Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 others Ex-Parte Kemax Trading Company Limited [2018] KEHC 3847 (KLR)

Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 others Ex-Parte Kemax Trading Company Limited [2018] KEHC 3847 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NO.  543 OF 2017

REPUBLIC..................................................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT                                                                                    

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD......................................1ST RESPONDENT

MINISTRY OF INTERRIOR AND COORDINATION                                               

OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT......................................2ND RESPONDENT

WOODWORLD MONGER.....................................................INTERESTED PARTY

   EXPARTE APPLICANT

KEMAX TRADING COMPANY LIMITED

JUDGMENT

1. By  a notice  of motion  dated 8th September, 2017, the  exparte  applicant Kemax Trading Company, a limited  liability company  duly incorporated in Kenya under the Companies Act sought  from this  court  the  following  orders:

1) An order of certiorari to remove and bring to this Honourable court for purposes of quashing the 1st  respondent’s decision dated 25th August  2017  dismissing  the  applicant’s request  for  review in Public Procurement Administrative Review Board No. 74 of 2017; Kemax  Trading Company Ltd vs Ministry of Interior and  Co-ordination  of  National Government;

2) An order of prohibition to prohibit the 2nd respondent  from  executing  contracts  with bidders awarded tenders  of item  numbers  53, 54, 64, 73, 77 and  103  or placing  orders for  purchase of papers  in respect of  the said  tender  items;

3) An order of mandamus compelling/directing the 2nd respondent to  award  the  exparte  applicant  the  tender in  respect of  tender item numbers  53,54,64,73,77 and  103.

4)  An order that costs of this application be borne by the respondents.

2. The application is predicated on the grounds on the face of the motion and supported by the statutory statement  and  verifying  affidavit sworn by Stephen Mburu on 30th August 2017   accompanying  the  chamber summons   for  leave.

3. The motion  which  was initially found to  have been  filed out  of the stipulated  period as  directed by  Mativo J  on 31st August  2017 to be filed  within  7 days  of  the order for  leave, was struck out  on 6th November  2017 for  being  filed out  of time. However, on application by the exparte applicant, this  court did on  21st November  2017  set aside  the order  of  6th November  2017 striking out the motion and  substituting  it with an  order enlarging time within which the main application  ought to  have been filed.

4. The first respondent the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board filed a replying affidavit sworn on 18th October 2017 by Henock K. Kirungu, its Secretary.

The Exparte Applicant’s Case

5. The exparte applicant’s  case is  that the 2nd respondent  Ministry  of Interior  and  Coordination  of  National Government   issued tender  No.  GP/4/2016-2018 for the supply and delivery of paper and boards for   Government Press, in November 2016.

6. The applicant claims that it participated in the tender and submitted bids for  various tender items, Nos 53,54,64, 73,77, 85, 103 and 109  but that it  was  awarded  the  tender in respect  of item  No.85  only.

7.  However, it  is alleged that the  2nd  respondent (Procuring Entity)  did not  notify  the  applicant  whether or not  the applicant’s bids  for  tender  items  53,54,64,73,77,103 and  109  were successful.

8. The  applicant claims that it only came  to know that it  was an unsuccessful  tenderer of  the  listed items on 1st August  2017 when it obtained  pleadings and sought to be enjoined  as an interested party in Public Procurement Administrative Review Board case  No. 68 of  2017  Somwet Ltd vs Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government.

9. It is averred that although the applicant was enjoined as an interested party  in the said  review matter, the Review Board  held that  it would  not make a  substantive  decision  in respect of  the applicant’s concerns as the  applicant  had  not  filed a  substantive  request  for review  before the Review Board.

10. Subsequently, the applicant filed a request  for  review  at the Review Board on  11th August  2017  being  Public Procurement  Administrative Review Board case No. 74/2017 upon  which the 2nd respondent filed a preliminary objection on 22nd August  2017  on the ground that the request  for review  was  filed out  of time in contravention of Section 167(1) of the Public Procurement  and  Asset Disposal Act,  2015.

11. It is alleged that the Review Board rendered  its  decision  on  25th August  2015   dismissing  the  applicant’s  request  for review. 

12. The applicant laments that the documents relied on by the 2nd respondent  Procuring Entity and  filed on 24th August 2017 were  irregularly filed as they were filed  without leave of the Review Board and that they were filed and served  after  the  applicant had filed and served  its submissions on the parties.

13. The exparte applicant  further claims that the Review  Board’s decision took  into account  extraneous, irrelevant  facts and  documents  not pleaded  in rendering   its decision hence  its decision  was unfair, biased, irrational  and  unreasonable.

14. Further, that the Review Board’s decision on framework contracts for the period between 2014 and 2016 and the corresponding Local Purchase Orders were relied on yet the same were not served  on the applicant to enable  the  applicant  make  representations and  or submissions  on the same before a  decision could be made.

15. The applicant further complains that the 1st respondent Review Board in arriving  at  its decision  made errors  of fact  by ignoring  the  prevailing market prices submitted by the applicant and relying on framework  contracts  for the periods  between  2014  and  2016   and the corresponding local purchase orders.

16. The 1st respondent was also faulted for  relying  on Section 54(2)  of the  2015  Public Procurement  and  Asset Disposal Act (the Act) and  disregarding  Articles  201(d) 232(1) (b)  and  227  (1)  of the Constitution  and  Section  3(e),(f) and  (h), 45(3) (c ), 46(4) (e)  of the Act.

17. It  was alleged that the  applicant and  the Kenyan tax payer  will suffer  substantial  loss if the application is not  heard forthwith  as the  2nd  respondent  will proceed  to execute  contracts  and  place  orders for  the  said papers  with bidders  who  submitted prices higher  than those  submitted by the applicant. 

18. Further,  that if  the decision of the  Review Board  is not  quashed, then the  2nd respondent  would proceed to place orders  for  purchase  of paper to the  detriment  of the  applicant and  the Kenyan tax payer  who will lose Kshs 93 million being the difference between  the prices  submitted by the applicant  in respect of  tender items 53,54,64,73,77 and 103 and those submitted by the bidders  who were awarded  the  tender  to supply  the  said items.

