.

[109] The Court in hearing a constitutional petition may very well arrive at the same conclusion as the Court hearing a judicial review application. However, the considerations right from the outset are different, the procedures are different, the reliefs that the court may grant are different, the Court will be playing fairly different roles.

[110] We consequently arrive at the conclusion that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the doctrine of *res judicata* applied to the current case. The Court of Appeal should have at that point found that the High Court was wrong in its conclusion.

26. The Supreme Court also discussed two **exceptions** to the doctrine of *res judicata*. The Court stated as follows: -

[84] Just as the Court of Appeal in its impugned decision noted that rights keep on evolving, mutating, and assuming multifaceted dimensions it may be difficult to specify what is rarest and clearest. We however propose to set some parameters that a party seeking to have a court give an exemption to the application of the doctrine of *res judicata*. The first is where there is potential for substantial injustice if a court does not hear a constitutional matter or issue on its merits. It is our considered opinion that before a court can arrive at such a conclusion, it must examine the entirety of the circumstances as well address the factors for and against exercise of such discretionary power.

[85] In the alternative a litigant must demonstrate special circumstances warranting the Court to make an exception.

27. The Supreme Court had earlier expressed itself on the doctrine of *res judicata* in **Petition 14, 14A, 14B & 14C of 2014 (Consolidated) Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others** [2014] eKLR where it delimited the operation of the doctrine of *res-judicata* in the following terms;

[317] The concept of *res judicata* operates to prevent causes of action, or issues from being relitigated once they have been determined on the merits. It encompasses limits upon both issues and claims, and the issues that may be raised in subsequent proceedings. In this case, the High Court relied on “issue estoppel”, to bar the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> respondents’ claims. Issue estoppel prevents a party who previously litigated a claim (and lost), from taking a second bite at the cherry. This is a long-standing common law doctrine for bringing finality to the process of litigation; for avoiding multiplicities of proceedings; and for the protection of the integrity of the administration of justice? all in the cause of fairness in the settlement of disputes.

[318] This concept is incorporated in Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21, Laws of Kenya) which prohibits a Court from trying any issue which has been substantially in issue in an earlier suit. It thus provides:

**No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such court.**

[319] There are conditions to the application of the doctrine of *res judicata*: (i) the issue in the first suit must have been decided by a competent Court; (ii) the matter in dispute in the former suit between the parties must be directly or substantially in dispute between the parties in the suit where the doctrine is pleaded as a bar; and (iii) the parties in the former suit should be the same parties, or parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title *Karia and Another v. The Attorney General and Others*, [2005] 1 EA 83, 89.

[320] So, in the instant case, the argument concerning *res judicata* can only succeed when it is established that the issue brought before a Court is essentially the same as another one already satisfactorily decided, before a competent court.

[333] We find that the petition at the High Court had sought to relitigate an issue already determined by the Public Procurement Administrative Review Tribunal. Instead of contesting the Tribunal’s decision through the prescribed route of judicial review at the High Court, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> respondents instituted fresh proceedings, two years later, to challenge a decision on facts and issues finally determined. This strategy, we would observe, constitutes the very mischief that the common law doctrine of “issue estoppel” is meant to forestall. **Issue estoppel “prevents a party from using an institutional detour to attack the validity of an order by seeking a different result from a different forum, rather than through the designated appellate or judicial review route”** (*Workers’ Compensation Board v. Figliola* [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422, 438 (paragraph 28)).

[334] Whatever mode the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> respondents adopted in couching their prayers, it is plain to us, they were challenging the decision of the Tribunal, in the High Court. It is a typical case that puts the Courts on guard, against litigants attempting to sidestep the doctrine of “issue estoppel”, by appending new causes of action to their grievance, while pursuing the very same case they lost previously. In *Omondi v. National Bank of Kenya Ltd. & Others*, [2001] EA 177 the Court held that “parties cannot evade the doctrine of *res judicata* by merely adding other parties or causes of action in a subsequent suit.”

