Bitange Ndemo v Director of Public Prosecutions & 4 others [2016] KEHC 1384 (KLR)

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Bitange Ndemo v Director of Public Prosecutions & 4 others [2016] KEHC 1384 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW DIVISION

MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO.  192 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW BY WAY OF ORDERS OF PROHIBITION

BITANGE NDEMO ……………....………........……........PETITIONER/APPLICANT

VERSUS 

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS……….......….......1ST RESPONDENT

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL                                                            

POLICE SERVICE…………………………………....……….2ND RESPONDENT

THE DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS                                                       

DEPARTMENT………………..…..……….…………...…..….3RD RESPONDENT

THE ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION...….4TH RESPONDENT 

THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE’S COURT (MILIMANI)….…......…5TH RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. By  a Notice of Motion  dated  20th May  2016  and filed  in court on 23rd May 2016,  the Exparte  applicant  Bitange  Ndemo  seeks from this court orders for:

1. A Declaration that the initiation, maintenance   and prosecution of  the applicant  in  the Chief  Magistrate’s court ( Anti-corruption  court) vide Criminal Case  No. 19 of 2014   is an abuse  of the criminal justice  system  and a contravention  of the  petitioner/applicant’s  Constitutional  Rights to freedom and security  of the person  and also  the right to secure  protection of the law;

2. A Declaration that the initiation  and prosecution  of the case against the petitioner/applicant in the Chief Magistrate’s Court(Anti-corruption court) vide criminal case No. 19  of  2014  amounts  to selective  prosecution and a gross  abuse  of the process of court;

3. A declaration that the initiation, maintenance and continued prosecution of the petitioner/applicant in the Milimani Chief Magistrate’s court (Anti-corruption Court) vide criminal case No.  19 of 2014 is oppressive, malicious and an abuse of the process of the court;

4. Orders of prohibition do issue the continuance of the Chief Magistrate’s Court (Anti- Corruption court) Criminal case No. 19 of 2014.

5. Costs of the application.

6. Any other order that the court may deem just and expedient to grant in the circumstances.

2. The application is brought  under the  provisions  or Order  53 Rule 4(1)  of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and pursuant  to leave granted  on 9th May 2016  by Honourable  Justice W. Korir  vide chamber  summons  dated  26th April  2016.

3. The  Notice of Motion is supported by verifying  affidavit sworn by  Bitange  Ndemo, the exparte  applicant  herein sworn  on 26th April  2016, the statutory  statement   dated  26th April  2016   filed on  27th April  2016  and the exhibits filed together  with the  chamber summons  for leave and  with  the notice of motion.

The exparte applicant/petitioner’s case

4. The  gravamen of the exparte applicant’s  case is that  on 27th January  2014, officers from Directorate of Criminal  Investigations Department  after carrying out exhaustive  investigations into alleged  breach of procurement   laws relating to the government procurement   of land for the proposed  ICT Park to wit LR No. 9918/3 Malili Ranch in Machakos  District recommended  various  charges against one  Eric Kyalo Mutua, Peter Mutua Kanyi, Julius Maweu Kilonzo, Directors  of Gateway  Logistic and  Honourable  Johnstone   Muthama  on the basis that there was adequate evidence on record  to successfully prosecute them with the various  criminal  offences.  The same  officers  recommended  that on Ms  Kagiri  of the Ministry of  Information  and Communication  together with  Mr James Waweru formerly of Attorney General’s office be charged with the  offence  of abuse  of office.

5. That on  29th January 2013- the officers  of Ethics  and Anti - Corruption Commission recommended to the Director  of Public  Prosecutions that the exparte  applicant  herein with one George  Madanji, Henry Mungasia, Joseph Kimwele, Ernest  Kerich, Edward  Mburu  and Joshua  Magare  be charged  with various  offences and  indeed  forwarded  a draft  charge sheet  to the Director  of  Public Prosecutions.