19. According to the exparte applicant, unless its application is allowed, the culture of imprudent use and or mismanagement of public finances will continue to go unchallenged to the detriment of Kenyans hence, these Judicial Review proceedings.

20. The applicant annexed to the sworn affidavit 10 documents  which include the tender documents, copy of the applicant’s  price  schedule; award  letter dated  30th June  2017; acceptance letter; request  for review; preliminary objection; supplementary   affidavit  and submissions; copy of  the document allegedly filed  by the 2nd  respondent on the same  day of hearing of the  request for review; response to request for review by the interested  party Wood World Paper Monger and copy of the Review Board’s  decision  made on  24th August  2017.

The Respondent’s Case

21. The 1st respondent Review Board filed a replying affidavit sworn by Henock K. Kirungu opposing the notice of motion.

22. According to the 1st respondent, the request for review filed by the applicant on 11th August 2017 was heard on  22nd  August  2017 and that the decision made on 25th August 2017  considered  all  the pleadings  before  the Review Board  as well as the  oral and  written submissions  of the parties  and  original tender documents, evaluation reports and other documents  supplied  to it by  the  2nd  respondent.

23. It was further contended in deposition by the 1st respondent that in determining  the  request for   review filed by the applicant, the Review Board framed only one issue for  determination  namely, whether or not the Procuring  Entity  breached the provisions of the Constitution and the Public Procurement  and  Asset Disposal Act by  awarding  tenders  for the disputed  items  to bidders who were not  the lowest   evaluated  bidders  in each category.

24. On the allegations that the Review Board allowed a document which the applicant  had not been served with  to be used  at the hearing, it was contended that the applicant never raised the issue of not being served at the hearing of the request for review and that therefore it cannot purport to raise that issue now. Further, that the 1st  respondent was obliged  to look at all  documents  filed by the  2nd respondent  as provided  for in  the  regulations.

25. It was contended that the applicant having failed to seek for an opportunity to submit on the document, it cannot raise objections now before the court.

26. The 1st respondent further  contended that  it  was  not bound  to consider the prevailing market prices as submitted by the applicant and that it noted  that it  was  not up to each  individual  bidder to carry out  its own  independent  market survey.  It  was contended that  the  applicant  had not  demonstrated  how the 1st   respondent’s decision is irrational or how it considered  extraneous  and  irrelevant  facts, or  existence  of any  ground to  warrant  the grant  of  judicial review  remedies  as sought.

27. It  was further  deposed further that  the  applicant  was  challenging the merits  of the decision of the  1st respondent  albeit  disguised  as a Judicial Review   application which ought to challenge the  procedure of  arriving  at a decision.

28. Accordingly, the 1st respondent urged the court to dismiss the notice of motion for lack of merit.

Parties’ Submissions

29. The parties’  advocates filed  written  submissions  which they  adopted as  canvassing  their respective  client’s  positions.

30. The exparte applicant’s counsel Messers  A.E. Kiprono  & Associates  filed their  submissions  dated   8th December  2017  on the same   date whereas the 1st respondent’s submissions dated 7th  December  2017 were filed on 8th December 2017 by Emmanuel Bitta,  Deputy Chief  State  Counsel  for the Attorney General, representing both respondents, the Review Board and the Procuring Entity.

31. It its submissions, the exparte  applicant maintained that this court  should take  into account, in making  its decision, the fact that this matter  arose from  a tender  which is also the  subject matter  in JR 515/2017  and  in JR  514/2017 (consolidated) hence the authorities  relied on in both  cases  are the same.

32. The exparte applicant maintained that the Review Board took into account extraneous, irrelevant facts and documents not pleaded, thereby rendering its decision unfair, biased, irrational and unreasonable.

33. The rest of the submissions reiterate the grounds in support of the application as reproduced herein above.

34. On the applicable principles  and law, reliance  was  placed on  the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 ALL  ER 935 where the court set out  the  three principles  upon which  administrative  action is  subject to  control by judicial  review namely:-illegality, irrationality and  procedural  impropriety.

35. The applicant’s counsel submitted that  the  Review Board  erred in law by failing to grant the applicant an opportunity to make  representations or submissions on the framework contract  prices for the periods 2014-2016 and corresponding local purchase orders (LPOs) , which documents were allegedly not part of the pleadings filed  by the  Procuring Entity  at the Review Board, yet the  2nd respondent makes  no reference  to framework  contract  prices for  the said  period  or  local purchase orders.

36. It  was  therefore  submitted that the Review Board  committed an illegality  in the process by arriving  at findings that  were not  pleaded  by parties and  in relying  on documents  that  were not  filed before the Review Board to enable the applicant make representation on the same hence the applicant was condemned  unheard  contrary to Section 7(2) (a) (v)  of the Fair Administrative Action Act.  Reliance was placed on the case of Pashito Holdings Ltd & Another v  Paul Ndungu & Others where it was emphasized  that in the performance of any judicial  or quasi-judicial function, the decision  makers  must observe the principles of natural justice otherwise the decision will be  declared  to be no decision. Further reliance  was placed on  the case of  Suchan  Investment  Ltd  vs Ministry of National  Heritage & Culture  & 3 Others  where the court emphasized the importance of adherence to the principles  of natural justice  which are  now anchored  in the  Constitution.

37. The applicant further submitted that its rights under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution on fair hearing were violated.  It was also submitted that the Review Board failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Public Procurement   and Asset Disposal Act, thereby acting illegally and unfairly.  Reliance was placed on the decision in Pastoli vs Kabale District  Local  Government  Council & Others  [2008] 2 EA  300 where the court opined that procedural impropriety  is when  the decision maker fails to act fairly in the process of  taking a decision  or for non-observance  of the rules  of natural  justice or  failure to act with  procedural  fairness toward  one to  be affected by the decision; or  failure to  comply  with  procedural Rules expressly laid down  in a statute  or legislative  instrument  by which such authority exercises jurisdiction to make a decision.

38. It was further submitted that the Review Board based its decision solely on previous framework contracts and local purchase orders for the years 2014-2016 and indicative market prices which did not form part of the response by the procuring entity and on which the applicant was never accorded an opportunity to make representation or submissions on the same.

39. It was also submitted that the basis of the letters of award of the tender is the “lowest evaluated bidder” and not the indicative prices, prevailing market  prices  or previous  framework contracts.