[352] The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in *Thomas v. The Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago*, [1991] LRC (Const.) 1001 held that “when a plaintiff seeks to litigate the same issue a second time relying on fresh propositions in law he can

only do so if he can demonstrate that special circumstances exist for displacing the normal rules.” That court relied on a case decided by the Supreme Court of India, *Daryao & Others v. The State of UP & Others*, (1961) 1 SCR 574 to find that the existence of a constitutional remedy does not affect the application of the principle of *res judicata*. The Indian Court also rejected the notion that *res judicata* could not apply to petitions seeking redress with respect to an infringement of fundamental rights. Gajendragadkar J stated:

*But is the rule of res judicata merely a technical rule or is it based on high public policy? If the rule of res judicata itself embodies a principle of public policy which in turn is an essential part of the rule of law, then the objection that the rule cannot be invoked where fundamental rights are in question may lose much of its validity. Now the rule of res judicata...has no doubt some technical aspects...but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32.*

[353] Kenya’s High Court recently pronounced itself on the issue of the applicability of *res judicata* in constitutional claims. In ***Okiya Omtatah Okiiti & Another v. Attorney General & 6 Others***, High Court Const. and Human Rights Division, Petition No. 593 of 2013 [2014] eKLR, Lenaola J. (at paragraph 64) thus stated:

*Whereas these principles have generally been applied liberally in civil suits, the same cannot be said of their application in constitutional matters. I say so because, in my view, the principle of res judicata can and should only be invoked in constitutional matters in the clearest of cases and where a party is relitigating the same matter before the Constitutional Court and where the Court is called upon to redetermine an issue between the same parties and on the same subject matter. While therefore the principle is a principle of law of wide application, therefore it must be sparingly invoked in rights-based litigation and the reason is obvious.*

[354] On the basis of such principles evolved in case law, it is plain to us that the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> respondents were relitigating the denial to them of a BSD licence, and were asking the High Court to redetermine this issue.

[355] However, notwithstanding our findings based on the common law principles of estoppel and *res-judicata*, we remain keenly aware that the Constitution of 2010 has elevated the process of judicial review to a pedestal that transcends the technicalities of common law. By clothing their grievance as a constitutional question, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> respondents were seeking the intervention of the High Court in the firm belief that, their fundamental right had been violated by a state organ. Indeed, this is what must have informed the Court of Appeal’s view to the effect that the appellants (respondents herein) were entitled to approach the Court and have their grievance resolved on the basis of Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution.

28. The Court of Appeal in ***John Florence Maritime Services Limited & Another v Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure & 3 Others*** [2015] eKLR (which decision was overturned by the Supreme Court) also, and so correctly, discussed the doctrine of *res judicata* at length. The Court stated in part as follows: -

*The rationale behind res judicata is based on the public interest that there should be an end to litigation coupled with the interest to protect a party from facing repetitive litigation over the same matter. Res judicata ensures the economic use of court’s limited resources and timely termination of cases. Courts are already clogged and overwhelmed. They can hardly spare time to repeat themselves on issues already decided upon. It promotes stability of judgments by reducing the possibility of inconsistency in judgments of concurrent courts. It promotes confidence in the courts and predictability which is one of the essential ingredients in maintaining respect for justice and the rule of law. Without res judicata, the very essence of the rule of law would be in danger of unraveling uncontrollably. In a nutshell, res judicata being a fundamental principle of law may be raised as a valid defence. It is a doctrine of general application and it matters not whether the proceedings in which it is raised are constitutional in nature. The general consensus therefore remains that res judicata being a fundamental principle of law that relates to the jurisdiction of the court, may be raised as a valid defence to a constitutional claim even on the basis of the court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process under Rule 3(8) of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013. On the whole, it is recognized that its scope may permeate broad aspects of civil law and practice. We accordingly do not accept the proposition that Constitution-based litigation cannot be subjected to the doctrine of res judicata. However, we must hasten to add that it should only be invoked in constitutional litigation in the clearest of the cases. It must be sparingly invoked and the reasons are obvious as rights keep on evolving, mutating, and assuming multifaceted dimensions.*

