Republic v National Cohesion and Integration Commission; Chama Cha Mawakili Limited (Exparte) (Judicial Review Application E057 of 2022) [2022] KEHC 10206 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (14 July 2022) (Judgment)
Neutral citation:
[2022] KEHC 10206 (KLR)
Republic of Kenya
Judicial Review Application E057 of 2022
AK Ndung'u, J
July 14, 2022
Between
Republic
Applicant
and
National Cohesion and Integration Commission
Respondent
and
Chama Cha Mawakili Limited
Exparte
Court faults the National Cohesion and Integration Commission for the unprocedural classification and ban of the terms “hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms.
The mandate of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to classify and ban hate terms/speech was an administrative action that was amenable to judicial review.
Constitutional Law – fundamental rights and freedoms – right to fair administrative action – administrators – the National Cohesion and Integration Commission as administrators- whether the National Cohesion and Integration Commission was an administrator within the meaning of the Fair Administrative Action Act - whether the mandate of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to classify and ban hate terms/speech was an administrative action that was amenable to judicial review - whether the National Cohesion and Integration Commission followed the proper procedure laid in its decision to ban and/or classify the terms “hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms - whether the decision of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to ban and/or classify the terms “hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms violated the petitioner’s right to fair administrative action – Constitution of Kenya, 2010 articles 33 and 47; National Cohesion and Integration Act, No.12 of 2008, section 26; Fair Administrative Action Act, , sections 2, 4 and 5.
Brief facts
The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (the respondent) was a body in charge of promoting national identity and values, mitigated ethno-political competition and ethnically motivated violence, as well as elimination of discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious basis and promoted national reconciliation and healing. Part of their mandate was classifying and banning terms that they considered to be hate speech. On April 11, 2022 the respondent classified the words “hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate speech and banned the words.The petitioner challenged the decision of the respondent in the instant petition to ban the aforementioned terms. The petitioner faulted the respondent for unilaterally classifying the words as hate speech and contended that the ban on the words was irrational, unreasonable, made in bad faith, ultra vires and a breach of its right to fair administrative action.
Issues
- Whether the mandate of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to classify and ban hate terms/speech was an administrative action that was amenable to judicial review.
- Whether the National Cohesion and Integration Commission followed the proper procedure laid in its decision to ban and/or classify the terms “hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms.
- Whether the decision of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to ban and/or classify the terms “hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms violated the petitioner’s right to fair administrative action.
Relevant provisions of the Law
Fair Administrative Action Act, Act No. 4 of 2015 Section 55. Administrative action affecting the public(1) In any case where any proposed administrative action is likely to materially and adversely affect the legal rights or interests of a group of persons or the general public, an administrator shall– (a) issue a public notice of the proposed administrative action inviting public views in that regard;(b) consider all views submitted in relation to the matter before taking the administrative action; (c) consider all relevant and materials facts; and(d) where the administrator proceeds to take the administrative action proposed in the notice– (i) give reasons for the decision of administrative action as taken;(ii) issue a public notice specifying the internal mechanism available to the persons directly or indirectly affected by his or her action to appeal; and (iii) specify the manner and period within the which such appeal shall be lodged.
Held
- Article 47 of the Constitution granted every person the right to administrative action that was expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 2 of the Fair Administrative Action Act (FAAA)defined an administrator as any person who took an administrative action or who made an administrative decision. The impugned action was an administrative action within the meaning of the FAAA as it affected the legal rights and interests of the applicant and other citizens who may be inclined to use the targeted words. The respondent was an administrator as defined in the FAAA in the context of the action taken.
- The applicant’s freedom of speech was affected by the decision of the respondent. The impugned action being an administrative action within the meaning of the FAAA brought it directly within the purview of the court’s jurisdiction conferred by section 9(1) of the FAAA. It was an action amenable to judicial review.
- Where an administrative action was likely to materially and adversely affect the legal rights or interests of a group of persons or the general public, section 5(1) of the FAAA safeguarded the rights of such a group of persons or the general public by requiring an administrator to issue a public notice of the proposed administrative action inviting public vies or considering any views submitted relating to the action. There was no evidence that the respondent issued the notice or considered all material facts. Though the respondent appeared to have given reasons for the administrative action, giving the reasons at the tail end of the impugned action in the absence of hearing the affected parties could not in all possibility sanitize the action. The respondent had not issued a public notice specifying the internal mechanism available to the persons directly or indirectly affected by the action to appeal and the manner and period within the which such appeal was to be lodged.