40. On the argument that the Review Board acted on irrelevant considerations, reliance was placed on Zachariah Wagunza & Another vs Office of the Registrar, Academic Kenyatta University & 2 Others [2013] e KLR where the court held that where a body takes account of irrelevant considerations, any decision arrived at becomes unlawful.

41. Relying on Republic vs  Public Procurement Administrative Review Board exparte  KEMSA, Crown Agents, Deutsche Gesellschaft  Fur Technishe Zusammenarbelt & John Snow  Inc [2010] e KLR it was submitted that the respondent’s dealing with issues that  were not  pleaded  before it reached a wrong conclusion  and thus  exceeded  its mandate. Further reliance was placed on Republic vs Kenya Revenue Authority exparte Aberdare Freight Services Ltd Miscellaneous Application No. 946/2004 where it was  held  that new issues  raised at  the  hearing amounted to an ambush and that  failure to afford a  party an opportunity to be heard  amounts to an error on the face of the  record requiring  correction by way of certiorari.

42. The applicant also relied on other decisions in Machaja v Khutwalo [1983] KLR 553; Onyango Oloo vs Attorney General [1986-1989] EA 456; Kanda vs Government of Federation of Malaysia [1962] A.C 322 and submitted that the 1st respondent’s consideration of matters that were not properly raised before it was against the exparte applicant’s legitimate expectation of procedural fairness and that violated the duty to act fairly.

43. It was therefore submitted that the Review Board’s findings that prices submitted by the applicant were far less than the prices  which  were  prevailing  three years  earlier on was ultra vires.

44. On the allegation of errors of fact, it was submitted that the Review Board  subordinated  the requirement   that  a successful tenderer  be the  lowest bidder  with the highest  combined score  per item to the  guiding  requirement  that the prevailing  market  prices  will be used to  determine  the  responsiveness, contrary to Clause 2: 27 /2:24:4 of the tender  documents.

45. Further submission was that even if the prevailing market prices were to be taken into account, the Review Board made an error of fact by purporting to equate indicative market prices and framework contracted prices  for the  period between  2014 to 2016  to the prevailing  market prices hence  the Review Board introduced  a criteria  which  was not set out in the tender  document.  Reliance was placed on Republic vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 3 Others Exparte  Olive  Telecommunication PVT Ltd [2014]e KLR where the court found that the Review Board’s introduction of the  definition  not contained  in the tender document amounted to an alteration  of the bid document. A similar holding was imported in JGH Marine A/S Western Marine Services Ltd CNPC Northeast Refinery & Chemical Engineering Company Ltd/ Pride Enterprises vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 Others [2015] e KLR.

46. It  was further  submitted that the  Review Board  further  made an  error of  fact by  assuming that  prices  prevailing  in 2014-2016  would be  the same   as market  prices  in  2017.  It was  submitted that  the  Review Board’s  finding that the  “applicant  would not  be able  to supply  the  same  goods  currently  at prices  which are  far lesser  than prices  which were  prevailing  three years ago” is also  an error of fact  because  the  Review Board  ignored  the  prevailing market  prices that  had been  presented  before it.

47. It was further submitted that the Review Board erred in fact  in  holding that “some  bidders  understated  the  prices with  the  prospect  of seeking possible  variation  once they  secure  an award”, yet  no  evidence  was  tendered to support  the holding  and that the  price for  item  no. 109  being Kshs 2050   by the successful  bidder  was much lower  than the  award  price  in  2014/2016   of kshs  3,500.  It was submitted that the rider that the market prices would be  used to  determine  the  responsiveness was meant  to guard  against  exorbitant  prices and not to vary  the award  criteria that  the  successful tenderer  to be the one  with the  lowest  evaluated price per  item.

48. according to the applicant, the Review Boar made a further  error  of fact by holding that the  “applicant  deliberately offered  low prices  so as to  be awarded  the tenders  in the hope of a future  price  variation.”

49. In the view of the applicant, the above conclusion was not based on facts because the Clauses 3.7 3.13 and 3:17 of the General Conditions of contract protected the Procuring Entity against what the Review Board termed bidders bidding  low prices  hence no tenderer would risk losing 5% of the tender  sum if it  knew that it would not be  in a position  to  supply  at the bid prices.

50. On errors of law, it  was submitted that the Review Board made   an error  when it  relied on  Section  54(2)  of the Public  Procurement  and  Asset Disposal Act and  disregarding Articles  201(d), 232(1) (b) and  227 (1)  of the Constitution and  Sections 3(e), (f) and (h); 45(3) (c), 46(4) (e)  of the  Public  Procurement   and  Asset Disposal Act.

51. It  was submitted that  whereas Section 54(2) of the  PPAD Act permits  a Public Entity to procure goods and services with known  market prices  at the prevailing market prices, the  said provision cannot override  the express  provisions of the Constitution  and in particular, where  the  Procuring  Entity  could not  establish the prevailing  market prices. Further, that in any case, the  above Section does not  prohibit  a public entity  from procuring goods  and  services at  prices that  are below  the prevailing  market prices  but is  intended to  guard  procuring  entities  against exorbitant  prices hence the Review Board  erred in  subordinating  constitutional provisions  cited to  provisions of the statute, as a result of which the prices  increased  by 93,400,000 which is a loss  to the public.  Relying  on the case of  Public Procurement Administrative Review Board and  Kenya Revenue Authority Miscellaneous Application  540/2008  where it  was held  that  Judicial Review  orders are  available   where  the Review Board  committed an  error  of law apparent  on the face of its decision, it was submitted that the Review Board cannot disregard  Mandatory provisions of the Act otherwise that would amount to a fundamental misdirection  or failure  to address  the  applicable  law or a  fundamental  error  of law  which renders the decision reached void of legality and therefore  void.

52. Further reliance was placed on the case of Alghurair Printing and Publishing  LLC  vs  Coalition  for Reform   and  Democracy  & 2 Others [2017] e KLR; Republic  vs  IEBC  & Another  exparte NASA  K & 6 Others[2017] e KLR  and  a submission  made that  by  ignoring  express  provisions  of the  Constitution  on  Public Procurement, the Review Board’s  decision must be  quashed.

