IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA
AT NAKURU
MISC. CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 88 OF 2019
JOHN KAGUNDA KARIUKI....................................APPLICANT
VERSUS
REPUBLIC................................................................................STATE
RULING
1. John Kagunda Kariuki, the Applicant herein, was charged with the offence of defilement under the Sexual Offences Act. He was tried and convicted at the Nakuru Chief Magistrate’s Court. He was sentenced to a minimum sentence of twenty (20) years imprisonment under section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act.
2. The Applicant was dissatisfied with his conviction and sentence. He appealed to the High Court. His appeal was dismissed in its entirety. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.
3. The Applicant is now back in the High Court with a new application. He seeks for a review of his sentence. He claims that the High Court has jurisdiction to re-sentence him. He wishes to serve the remainder of his sentence in Probation rather than in Prison custody. He says that he is fully reformed in Prison and that he was the sole bread winner and his family is suffering immensely due to his absence.
4. It would appear that the Applicant has grounded his Application on the Muruatetu doctrine. This was the decision of the Supreme Court in Francis Karioko Muruatetu & Another v Republic [2017] Eklr. In the Muruatetu Case, the Supreme Court outlawed mandatory death penalty for murder as unconstitutional and struck down section 204 of the Penal Code to the extent that it prescribed mandatory death sentence upon conviction for murder.
5. The reasoning in Muruatetu Case respecting section 204 of the Penal Code (the penalty section for murder), has been extended by the Court of Appeal to the mandatory death penalty in robbery with violence cases and probably all other similar mandatory death sentences. That was in William Okungu Kittiny v R [2018] eKLR.
6. The reasoning in Muruatetu Case was also extended to sentences imposed by the Sexual Offences Act – and possibly all other statutes prescribing minimum sentences by the Court of appeal in a recent decision in Dismas Wafula Kilwake v R [2018] eKLR, the Court of Appeal sitting in Kisumu had the following to say about the mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in the Sexual Offences Act:
In principle, we are persuaded that there is no rational reason why the reasoning of the Supreme Court [in Francis Karioko Muruatetu & Another v. Republic, SC Pet. No. 16 of 2015], which holds that the mandatory death sentence is unconstitutional for depriving the courts discretion to impose an appropriate sentence depending on the circumstances of each case, should not apply to the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act, which do exactly the same thing.
Being so persuaded, we hold that the provisions of section 8 of the sexual Offences Act must be interpreted so as not to take away the discretion of the court in sentencing. Those provisions are indicative of the seriousness with which the Legislature and the society take the offence of defilement. In appropriate cases therefore, the court, freely exercising its discretion in sentencing, should be able to impose any of the sentences prescribed, if the circumstances of the case so demand. On the other hand, the court cannot be constrained by section 8 to impose the provided sentences if the circumstances do not demand it. The argument that mandatory sentences are justified because sometimes courts impose unreasonable or lenient sentences which do not deter commission of the particular offences is not convincing, granted the express right of appeal or revision available in the event of arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of discretion in sentencing.
The Sentencing Policy Guidelines require the court, in sentencing an offender to a non-custodial sentence to take into account both aggravating and mitigating factors. The aggravating factors include use of a weapon to frighten or injure the victim, use of violence, the number of victims involved in the offence, the physical and psychological effect of the offence on the victim, whether the offence was committed by an individual or a gang, and the previous convictions of the offender. Among the mitigating factors are provocation, offer of restitution, the age of the offender, the level of harm or damage inflicted, the role played by the offender in the commission of the offence and whether the offender is remorseful.
7. This progressive decisional law now requires Courts to pay attention to individual aspects of the case while sentencing even for convictions under the Sexual Offences Act which have prescribed minimum sentences. Where there are compelling reasons to depart from the prescribed minimum, which is treated as indicative of the sentence to be imposed, the Court can impose a different sentence.
8. However, unlike the decision in Muruatetu and other cases where the death penalty was imposed, the decision Dismas Wafula Kilwake does not operate retroactively. This was a decision given the ordinary common law mode which does not entitle all other people who could have benefitted from the new development in decisional law to approach the High Court afresh for review of the sentences imposed. Instead, the principles announced in the case will apply to future cases. In other words, persons whose appeals have already been heard by the High Court are not entitled to file fresh applications for re-sentencing in accordance with the new decisional law. To reach a different conclusion would lead to an ungovernable situation where all previously sentenced prisoners would seek review of their sentences.
9. To reiterate, only prisoners who had been sentenced to death pursuant to mandatory provisions of the law are entitled to new sentence hearings. For all others, they are entitled to urge the new decisional law in their appeals in a bid to get lower sentences and no more. They cannot bring new applications for re-sentencing.
10. In the present case, the Applicant’s appeal has already been heard by the High Court. He cannot return to the High Court for a review of the sentence imposed. He is at liberty to make an argument for reduced sentence at the Court of Appeal.
11. Consequently, I reach the conclusion that the Applicant cannot, in the circumstances of this case, benefit from the doctrine propounded in Muruatetu Case. I therefore dismiss his application for re-sentencing as unmeritorious.
12. Orders accordingly.
Dated and delivered in Nakuru this 17th day of July, 2019
.........................
JOEL NGUGI
JUDGE