6. Later, on 5th August  2013, the officers  of the Ethic and Anti Corruption Commission wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions  confirming  that after   further  investigations and review of the evidence available, the proposed charges in  respect of counts  two  and three against  Mr Bitange Ndemo and George Madanji were no longer   sustainable, and recommended that the applicant, and Madanji  be charged together  with members of the ministerial tender committee.

7. That  the Director of  Public  Prosecutions on 2nd September  2013  after taking  into account  exhaustive  investigations  conducted  by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission officers  and the  latter’s  recommendation, ordered   the inquiry file   to be closed  since the applicant’s prosecution was not warranted.

 8. The  applicant claims  that on 5th September  2014, the Director of   Public  Prosecutions in a discriminatory and selective  manner, unlawfully, maliciously and without any basis whatsoever  recommended  the applicant  to be  prosecuted in the same   investigations file and as a result  the applicant  was summoned  to Milimani  Chief Magistrate’s Court  ACC 19/2014  where he   was charged  with the offences of:

Count 1:  Willful failure to comply with the law relating to Section 45(2) (b) as read with Section 48 of the Anti Corruption and Economic Crimes Act No. 3 of 2003;

Count  2:  Willful failure to comply with the law relating  to procurement  contrary to Section  45(2) (b) as read with  Section  42  of the Anti Corruption  and Economic  Crimes Act  No. 3 of  2003;

Count  3 : Abuse of  office contrary to Section  46 as read with  Section  48 of the Anti Corruption  and Economic  Crimes Act  No. 3 of  2003;

Count 4:  Stealing contrary to Section 268 as read with Section 275 of the Penal Code; and

Count 5: Conspiracy to commit a felony contrary to Section 393 of the Penal Code.

9. According to the exparte applicant, although   the criminal  case   was instituted  against him in  2014, it  has not been heard and determined  and that  during the  course of  the pending   trial, the  exparte  applicant accessed  documents and correspondence which now confirm that his continued   prosecution is malicious, was instituted  for purposes other than  the furtherance  of the justice  system,  and is a clear  abuse of court process.

10. Further, the exparte applicant claims that the people recommended  for prosecution have been shielded from prosecution in an attempt to embarrass, humiliate  and coerce  the applicant  while   others   have been  treated  as prosecution  witnesses  in an attempt   to deny  the applicant  a defence , and  which is  an abuse of  the court  process  and an  infringement  of  the applicant’s Fundamental  Rights  and Freedoms as enshrined  in the Constitution hence this court   has the power  to intervene  under Articles  19,20,21, 22 of the Constitution and grant such  appropriate  remedies  as are bestowed  on it including   those under Article  23(3) of the Constitution.

11. The applicant  avers that his continued  prosecution on no  foundational evidence  is ill founded  and a violation  of  his  Fundamental Rights  and Freedoms  as enshrined in the Constitution and that therefore  he should not  be  subjected  to illegal  proceedings  whose sole intention to embarrass and vex him, while  trampling  on his rights which are  protected  under the Constitution  with impunity  and that it is not clear as to  what the intentions of the respondents are, when, after  4   years   of  waiting   for the trial, they asked him  to report to the investigating  officer for  preliminaries  while the  criminal case  is pending  before court.

12. It is the above brief facts that informed the filing of these Judicial Review proceedings.

13. In support of the Judicial  Review  Notice  of Motion/Petition  are a verifying  affidavit   reproducing  the  above facts  on oath  and  annexing  exhibits and  asserting  that the  Government of Kenya  through  the Treasury  and Auditor General’s  Office  and the Public Investment Committee  of Parliament   and the Public Accounts Committee who are the watchdogs  of public resources  have never  complained  that public funds were lost in the Konza ICT project.

14. The applicant believes that his prosecution is a witch hunt and a cover up of the actual culprits.

The respondents’ defence

15. In their defence  to the allegations leveled  against them in the Judicial Review Motion/Petition, the 1st, 2nd  and  3rd  respondents filed replying affidavit  sworn by Gitonga  Muranga a  prosecution counsel with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions  on 5th May 2016  deposing  that the inquiry  file leading  to the charges that the applicant   is facing   was opened  following allegations made between 2009  and  2014 to various  Government  Agencies including  the  1,2 and  3 respondent, by several  shareholders  of Malili Ranch.