53. On irrationality, the case of Council  of  Civil Service Unions vs Minister for Civil Service [1984] 3 ALL ER  935 was relied  on, in the  definition of what  irrationality  is all about  and the applicant submitted that it was grossly unreasonable and irrational for the Review Board to introduce extraneous  evaluation  requirements  outside  the Act  without  expressly  and clearly faulting the tender document itself.  It  was  therefore  submitted that in  EA Railways  Corporation vs  Antony Sefu, Dar HCC  19/1971 [1973] EA 327, the court  observed that  it is empowered  to look into  the  question whether  a tribunal  has stepped outside  its  field  of operation and it may  declare  a tribunal’s  decision a nullity  if a tribunal  did  not adhere  to the procedure  laid  down by a statute  in arriving   at  its decision.

54. In this case, it was submitted  that by upholding  an award  which was contrary to the criteria set out in the tender  document, which  all bidders  had relied on, the Review  Board  abdicated its responsibilities of ensuring that the procuring entities  adopted  procedures  that  promote  competition  in the process; ensures that competitors  are treated  fairly; promote competition  in the process; ensures that competitors are treated fairly; promote integrity and fairness and increase public  confidence  in procurement procedures.

55. In the instant case, it  was  submitted that the successful  bidders’  quotations for the disputed  tender items were much  higher than  the applicant’s  quotations  for the same  items  which is  a loss for the Kenyan tax payer.

56. on public  interest, it  was  submitted  that the Kenyan  tax payer  stands  to lose kshs 93,400,000 being the differences between the  prices  submitted by  the applicant   and those  submitted by  the  bidders  who were awarded the tender which is in violation of principles of public procurement  espoused  in  Article  227 (1)  and  232(1)  (d) of the Constitution on efficient, effective and  economic  use of  public  resources and  Article  201(d) on management  of public finances  and  which emphasizes  the prudent  and  responsible  use of public  money. 

57. Further submission was that  in awarding tenders for items  53,54,64,73,77 and  103  to the bidders  with the highest  prices, the  Review Board  violated  the  constitutional principles  set out  above.  Further reliance  was placed on Republic vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another exparte Selex  Sistemi Integrati Nairobi HCMA 1260/2007  on the importance of public   interest concerns  in the enactment of the Public  Procurement  and  Asset Disposal Act(repealed).

58. It  was therefore submitted that failure to observe the evaluation  criteria  set out in the  tender  document; the principles  set out  in Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act; and the  Constitution on the principle  of value  for money  when dealing with  public  funds, the Review Board  turned  a blind  eye on the acts  of the  2nd respondent  hence this  motion should  be allowed  with costs.

59. The  1st respondent’s  submissions   filed on  8th December 2017  adopt the  replying  affidavit  sworn by  Heneck K. Kirungu  and  submits  on:

a) Jurisdiction;

b) Procedural impropriety

c)  Merits  review

60. On jurisdiction, it was submitted by the Respondent that this court has no  jurisdiction to direct or issue mandamus  to compel the  2nd  respondent  to award  the  applicant  the tender  in respect  of the disputed items  as prayed  because  the award  was the  decision  made  by the  procuring entity.  Further, that Section 11 of the Fair Administrative Action Act contemplates remittance of the matter back to the Review Board for reconsideration.

61. Relying on the case of Judith Onyango  Elizabeth  Oyugi  v IEBC & 3 Others [2017] e KLR, it was submitted that the Court of Appeal  was clear that past decisions must be read with the developments following enactment of Article 47 of the Constitution and  Sections 7 & 11  of the Fair Administrative Action Act  in mind; which  the courts  have interpreted  with an  expanded scope of Judicial Review to include a limited  consideration of the merit  of the decision, as was equally  observed by the Court of Appeal in Suchan Investments Ltd vs  Ministry  of National Heritage  & Culture & 3 Others [2016] e KLR where the  new paradigm was explained.

62. However, it was submitted that the Court of Appeal still  emphasized  in Rento Company  EA Ltd  Lantech Africa Ltd, Toshiba Corporation Consortium v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board &  Another [2017] e KLR  that from the language of Sections 4 to 6 of the Fair Administrative  Action Act, the remedy of  Judicial Review must be concerned  more with the  decision  making  process and that  remains  a critical  requirement   in Judicial Review  applications.

63. Further, that the Court of Appeal in the above Rento Company case stated that  the court ought not to  substitute its opinion for that of the public body constituted by law to decide  the  matter in question; and that  the  court will  interfere  with the decision of a public body if it is outside  the band of reasonableness as provided for in Section 7(2) of  the Fair  Administrative Action Act.

64. On procedural  impropriety, it  was submitted that the  Review Board observed procedural propriety and that the exparte  applicant was accorded  a fair hearing  as set out  in the affidavit of Henock Kirungu and  that the record  of proceedings  and decision  of the  1st respondent  bear  out this, in that  the issue  of price of paper was in issue  before  the 1st  respondent Review Board.

65. Further submission by the 1st respondent was that the applicant  was  represented before the Review Board  when the  2nd respondent applied to expunge the documents it had annexed  to the  preliminary objection and for it  to file a  new document;  and that the  applicant’s  counsel never raised any issue of the  2nd respondent’s  documents being  irregular  before the  Review Board  hence it  cannot  raise  such issue  in these proceedings. Reliance was placed on the case of Union Insurance Company of Kenya Ltd vs Ramzan Abdul Dhanji (Application No.  Nairobi  179/1998  where the  Court of Appeal  made it clear  that where  parties  are given  a reasonable  opportunity  of being  heard and  once that  opportunity is given  and  not utilized , then  the only  point on  which the  party  not utilizing  the  opportunity  can be  heard is  why he  did not utilize  it.

66. On the merits review, it was  submitted  that essentially, the applicant  is seeking for  review of  the  correctness  of the Review Board’s  decision to uphold  the  Procuring  Entity’s  decision hence it is seeking out this court to substitute  its decision  with that of the  1st  respondent  Review  Board. It  was  submitted that  the  facts  and  circumstances  of this case do not  permit  for  a merits  review  of the decision of the  1st respondent. Reliance  was  placed on Republic vs  Permanent Secretary  Ministry of Mining Exparte Airbus Helicopters South Africa (PTY) Ltd  [2017] e KLR on the special  jurisdiction  exercised by Judicial Review Courts which is not an appeal  or ordinary  adversarial  litigation  between  private parties.