- The right to be heard was cardinal and could not be derogated. The respondent undertook a crucial and sensitive role in promotion of national cohesion in an environment of pronounced diversity. The statutory power donated to it, however, had to be exercised within the law and in strict observance of individual and collective rights enshrined in the Constitution and the law. However well-meaning the respondent could not get away with unilateral decisions that affected the citizenly without regard to their constitutional and legal rights topmost of which was the right to heard.
- Every administrator bestowed with statutory powers to make decisions or to take actions that adversely affected an individual or group of individuals was not to lose sight of the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the FAAA and to specifically accord such person(s) notice of intended action, hear their views, consider all relevant matters, give reasons for the decision taken and inform them of the right and manner of appeal. The respondent did not follow due process before taking the impugned action. The applicant’s rights enshrined in article 47 of the Constitution and operationalized through the FAAA were trampled upon.
Petition allowed.
Orders
- An order of certiorari was granted that quashed the respondent’s decision made on April 8, 2022 vide Hatelex: A lexicon of Hate Speech Terms in Kenya banning and/or classifying “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms.
- Each party was to bear its own costs.
Citations
Cases
- Municipal Council of Mombasa v Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd. (Civil Appeal 185 of 2001; [2002] KECA 8 (KLR)) — Explained
- Republic v Nairobi City County Ex parte Registered Trustees of Sir Ali Muslim Club (Judicial Review Application 46 of 2017; [2017] KEHC 2864 (KLR)) — Followed
- RICHARD NCHAPI LEIYAGU V INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES COMMISSION &2 OTHERS (Election Petition 4 of 2013; [2013] KEHC 3100 (KLR)) — Explained
- Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service ([1984] UKHL 9, [1985] AC 374, [1984] 3 WLR 1174, [1985] ICR 14, [1984] 3 All ER 935, [1985] IRLR 28) — Mentioned
- In Municipal Council of Mombasa vs. Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd Civil Appeal No. 185 of 2001
- Constitution of Kenya, 2010 — Article 33,47 — Interpreted
- Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 (Act No 4 of 2015) — Section 2, 4,5(1); 9(1) — Interpreted
- National Cohesion And Integration Act, 2012 (Act No 12 of 2008) — Section 25,26 — Interpreted
- Fordham, M., QC (2008), Judicial Review Handbook by Michael Fordham, 3rd Edn (Hart Publishing; pp 249- 25)
- Hogg, Q., Hailsham of Saint Marylebone (Ed) (1995), Halsbury’s Laws England (London: Butterworth 4th Edn Vol 44 (1))
Judgment
1.The ex parte applicant is before this court vide a Notice of Motion Application dated April 14, 2022 which is verified by a verifying affidavit sworn by Georgiadis Majimbo on April 11, 2022.The Application seeks the following orders:a)An order of certiorari be granted by this honourable court to bring into this court and quash the respondent’s decision made on April 8, 2022 vide Hatelex: A lexicon of Hate Speech Terms in Kenya banning and/or classifying “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms.b)Costs of and incidental to the application be in the cause.
2.The ex parte applicant’s case is that the respondent on April 8, 2022 made a decision to classify and/or ban words it considered as hate terms vide its Hatelex: A lexicon of Hate Speech Terms in Kenya. Some of the words classified as hate terms and/or banned by the respondent included “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui”.
3.The ex parte applicant contends that the decision contained in the Hatelex does not adhere to the principles set out in article 33 and 47 of the Constitution. The decision is said to be irrational as it is irrational for the respondent to unilaterally classify words or terms as hate speech and ban them without any justification. It was also contended that the timing of the classification/ban is calculated to confer undue advantage to some political formations in the upcoming elections.
4.The respondent’s decision is faulted for being irrational, unreasonable, made in bad faith and ultra vires. It is argued that before the respondent made a decision to ban or classify the said words as hate terms or speech, it ought to have accorded Kenyans or political aspirants who would be affected by the said decision a fair hearing. The respondent in making the impugned decision is said to have exceeded its authority as conferred to it under section 26 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act,2008.
5.On whether the grant of judicial review reliefs is no doubt exercise of discretion the ex parte applicant cited the Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edn Vol 1(1) and Council of Civil Service Unions versus Minister for the Civil Service (1985) A.C. 374,410.