16. That the shareholders complained that they had not authorized the amalgamation and sale of their individual parcels of land to the Government of Kenya.  That the applicant  recorded  his  statements  with the police  on diverse  dates  which statements  revealed   that he  was  a conspirator  to the illegal, irregular  and fraudulent  sale of  the said land  which at the material  time did not  belong to  the  Malili Ranch Company  but to  individual  owners comprising 7.8  acres  each, and  who should  have  been paid  individually,  and that this is  a fact  which the  applicant   and the  directors   of Malili  Ranch knew.

17. The respondents further contend at the  decision to charge  the  applicant   was informed  by sufficiency  of evidence  on record   and the public  interest, after the  Director of Public Prosecutions  had reviewed  and  analyzed  the evidence contained  in the investigations  file including  witness  statements, documentary exhibits  and the applicant’s  own statement  as required  by law.

18. According to the respondents, there is ample  evidence  to show that the  transaction   was not  done above  board and that it  was  shrouded  in fraud  and lack of due  diligence.

19. Further, that the  Directors  of Malili Ranch offered  the land  for sale  without consent  of the shareholders  and evidence shall be adduced  at the trial  to show that the Directors and the applicant herein  were  key beneficiaries  of the proceeds  of sale that  arose from their fraudulent  acts.

20. In addition, that whereas  each  shareholder was entitled  to shs  1,560,000 for  7.8  acres, some  shareholders  received only shs  1,400,000, others 1,100,000 the difference being the  money which  was stolen   amounting to shs  179,134,070 out of which the applicant herein   also benefited  and hence, the necessity  to  review the inquiry files by Mr Paul Kibugi Muite  Senior Counsel and make recommendations which informed  the charges facing the applicant and that  recommended  actions  were considered  and accepted  by the Director of Public Prosecution.

21. According to the respondents, the Director of Public Prosecutions is  exercising  state  powers and  constitutional  functions  as conferred  to  him under  Article   157(6)  of the Constitution  and Section  5(4)  of the Office Director of Public Prosecution Act  and in so doing, he is  applying  himself to the principles espoused  in the Constitution i.e  Article 157(1), Article  10, Article  21(1), Article 73(2) (d) and Article  232(a) of the Constitution.

22. And that the applicant has not demonstrated that the Director of Public Prosecutions has abused or exceeded his powers in prosecuting the applicant herein.

23. Further, the respondents deny all the allegations of harassment, malafides  and contend that the sufficiency  of the evidence  shall be  considered  in the trial  court and not by  this court  which is not  exercising  jurisdiction as an appellate  court and that there are  sufficient  legal   safeguards  to ensure that the exparte  applicant  gets a fair  trial hence  there is no merit  in this application for Judicial Review  which, according  to the Director of Public Prosecutions, seeks some illegal and unconstitutional immunity or insulation against lawful prosecution  and that no prejudice  will be  suffered  by the applicant  going  through  the motions of the prosecution  as scheduled.

24. respondents therefore prayed for dismissal of the notice of motion for Judicial Review Orders.

Submissions 

25. The parties  filed their  submissions to canvas  the notice of motion  with oral  highlights presented before me on 20th July 2016.  I shall  combine  the written  and oral submissions as presented  in court.  The exparte  applicant  filed his written  submissions  dated  20th May  2016   and further submissions dated  18th July  2016 each accompanied  by a list   authorities  in support.

26. The respondent submissions are dated 10th June 2016 and are also supported by authorities.

The exparte applicant/petitioner’s submissions.

27. Senior counsel Mr Fred Ojiambo representing the exparte  applicant  submitted that his client’s  application seeks for  redress  following   a denial  of and violation and infringement   of his fundamental rights  and freedoms under  the Bill of Rights   hence the prayers for Declarations that the continued  prosecution against  the exparte  applicant for  abuse of office  and theft  and conspiracy is an  abuse of the criminal justice   system, freedom of security  and the right to  the protection of the law.