67. Further, it was submitted that Judicial Review is a constitutional supervision  of public authorities involving a challenge to the legal and  procedural  validity  of the decision  and that it  does not  allow the  court to  examine  the  evidence  with a view of forming its own  view  about the  substantial  merits  of the case. Reliance   was placed  on  Republic  vs Permanent  Secretary  Ministry of Mining  exparte  Airbus  Helicopters  Southern  Africa (PTY) Ltd  [2017] e KLR.

68. Further reliance  was placed on Mohamed Omar  Bayor  v Commissioner of Investigation and Enforcement  & Another  [2015] e KLR where the learned judge cautioned against  usurpation of power; and  reemphasized  that Judicial Review  is concerned, not  with the decision, but  with the decision  making process.

69. It was submitted that the Review Board correctly  considered provisions  of  Section  80 of the Public Procurement  and  Asset Disposal  Act, 2015  which sets out  the requirements  for the tender evaluation  committees  to take  into consideration when evaluating tender.

70. It was further submitted that the 1st respondent  correctly  appreciated that  Section  54(2)  of the  PPAD Act directs  in mandatory terms  that standard  goods, services  and  works with  known market prices shall  be procured  at prevailing  market prices, which, according to the 1st respondent, the 2nd   respondent correctly included in its tender document a provision  which made  any award  of any  item  of the tender  subject  to prevailing  market  price.

71. It  was submitted, finally, that since all the other  prayers  sought are  predicated  on the issuance  of an order  of certiorari, which is not merited, the entire  application should  be dismissed  with costs to the respondents.

DETERMINATION

72. Before determining the merits of this matter, I observe that  upon leave  being granted by Honourable Mativo J  on  31st  August  2017 to the  applicant  to apply for  judicial review  orders, there  was  and is no order  of this court in this matter staying  the execution of contracts, placement of purchase  orders in respect  of tender items numbers  53,54,64,73,77 and  103 by the second respondent pending the hearing and determination of  these Judicial Review proceedings.

73. What the court notes is that  prayer No. 5  of the chamber summons  for leave  was clear  that the  applicant  also sought for an  order that the  leave so granted  do operate  as stay of execution  of contracts  and  or placement   of orders in  respect of the disputed  tender items.  However, no such order of stay was granted and neither did the exparte applicant even pursue the issue of stay of execution of contracts in respect of the disputed tender items.  It follows  that as this court proceeds  to determine  the  merits  and  or demerits  of the motion herein, it  has to bear in mind the above  circumstances  of this matter  which is  closely related to JR  514 and  515 of  2017.

74. Public procurement is a very important process in the public sector.  The process of procurement and disposal of public goods and services in Kenya is governed by not only statutory provisions but also constitutional provisions.  Article 227 of the Constitution provides that:

“When  a state  organ or any  other public  entity contracts  for  goods  or services, it shall do so  in accordance  with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and  cost effective.”

75. To achieve  the above  stated  constitutional  objective of public  procurement and disposal of public  goods  and  or services, Parliament reenacted  the Public Procurement  and Asset Disposal  Act, 2016   which Act  is intended  to, among  others, maximize  economy and efficiency as well as  to increase public confidence   in those procedures.  It is also intended to increase transparency and accountability and fairness, which are core values and principles of good governance espoused in Article 10 of the Constitution.  It  is for that  reason that   the  courts, in public  procurement  matters, must  look into each and  every  case  and  its circumstances  and  balance  the public interest with  that of a  dissatisfied  applicant. (See Republic vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another  Exparte  Selex  Sistemi, Integrati  [2008] KLR 728.

76. The court must, therefore, in determining any issue raised in the proceedings of this nature, bear in mind the above settled   principles.

77. Therefore, taking  into account all the  pleadings   responses, submissions, constitutional and statutory provisions and  case law cited by both participating parties in these proceedings, this court  is of the  view  that the following key issues emerge  for determination, together  with ancillary  questions  that may arise and which  the court will endeavor  to answer, to the best  of its ability:

1) Whether  the application  herein challenges   the merits  of the  decision  of the Review Board  made  25th August 2017 it  attacks the process by which that  decision was  arrived  at;

2) and therefore  whether this court can, in the  exercise  of  its Judicial Review  jurisdiction  entertain  a merit  review of the impugned  decision.

3) Whether the exparte applicant’s right to be heard on the  documents  filed on  the  date of  hearing  of the application for  review  was violated  by  the Review  Board.

4) Whether the  1st respondent  exceeded its jurisdiction, acted  ultra vires or took into account extraneous, irrelevant matters/facts not pleaded/documents  in arriving  at the  decision which is impugned  herein as being unfair, biased, irrational and  unreasonable.

5) Whether  the  1st respondent  made  errors  of fact  and  law in arriving  at  the decision that it did.

6) What orders should the court make?

78. On  the first  and second issues of whether  the  application herein  challenges  the merits  of the decision  of the Review Board  and  therefore whether  this court has jurisdiction to entertain merit review  of the impugned  decision, it is important, first and  foremost, to appreciate  the law  regarding  Judicial Review  matters.

79. First and foremost is that Judicial Review is no longer confined to the old traditional targeted  prerogative  orders and  grounds of  illegality, irrationality  and  procedural  impropriety.  This was recognized even well before the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution in Kenya.  See Republic vs Panel on Take over and Mergers Exparte Detafin [1987] QB 815.