6.The respondent in rebuttal filed grounds of opposition dated May 26, 2022 in which it was contended that the application as drawn and taken out offends the provisions of section 25 & 26 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act No 12 of 2008 and that it seeks to curtail the statutory duties of the respondent which is not the purpose of this court. Further that the application is based on contradictory allegations which borders on mere belief, suspicion and speculations and hence incapable of any Judicial Review determination and that JR is only concerned with the decision-making processes.
7.It is contended that the applicant has not proven irrationality, illegality, procedural impropriety, abuse of power, unfairness and/or ultra vires. It is trite law that he who alleges must prove. The respondent further contended that issuance of the order of certiorari is against public interest and this being an election period national cohesion and unity is an integral point.
Determination
8.I have considered the application, the supporting grounds, the grounds of opposition and learned submissions by counsel. Of determination is whether the applicant has established sufficient grounds for the grant of judicial review orders sought.
9.In a nutshell the ex parte applicant herein faults the respondent for classifying and/ or banning the terms “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate speech vide its Hatelex on April 8, 2022. It is contended that the said action contravenes the provisions of article 33 on Freedom of Expression and article 47 on Fair Administrative Action. The respondent is also said to have contravened the provisions of section 26 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act,2008 which outlines the powers of the Commission.
10.The respondent in disagreement with the said assertions contends that the ex parte applicant’s application as filed contravenes section 25 & 26 of the Act. The applicant is accused of wanting to curtail the statutory duties of the respondent herein.
11.The respondent before this court is a statutory body established under the National Cohesion and Integration Act No 12 of 2008 to promote national identity and values, mitigate ethno-political competition and ethnically motivated violence, eliminate discrimination on ethnic, racial and religious basis and promote national reconciliation and healing. The Commission was created by the National Cohesion and Integration Act,2008 following the 2007- 2008 post-election crisis during which several local radio stations are believed to have facilitated the spread of inciteful political rhetoric, often in vernacular.
12.The Commission’s object and functions are found under section 25 of the Act which states as follows;
13.The Commission’s power can be found under section 26 which also states as follows;
14.The commission exercising its mandate under the said provisions undertook a study to identify a lexicon employed by influential people to incite violence on one part of the population (some ethnic groups) against another (other ethnic groups). This study culminated into the said Hatelex which identifies the common stereotypes(words), translates the said words, identifies the target community of the said words and the persons who use the said words. The report also gives a meaning of the said common stereotypes.
15.The respondent in its report annexed to the ex parte applicant’s verifying affidavit dated April 11, 2022 describes the two terms that is “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui as follows;
| Common stereotypes | Translation | Target Community | User Community | Meaning |
| Watajua hawajui | They will know that they do not know | Political aspirants and supporters of the less dominantpolitical party in an area | Political aspirants and supporters ofthe dominant political party in an area | This statement is perceived that the opponents daring a party on an issue will be surprised by the vicious nature of responses they will meet in return. |
| Hatupangwingwiwi | No one can arrange us | Specific families & communities that have been in power for long particularly the Luo, andKikuyu. | Political aspirants from families/ communities that have not been at the center of power in the past. | This statement is used to underscore the fact that some families/ communities have been at the periphery of national leadership and influence for so long and they no longer want to remain out. |
16.According to the report by the respondent, the study identified terms and heavily coded messages that can be used to incite hatred and deliberately exclude other communities in various languages including English, Kiswahili, Sheng’, Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Non-Verbal gestures.
17.The respondent is faulted in these proceedings for being in breach of article 33 and 47 of the Constitution. The decision is said to be irrational, as, it is irrational for the respondent to unilaterally classify words or terms as hate speech and ban them without any justification. It was also contended that the timing of the classification/ban is calculated to confer undue advantage to some political formations in the upcoming elections.
18.The respondent’s decision is faulted for being irrational, unreasonable, made in bad faith and ultra vires. It is argued that before the Respondent made a decision to ban or classify the said words as hate terms or speech, it ought to have accorded Kenyans or political aspirants who would be affected by the said decision a fair hearing. The respondent in making the impugned decision is said to have exceeded its authority as conferred to it under section 26 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act,2008.
19.A good point to start from is to acknowledge the underpinning of the right to fair administrative action in the Constitution at article 47 thereof. The article provides;
20.Parliament enacted the Fair Administrative Action Act (hereinafter the FAAA) to give effect to the constitutional right to fair administrative action. It is opportune at this stage to consider the impugned action taken by the respondent with a view to making a determination whether the same is an administrative action within the meaning of the FAAA. Section 2 of the FAAA provides;The section defines an administrator as any person who takes an administrative action or who makes an administrative decision.