*We also resist the invitation by the appellants to hold that all constitutional petitions must be heard and disposed of on merit and that parties should not be barred from the citadel of justice on the basis of technicalities and rules of procedure which have no place in the new constitutional dispensation. The doctrine is not a technicality. It goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a dispute. If it is successfully ventilated, the doctrine will deny the court entertaining the dispute jurisdiction to take any further steps in the matter with the consequence that the suit will be struck out for being res judicata. That will close the chapter on the dispute. If the doctrine has such end result, how can it be said that it is a mere technicality" If a constitutional petition is bad in law from the onset, nothing stops the court from dealing with it peremptorily and having it immediately disposed of. There is no legal requirement that such litigation must be heard and determined on merit.*

From our expose of the doctrine above, we are now able to formally answer the issues isolated for determination in this appeal earlier as follows: -

i) *The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to constitutional litigation just as in other civil litigation as it is a doctrine of general application with a rider, however, that it should be invoked in constitutional litigation in rarest and in the clearest of cases.*

ii) There is no legal requirement or factual basis for the submission that the doctrine must only be invoked and or ventilated through a formal application. It can be raised through pleadings as well as by way of preliminary objection.

iii) The ingredients of *res judicata* must be given a wider interpretation; the issue in dispute in the two cases must be the same or substantially the same as in the previous case, parties to the two suits should be the same or parties under whom they or any of them is claiming or litigating under the same title and lastly, the earlier claim must have been determined by a competent court.

29. Having endeavoured an elaborate discussion on the doctrine of *res judicata*, this Court will now apply the foregoing to the matter at hand.

30. The plea of *res judicata* was raised by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent herein, through the Replying Affidavit sworn by one No. 49170 SGT. Joseph Wafula on 15<sup>th</sup> October, 2020.

31. The ruling in the criminal revision as well as the proceedings in the criminal case are part of the record. I have carefully perused the same.

32. There is no doubt that a challenge to the denial to admit the Petitioner to bail was mounted to the Criminal Division of the High Court in the criminal revision. The matter was, therefore, dealt with by the same High Court save that it was in a different Division. There is only one High Court in Kenya. The Divisions of the High Court are, *inter alia*, for purposes of organizing the smooth running of the Court. Once a matter is fully heard and determined by one Division of the High Court, it cannot be relitigated before another Division of the High Court. Unfortunately, that is what the Petitioner is attempting to do in this matter.

33. The Criminal Division of the High Court was the competent Court to deal with the matter. The Court so dealt with the same. In the event the Petitioner was still aggrieved by the decision in the criminal revision, he had an option of preferring an appeal to the Court of Appeal, but not to seek similar prayers in a different Division of the High Court.

34. This Court, therefore, finds and hold that the doctrine of *res judicata* applies in all four corners in this matter. The issues of whether the Petitioner be released on bail was long settled and the same issue cannot be relitigated in the Petition before Court.

#### **Whether the Petition be dismissed:**

35. The Respondents were unanimous that since the issue of bail was *res judicata* then the Petition be dismissed.

36. A look at the Petition revealed that the same contained other allegations of infringement of rights. The Petitioner averred that he was injured during the arrest thereby subjected to cruelty, inhuman and degrading treatment. Accordingly, the Petitioner claimed that his rights under Articles 49 and 50 of the Constitution were variously infringed to the extent that he was injured during the arrest and that he was not informed of the reason for his arrest. He claimed for compensation.

37. I have gone through the evidence by all the parties on the issue of the alleged assault on the Petitioner. The Respondents vehemently rejected the allegation. The Petitioner produced some treatment notes in proof of the alleged injuries. The veracity of the documents was put to test by the Respondents.

38. The practice and procedure in constitutional Petitions is provided for under *The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013* (hereinafter referred to as '**the Mutunga Rules**').

39. Rule 20(1) of the Mutunga Rules is on the manner in which constitutional Petitions ought to be heard. Such Petitions may be heard by way of affidavits or written submissions or oral evidence. Rule 20(3) of the Mutunga Rules provide that a Court may upon application or on its own motion direct that the Petition or part thereof be heard by oral evidence. Rule 20(4) and (5) of the *Mutunga Rules* provide for the summoning and examination of witnesses.