80. In other  words, the grounds  upon which  judicial review  jurisdiction  is predicated  are incapable  of  exhaustive  listing.( see Nyamu J in  Republic vs  The Commissioner  of Lands  exparte Lake Flowers Ltd Nairobi HC Miscellaneous  Application  1238/1998 wherein  the Learned Nyamu ( as he then  was)  stated:

“Availability  of  other remedies   is no  bar to  the granting  of the Judicial  review  relief  but can  however  be an important  factor in exercising the discretion  whether  or not  to grant   relief……

The  courts must  resist  the  temptation  to try and  contain  Judicial Review in a straight  jacket….Although Judicial Review  has been bequeathed to us  with  defined  interventions namely, illegality, irrationality and  impropriety of  procedure  the intervention has been extended using the principle of proportionality……

The court will be called upon to intervene in situations  where authorities  and  persons  act in bad faith, abuse of  power, fail to  take into account relevant considerations in the decision  making  or take  into account  irrelevant   considerations or   act contrary to  legitimate  expectations….Even on the  important  principle   of standing for  the purpose  of  judicial review  the  courts must  resist  being  rigidly chaired  to the past  defined  situations of standing and look at the nature of the matter before  them……Judicial Review  is a tool of Justice, which can be made  to serve the  needs  of a growing  society on a case to case basis….The court envisions  a future growth  of Judicial Review  in the human rights  arena where it is  becoming  crystal  clear  that human rights will involve  and  grow with the society.”

81. Earlier on in the  case of Bahaji  Holdings  Ltd  vs  Abdo  Mohammed  Bahaji & Company Ltd & Another  Civil Application  No.  Nairobi 97/98, the Court of Appeal made it clear that  the  limits  of Judicial  Review continue expanding  so as to  meet the  changing  conditions  and  demands  affecting  administrative  decisions.  Similarly in Re National Insurance  Company Act  and  COTU (K) Nairobi HC MA 1747/2004  Nyamu J  ( as he then was ) observed that while it is true that so far the  jurisdiction  of  a Judicial Review  court has been  principally based on the “3 I s” namely Illegality, Irrationality and  Impropriety  of procedure, categories  of intervention  by the court  are likely to be  expanded  in future  on a case  to case basis.

82. The  2010 Constitution clearly espouses  Judicial Review  as a constitutional remedy, with a basis  in the court’s  exercise of  supervisory jurisdiction over tribunals, bodies or authorities  exercising  judicial or quasi –judicial  authority  ( Article  165(6)  of the Constitution).

83. This power, as vested is to ensure that subordinate courts, tribunals, bodies, persons or authorities exercise their functions within the boundaries of the law.

84. Judicial Review is specifically listed in Article 23(3) of the  Constitution as one of the remedies  that  a court  may grant  in  constitutional petitions where it is alleged  that  there is violation or threatened  violation  of rights  or fundamental  freedoms.  Article 47 of the Constitution espouses the right to fair administrative action. To implement this right, Parliament  enacted  the Fair  Administrative Action  Act, 2015 which sets  out circumstances  under which  a court  will  interfere with an administrative action, and   the  specific remedies  or reliefs  that the court may make including judicial review orders of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, injunctions, directions, declarations  among other  reliefs.

85. The Court of Appeal in Suchan  Investment Ltd  vs Ministry  of National  Heritage  & Culture  & 3 Others (supra) Koome’ Sichale & Otieno Odek JJA made it clear that even if  undertaken  pursuant  to the  grounds in Section 7(2)  of  the Fair Administrative  Action Act, 2015, the  reviewing  court  has no mandate to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator. The Court of Appeal  further stated that from the language of Sections  4 and  6  of the Fair Administrative Action Act, it is clear that  in addition  to this  new thinking, the traditional  rule that  the  remedy of judicial review  must be  concerned  more with the decision making process remains a critical  requirement  in judicial review  applications.  This is  because the  purpose  of the remedy of  judicial review  is to ensure that  the individual  is given  fair  treatment   by the authority   to which he  has been  subjected.  In doing  so, it must  be remembered  that the court  ought not to substitute  its opinion for that  the public body  constituted by law to decide the matter in question (see  Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority  exparte Yaya  Towers  Ltd [2008] e KLR.

86. It is now clear that albeit  judicial  review  is a constitutional  supervision  of public bodies  involving  a legal and  procedural validity of  the  impugned  decision, it does not  permit  the court to examine  the  evidence  with a view  to forming  its own  view about the  substantial  merits of  the case.  This is because  a court exercising judicial review jurisdiction  does not  exercise appellate  jurisdiction hence  it cannot  form its  own preferred view  of the  evidence-see  Reid vs Secretary of State  for  Scotland[1999] 2  AC 512).

87. Accordingly, this court would have no power to entertain a merits review of the decision of the Review Board.  The 1st  respondent  has maintained  that what  the exparte applicant  is seeking  before this court  is a merits review  of the decision  of the Review Board.  The applicant has denied this contention.

88. However, examining the grounds upon which the applicant relies which grounds include:

Whether the Review Board  made an error of fact  by subordinating  the  requirement  that the  successful  tenderer be  the  lowest bidder with the highest score per item to the guiding  requirement  that the prevailing  market  prices  will be  used to  determine  the  responsiveness  and that even if  the  prevailing  market  prices  were to be  taken into  consideration; that the Review Board made an  error of  fact by  purporting to equate  indicative   market prices  and  framework contract  prices for  the periods   between  2014   to 2016 to the prevailing  market prices; that the Review Board also made errors of fact by making an  assumption that prices prevailing  in the years 2014-2016  would be  the  same as the market prices in the year  2017; that  the  Review Board  ignored the prevailing  marketing  prices that had been  presented  before the Review Board   by the applicant; that  the  Review Board  also made  an error  of fact in holding  at page 233 of the chamber summons that some bidders  understated  the prices  with the  prospect  of seeking  a possible variation  once they  secure  an award”

Yet:

a) No evidence  was presented  before  he  Review Board  to support the  same; and

b) The price  of kshs  2050 submitted by the successful  bidder for item No. 109 is much lower than the award, price  in  2014/2016   of kshs  3500.

89. All the above  detailed  and  alleged  errors  of fact  on the part of  the  Review Board  invite this court  to examine  the  totality of the  evidence  presented  before  the  Review Board  and  therefore to review  the merits of the decision  of the Review Board  and  not the process by which  the impugned  decision  was  arrived at.

90. To do so, honestly speaking, this court will be exercising appellate jurisdiction to arriving at its own independent decision as stipulated in Section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, and not exercising Judicial Review jurisdiction over the Review Board.