28. Further, it  was  submitted on behalf  of the exparte  applicant  that  his prosecution  is a gross  abuse of the process of the court, is oppressive  and  an abuse  of the legal  process  and therefore  the prayer for prohibition  against the  continued  prosecution; and that  this court  has the  jurisdiction  to grant  the remedies sought pursuant to Articles 23(3) and 165 of  the Constitution.

29. The exparte  applicant’s counsel, relying on his  client’s pleadings  and affidavit  and written   submissions  submitted that at all  material  times the applicant  was the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information  and Communication and  was  tasked with the setting  up  of Konza  Techno  city hence he  set  up a  Ministerial  Tender  Committee as per the  relevant   law to  source for suitable  land.  That he    was not a member  of that tender committee  but that the process  was completed   upon which  the  purchase  money  was  paid to Eric Kyalo  Mutua advocate  who  was  the company  secretary and  advocate for  the Malili Ranch for onward  transmission  to his clients  but that it  turned out  that the said Eric Mutua did not  pay some  of the members of Malili Ranch  hence they  raised a complaint  which prompted  investigations  into the matter.

30. The exparte  applicant   made it clear  that he is not  seeking for  the veracity  of the facts  or evidence  proving or  disproving  facts of  or the innocence  or otherwise  or review  or assessment  of the evidence  against  him as  gathered  from the witnesses  for the prosecution in the trial  but that  he is   concerned  about the  decision  taken to charge him.

31. Further, that he is not   challenging or impugning the powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions who has duty to act independently in connection with the prosecution but that that of the DPP power was not being exercised within  the constitutional confines.

32. That the Director of Public Prosecutions having  reviewed the  evidence  in the investigations file, and  having made  certain recommendations on who should be charged with  what offence, and having  made a  definitive  decision in writing  to the Ethics and  Anti -Corruption  Commission  Chief Executive Officer  Mr Halakhe  Waqo  that there  was no basis  upon which the exparte applicant should be   charged , for the  Director of Public Prosecutions to  reverse  his decision to charge the  applicant  on the basis of  Senior Counsel  Muite’s  report  on fresh evidence, it  was  critical  that the applicant  is given an opportunity  to  respond or comment on that new evidence touching the complaint  that  none of the shareholders  of the  Malili Ranch  were paid  the purchase  price  which  was released  to Mr Eric Mutua.

33. Further, that infact, according  to Senior Counsel Muite’s  letter communicating   the  fresh evidence, he made it  clear that the CID were still investigating  the matter  and that the  exact  charges would be arrived at once the CID completes  investigations.

34. Further that  it  was speculative for the Senior  Counsel to  state that Eric Mutua   was seriously implicated in the scam yet conclude that he should be made a  prosecution witness  to secure  conviction  of the exparte  applicant, when the  statement of  Eric Mutua clearly  was that  he did not  pay the exparte applicant  any  of the proceeds  of sale of  the  Malili Ranch.

35. According to the exparte applicant, there was breach of fair administrative action in choosing and picking co-conspirators to a crime, so as to nail him.

36. That the exparte applicant  was never  questioned on  the new evidence  before he was charged, which he considers was in violation of his right  to fair administrative action as espoused in Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative  Action Act, No 4 of 2015   hence abuse  of discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions to manage   and conduct public  prosecutions. Reliance was placed on the case of  Githunguri V HCR Appl. 271/1995 where the Attorney General acted  in similar fashion.  The court found that action to be abuse of the legal process.  Further reliance   was placed   on Paul Imison V AG HC Miscellaneous Application 1604/2003 and Njuguna Ndungu Vs EACC & 2 others [2014] e KLR.

37. It  was submitted on behalf of the applicant that if the Director of Public Prosecutions found new  evidence  against  the exparte applicant, he  should have  confronted  the exparte  applicant  with that new evidence to enable the applicant respond otherwise  the Director of Public Prosecutions’ actions  are  shrouded  in mystery  and secrecy as was held  in R Vs AG  exparte  Diamond  Lalji  & Almed  Hasham Lalji  [2014]  e KLR  where it   was held that  new evidence  must be  put to the  suspects  to respond  and failure to do  so is a  violation of Article  157 of the Constitution.