40. The conduct of constitutional Petitions is also guided by various laws. For instance, the Evidence Act applies to matters generally relating to evidence. The Evidence Act is clear on its application to constitutional Petitions and affidavits in Section 2 thereof. The provision provides as follows: -

(1) This Act shall apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court other than a Kadhi's Court, but not to proceedings before an arbitrator.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any other Act or of any rules of Court, this Act shall apply to affidavits presented to any Court.

41. Sections 107(1), (2) and 109 of the Evidence Act are on the burden of proof. They state as follows:

107(1) Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.

(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

and

*109. Proof of particular fact*

*The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.*

42. The burden of proof on a Petitioner in a constitutional Petition was addressed by the Supreme Court in ***Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others vs. Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others [2014] eKLR*** as follows: -

*Although Article 22(1) of the Constitution gives every person the right to initiate proceedings claiming that a fundamental right or freedom has been denied, violated or infringed or threatened, a party invoking this Article has to show the rights said to be infringed, as well as the basis of his or her grievance. This principle emerges clearly from the High Court decision in Anarita Karimi Njeru vs. Republic, (1979) KLR 154: the necessity of a link between the aggrieved party, the provisions of the Constitution alleged to have been contravened, and the manifestation of contravention or infringement. Such principle plays a positive role, as a foundation of conviction and good faith, in engaging the constitutional process of dispute settlement.*

43. In determining whether the Petitioner sustained injuries at the time of his arrest and that the said injuries, if any, were inflicted by the Respondents, this Court will be called upon to interrogate the contents of the various documents and possibly examine the makers of those documents. However, that cannot be done in these proceedings since the hearing of the Petition proceeded by way of reliance on affidavit evidence.

44. There is, therefore, the need to accord the Petitioner the opportunity to present his claim on his arrest under Articles 49 and 50 of the Constitution. That can be done in two ways. The first way is to deal with the issues in the criminal case. The other way is to have a Petition on the alleged violation of the rights be heard by way of oral evidence.

45. This Court would have directed that the issue of the alleged violation of the Petitioner's rights during arrest be dealt with in these proceedings by way of oral evidence. As said, parties agreed and the Court directed that hearing be by way of reliance on affidavit evidence. Further, the Petition herein has been pending since 2019. As such, the litigation ought to come to an end.

46. This Court is alive to the position that even if the Petitioner is successful in proving infringement of his rights at the time of his arrest, that alone cannot be a bar to the hearing and determination of the criminal case. The reason is that there are adequate remedies thereto which remedies do not include termination of the criminal case.

47. On the basis of the foregoing and in order for the Petitioner to be accorded an opportunity to present his case aforesaid, this Court finds and hold that it is prudent that the issue of the alleged violation of the Petitioner's rights at arrest be dealt with in separate proceedings.

48. Having taken the above position and since the other claim has been decreed to be *res judicata*, this Court finds that there is no any other basis for sustaining the Petition herein.

49. The only available way out is for the proceedings herein to be terminated.

**Disposition:**

50. The determination of the above two issues squarely settles the Petition in this matter. As the Petitioner reserves his right to institute proceedings on the alleged infringement of his rights during his arrest, he does not stand to suffer any prejudice.

51. In the end, the Petition and the Notice of Motion dated 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019 are determined in the following terms: -

**(a) The Petition and the Notice of Motion dated 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019 be and are hereby struck out.**

**(b) Due to the age of the JKIA Law Courts Criminal Case 121 of 2019 *Republic versus Joyce Akinyi & 2 Others*, the trial Court shall take steps towards an expedited hearing and determination of the said case.**

**(c) In the event of currency of any orders staying the hearing of the criminal case, such orders shall stand discharged and accordingly set-aside.**

**(d) Each party shall bear its own costs.**

Orders accordingly.

**DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 10<sup>TH</sup> DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022.**

**A. C. MRIMA**

**JUDGE**

**Judgment virtually delivered in the presence of:**

**Mr. Abenga**, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner.

**Miss. Mutindi**, Learned Prosecution Counsel instructed by the Office of Public Prosecutions for the 1<sup>st</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> Respondents.

**Elizabeth Wanjohi** – Court Assistant.