91. Equally,  from the pleadings and detailed submissions filed by the exparte applicant and which I have endeavoured to reproduce in this judgment, it is apparent that the exparte applicant attacked the merits of the impugned  decision by setting  out instances  where it  considers the  Review Board  committed errors of law including  claims that  the Review Board  made an  error of law  by subordinating  the provisions of the Constitution to that of the Statute, in particular, Section 201(d) 232(1)(b) and 227(1) of the Constitution, leading  to increase  in prices in excess of kshs  93,400,000.[emphasis added].

92. Whereas an error of law in itself would be a ground for judicial review of administrative action, what the applicant wished this court to do with the above submission is to  call upon the court  to determine  by way of a submission, whether  Section 54(2) of the Act  is inconsistent  with Articles 201 and  277 of the Constitution, an issue  that  was   never raised  before the Review Board.  And albeit  a point of  law can be  raised at any  stage in  the  proceedings, I find  that the applicant has focused  on the merits of the decision  of the Review Board  and not the process of decision  making by the Review Board.

93. Albeit the applicant bitterly complained that the  Procuring Entity awarded a tender to the highest bidder thereby occasioning the public loses in that over 93,000,000 was  to be paid over and above what the applicant would have paid for the items complained of, this court’s view is that whether or not the Review Board was wrong or right on the comparisons  made can  only be  dealt  with by the Appellate Court  as  that  was  an issue  raised  by Procuring Entity  and the Review Board  only made an inference  of the effect  of deflating  of prices. The issue complained of was a merits review and not of procedural impropriety.

94. To review  the merits of  the Review Board’s  decision  will be  to usurp powers of the appellate court and therefore to substitute the decision of the Review Board with the court’s own decision.

95. On the third  issue of  whether  the applicant  was denied  the right to be heard  on the documents filed  on the date of hearing  of the request  for review,  the  applicant  submitted at  length claiming that the  procuring entity  was allowed to  file and rely  on a document   which  was  filed on the  hearing date and  that the applicant  was not  accorded  an opportunity  to challenge  the  said  document  hence its right  to be heard  was violated.

96. On the  part of the  1st respondent, it  was  contended that the  procuring entity  applied for leave to have  its documents  filed  annexed  to its preliminary objection  expunged  and for it to file a  new document  and that the exparte applicant’s  counsel never raised the issue of the Procuring Entity’s documents  being irregular  before the 1st  respondent  Review Board  and that it  cannot therefore  purport to raise it  in these proceedings.

97. In addition, it was contended by the 1st respondent that  the  exparte  applicant  cannot  claim that  it never had  sufficient  time to  prepare  and make  representations and  or submissions on that document when it  did not  raise such issue  before the 1st respondent.

98. My finding  is that the exparte  applicant has not demonstrated before this court that it was denied an opportunity  to be  heard to challenge  the document  which was  filed  by the procuring entity in the place  of the expunged  documents.  I have perused the record and nowhere did the exparte applicant challenge the filing or reliance on the filed document by the procuring entity.  Neither did it urge the Review Board to ignore the said document.

99. Accordingly I find that the exparte  applicant’s complaint  which is  belated  has no  factual  or legal  basis  since the  applicant was served with the impugned document and had the opportunity  to make oral  submissions  through its  counsel at the  hearing of the  request  for review.  The applicant did not seek any additional time allocation to prepare itself. It never objected to any document being filed and which document was served upon its counsel on record.  Having sat back and left it to the determination by the Review Board, the applicant cannot raise such an issue by way of Judicial Review.

100. In the end, I find that the applicant’s complaint that it was denied an opportunity  to be heard  on the document  filed by the  procuring  entity on the  hearing  date of the Request for  Review is an  afterthought which cannot be entertained at this stage.

101. On the issue of whether the 1st respondent  exceeded  its jurisdiction, acted  ultra vires or took into account extraneous, irrelevant  matters/facts/document not  pleaded in arriving  at its decision  which is impugned as being unfair, biased, irrational and  unreasonable, the basis  upon which  the above issue was pleaded  and  framed  is that the  Review  Board based its decision solely on previous framework contracts and local purchase orders [LPOs]  for the years 2014-2016,   and indicative  market prices which did not  form part  of its  response  and that the applicant  was therefore  not given  an opportunity  to make representations  or submissions on the same.

102. Further, the exparte applicant alleges that the Review Board in doing so, took into   consideration extraneous and irrelevant facts not pleaded rendering rendering it decision unfair, biased, irrational and unreasonable.

103. As already stated  in ground  3 above, the  document  which  the applicant  alleges  that it  was not  given an  opportunity to make  representations or submissions on the  same, the record  is  clear that the impugned document was filed in the place of the expunged document annexed to the preliminary objection  raised by the  Procuring Entity and the applicant  never objected  to it being  filed  or relied  upon.  Neither did the applicant seek more time to peruse it and submit on it later.

104. Accordingly, I find and hold that  the applicant  has no basis  for claiming  that the 1st respondent  Review Board  exceeded  its jurisdiction or that it acted ultra vires by relying on the document in question or that the  matters in  the  document  were not pleaded. In Odd Jobs  vs Mubia [1970] EA 47 the court  held that  where it  appears from the course  followed at trial that   an unpleaded issue  has been left to the  court for  determination, the court or tribunal has to make a finding  on it.  Equally, in Justus Mongumbu Omiti v Walter Osebe  & 2 Others  EL P 1/2008, the  court made it clear that it could  not lock out  evidence  which would  help it  determine whether  a process  was  free, fair and  transparent  on the technical  grounds that the issues addressed  by such  evidence  were not  pleaded.

105.  It follows that the applicant  herein  having been  served with the impugned document, it  was  afforded  an opportunity to make   oral submissions  on it at the  hearing of the  request for  review  and  therefore  as the  applicant  did not  object  or seek  more time to prepare itself to respond to the said document, it cannot be heard  to complain at this stage  that the  Review Board  acted ultra vires or that it  exceeded its  jurisdiction or that the Review Board  acted on  irrelevant  considerations  in arriving  at the impugned  decision. As was rightly held in Republic vs Business   Premises Rent Tribunal & 3 Others Exparte Christine Wangare Gachege [2014] e KLR, inter alia:

“…….In Judicial Review proceedings, the mere  fact that  the tribunal’s decision was based  on insufficient evidence, or  miscounting  of evidence  which is  what  the  applicant  seems  to be raising  here or  that in the course  of proceedings  the tribunal committed an error are not grounds for granting   Judicial Review  remedies.