21.A cursory look at the impugned action readily reveals that the action is an administrative action within the meaning of the Act as it affects the legal rights and interests of the applicant and other citizens who may be inclined to use the targeted words. The respondent is an administrator as defined in the Act in the context of the action taken.
22.It merits a quick mention that the legal rights of the applicants that are affected are the constitutional guarantees to freedom of speech enshrined in article 33 of the Constitution. The article provides;
23.Notably, the said freedom is not absolute as section 33(2) provides as follows;
24.The impugned action being an administrative action within the meaning of the FAAA brings it directly within the purview of this court’s jurisdiction conferred by section 9(1) of the FAAA. It is therefore an action amenable to judicial review.
25.The The court’s role in its supervisory jurisdiction of public bodies was explained in Judicial Review Handbook by Michael Fordham (Third Edition) p.249- 256 as follows:
26.The scope of judicial review is well established in case law. In Municipal Council of Mombasa v Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd Civil Appeal No 185 of 2001 it was held that:
27.The respondent is faulted for unilaterally classifying the words “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate speech and the ban on the words is challenged on the basis of being irrational, unreasonable, made in bad faith and ultra vires. Where an administrative action is likely to materially and adversely affect the legal rights or interests of a group of persons or the general public, section 5(1) of the FAAA safeguards the rights of such a group of persons or the general public by providing as follows;5.Administrative action affecting the public(1)In any case where any proposed administrative action is likely to materially and adversely affect the legal rights or interests of a group of persons or the general public, an administrator shall–(a)issue a public notice of the proposed administrative action inviting public views in that regard;(b)consider all views submitted in relation to the matter before taking the administrative action;(c)consider all relevant and materials facts; and(d)where the administrator proceeds to take the administrative action proposed in the notice–(i)give reasons for the decision of administrative action as taken;(ii)issue a public notice specifying the internal mechanism available to the persons directly or indirectly affected by his or her action to appeal; and(iii)specify the manner and period within the which such appeal shall be lodged.
28.I have perused the record herein. There is no evidence that the respondent issued a public notice of the proposed administrative action inviting public views in that regard or considered any views submitted in relation to the matter before taking the administrative action. There is no evidence that the respondent considered all relevant and materials facts. Though the respondent appears to have given reasons for the administrative action, giving the reasons at the tail end of the impugned action in the absence of hearing the affected parties cannot in all possibility sanitize the action. Moreover, the respondent has not issued a public notice specifying the internal mechanism available to the persons directly or indirectly affected by the action to appeal and the manner and period within the which such appeal shall be lodged.
29.The right to be heard is cardinal and cannot be derogated. This court appreciates the crucial and sensitive role that the respondent undertakes in promotion of national cohesion in an environment of pronounced diversity. The statutory power donated to it, however, must be exercised within the law and in strict observance of individual and collective rights enshrined in the Constitution and our laws. However well meaning, the respondent cannot get away with unilateral decisions that affect the citizenly without regard to their constitutional and legal rights topmost of which is the right to heard. This was emphasized in the case of Leiyagu v IEBC & 2 others where the court stated;
30.Every administrator bestowed with statutory powers to make decisions or take actions that adversely affect an individual or group of individuals must not lose sight of the provisions of section 4 and 5 of the FAAA and to specifically accord such person or persons notice of intended action, hear his/her/their views, consider all relevant matters, give reasons for the decision taken and inform them of the right and manner of Appeal. I agree with the sentiments of Odunga J in Republic v Nairobi City County ex parte Registered Trustees of Sir Ali Muslim Club [2017] eKLR where he stated:
31.From the foregoing and for reasons above stated, am satisfied that the respondent did not follow due process in taking the impugned action. The applicant’s rights enshrined in article 47 and operationalised through the Fair Administrative Action Act were trampled upon. The application before court is meritable. I allow the same and make the following orders;1)An order of certiorari be, and is hereby granted, to bring into this court and quash the respondent’s decision made on April 8, 2022 vide Hatelex: A lexicon of Hate Speech Terms in Kenya banning and/or classifying “Hatupangwingwi” and “watajua hawajui” as hate terms.2)Each party to bear their own costs
DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 14TH DAY OF JULY 2022………………………A.K. NDUNGUJUDGE