In reaching  its determination, it must however, be recognized that a tribunal  or statutory  body or  authority  has jurisdiction to err and  the mere  fact that  in the course  of its inquiry it errs  on the merits  is not  a ground for  quashing  the  decision  by way  of Judicial Review as opposed  to an appeal.  It is  only an appellate tribunal which is empowered and in fact   enjoined in cases of the first appeal to  reevaluate  the evidence  presented  at the first  instance  and arrive at  its own  decision on facts of course taking into account that it had no  advantage  of seeing  the witnesses  and  hearing them testify.  Whereas a decision may properly be overturned on an appeal it does not necessarily qualify as a candidate for Judicial Review.”

106.  The Court of Appeal in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others vs Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 Others Civil Application No.  Nairobi 307/2003 stated:

The courts expressly  recognize  that they  are manned  by human  being who are by nature  fallible, and that  a  decision of a court  may  well be shown  to be  wrong  either  on the basis of existing law or on the  basis  of some newly  discovered  fact which, had it  been available  at the time  the  decision was made, might  well have  been made  the decision  go the  other way.”

107.  Citing the  above  decision, the 3  judge  bench  in Republic vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 3 Others exparte Olive Telecom PVT Ltd [2014] e KLR stated and  I concur:

“ Whereas in some quarters it may be construed that the Court of Appeal  by employing  such a flamboyant  language   was encouraging  impunity  on the part of Judicial Officers, what we  understand d the  Court of Appeal to be saying  is that the mere fact that a  judicial officer errs  in his or her  judgment  does not  necessarily follow that the said officer acted without or in  excess or jurisdiction.  In other words,  the issue  for  Judicial Review  is not whether  the  decision is right  or wrong, not whether  the court agrees with it, but  whether it was  a  decision  which the authority concerned  was  lawfully entitled to make  since a decision can be lawful without being correct.  The courts  must be  careful  not to invade  the political  field  and  substitute  their own  judgment for  that of the  administrative  authority but they should judge the lawfulness and not the wisdom of the decision.

If the decision  was wrong, it  should be  remedied  by an appeal which allows the appellate court to engage in   intrusive analysis of evidence  by the trial  tribunal  and  review  the merit of the  decision  thereto.  See Municipal Council of Mombasa vs Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd (supra).

108.  The court went further to state:

“ 145.  However, while  we reiterate  that this  court in exercise of its supervisory  jurisdiction by way of Judicial Review ought  not to  usurp the powers  of the Board , where the Board fails to consider  relevant  evidence and  considers  irrelevant   ones this court  must intervene  where the  failure  to do so renders  the  decision  so grossly unreasonable   as to render  it irrational.  In our view, this is the exparte applicant’s case.”

109. Therefore, an error of law of fact does not  necessarily  amount to a procedural error, impropriety, illegality, irrationality  or being  proportionate/biased or  a decision  being  made in  bad faith.

110. As earlier  stated, the applicant  has focused  on errors  of fact  and   errors of law  made by the Review Board  in its decision  and not on the illegality, irrationality or procedural  impropriety  of the decision making process.

111. For that reason, I find and hold that the applicant has not demonstrated that the Review Board acted in excess of  jurisdiction, ultra vires, or that  it  was  biased,  or acted in bad  faith in reaching the decision that it did and neither has it  been demonstrated to the satisfaction of this court  that the Review Board failed to take into  consideration relevant matters or that it took into account irrelevant  matters, considering that the document allegedly  relied on at the hearing   was not an extraneous  document, the same   having been  filed and  served  on the applicant  who had  an opportunity  to submit  or object  on the same.

112. The applicant did not allege that reliance on the impugned document by the Review Board was a discriminating act or that the Review Board did not use the same parameters in upholding the decision of the procuring entity.  In other words, there is no allegation of differential or discriminatory treatment.

113. Therefore, on what  orders this court  should make, it is clear to me that the applicant  is not entitled to the Judicial  Review  orders  of  certiorari, prohibition and mandamus  for reasons  given  above  and  in  addition, prohibition  would not  issue against  the  2nd  respondent  to prohibit  it from executing  contracts  with bidders  that were awarded  tenders  in respect  of items 53,54,64,73,77 and  103  or placing  orders for the purchase of  papers  in respect  of the said  tender  items  for reasons  that as there was  no stay orders  given at the leave  stage, there is  a high  probability that  the  prayer  for prohibition  was overtaken by events  and  therefore  granting  prohibition  would  serve  no purpose.

114.  On whether  mandamus  should  issue, I find that this remedy which was sought as against  the 2nd respondent Procuring  Entity  to award  the  exparte  applicant  the tender  in respect  of the items  complained  of is not available  as this court  has not been shown that  there is  a legal duty  owed by  the Procuring Entity to award  to the  applicant  a contract  in respect  of the items stated.

115.  What this court   would do, in the circumstances  of this case, had it  found that the  1st respondent  Review Board  had acted  ultra vires  or without  jurisdiction  or illegality, is to  quash  the decision  but the  quashing  of the decision  would in no way  confer  rights to the  applicant  to be awarded  any contract  by the Procuring Entity. The court has no power to direct the Procuring Entity to award a contract to any party or bidder, more so, where the  decision which  is impugned  is the Review Board’s  decision and  not the Procuring Entity’s decision.

116.  To bypass  the  Review Board and  direct the Procuring Entity to award a contract  to a bidder is to usurp powers  of the Evaluation Committee and the Tender Committee  of the Procuring Entity as  well as  powers of the  Accounting  Officer  of the Procuring  Entity.

117. In the end, I find and hold that the applicant has not demonstrated that it is entitled to any of the Judicial Review orders sought. Accordingly, the application dated 28th August 2017 be is hereby dismissed, with an order that each party shall bear their own costs of these judicial Review proceedings.

118. And as I pen off, I acknowledge the fact that my transfer to another station and the challenges encountered in that new station did contribute heavily to the delay in delivering this judgment in good time and an apology has been tendered to the exparte applicant’s counsel Mr Kiprono who was present in court.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 28th day of September, 2018.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

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