38. Further, it was submitted that the respondents have not challenged the factual basis upon which this matter is founded hence the court must intervene where there is violation of rights.

39. In addition, it  was submitted that  the so called  new evidence lacked  foundation  in that if  the new  evidence   shows that the shareholders  were not  paid their money by Eric  Mutua  who received the money on their behalf and who has so admitted to receiving such monies, and who has also denied paying any part of that money to the exparte applicant, then it  is not clear why Eric Mutua was being shielded from prosecution and instead  the exparte  applicant  is being  charged with  stealing  and Eric Mutua is being recommended to be treated as a prosecution witness even though it is said that his statement implicates him as being culpable.

40. It is therefore submitted that on the basis of the above facts, the   prosecution  of the applicant lacks  any foundation and  should not be allowed to proceed as  was held  by Odunga  J in  Williams Vs Spantz[1992] 66 NSWLR 585  that  where the evidence  is incapable   of sustaining  a committal, they lack any  proper foundation and will obviously be oppressive  and vexatious  and so the proceedings  are an  abuse of the  process  of the court hence  the court  would be  justified   in intervening. Further reliance was placed on the decision in Praxides Namwoni & Others Vs Director of Public Prosecution & Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission JR 502 of 2015.

41. The exparte applicant further  complained that the singling out of the  exparte applicant  and leaving  out persons  who were  adversely mentioned  and who even gave statements which  were self  incriminating  and instead   opting to  use them  as prosecution witnesses  to “secure  a conviction  against  the exparte applicant”  was  discriminatory  and abuse  of power  that is constitutionally  given.  Reliance  was placed  on Joshua  Okungu  &  Another   V CMS court, Anti Corruption court  & Another [2014]  e KLR  where the court made it clear  the arbitrary, discriminatory and selective  manner  in which   the prosecution  was commenced  against  the exparte  applicant  could not be justified and  that it  would  amount to  abuse of  legal process.

42. Further, it was submitted that in accordance with  Section 4  of the Office Director of Public Prosecutions Act, where  there  is violation  of statutory  duties, the court cannot sit  aside and  say let the prosecution   go on, and  in the view of the fact that  the Director of Public Prosecutions had evidence  that Mr Eric Mutua, the  advocate  who  had the money  admitted  that he  never  made any  payments  to any  officials of the Ministry of Information, that  the exparte applicant’s selective  prosecution in the  midst  of all that,  is  denying him of  equal protection of the law  as espoused under Article  27 of the  Constitution hence the Director of Public Prosecutions should  be prohibited  from prosecuting  the  exparte  applicant and that  the court should  make Declaratory  orders  terminating the prosecution  that is  intended to shield Mr Eric Mutua.

43. Further, that the Inter Ministerial Committee report was not made by the exparte applicant.

The respondents’ submissions

44. In response to the exparte  applicant’s  submissions, Mr  Nderitu  counsel for  the respondents  opposed  the proceedings hereto, relying  on the  replying  affidavit   and written  submissions and authorities  as filed on record.

45. According to counsel for the respondents who entered an appearance in this matter, there are only two issues for determination namely:

1) Whether the  decision  to charge  the applicant is lawful and  constitutional; and

2) Whether the intended trial of the applicants is an abuse of legal and or administrative process.

46. On the first issue, the respondents’ counsel contended that the Judicial Review application is an abuse of the court process.  That the applicant as the former Permanent  Secretary and Accounting Officer of the  Ministry of Information Communication and Technology is charged with specific  offences under the Public  Procurement  and Asset  Disposal  Act (repealed) and  stealing  and conspiracy to steal under  the Penal Code  hence it   was  misleading  to allege that  the applicant   was charged  with procurement   related  offences.

47. Further, that the fact that the applicant claims to be ready and willing to stand trial, he is on a trial and error fishing expedition.  It  was  also submitted that this  court cannot review  evidence which  the Director of Public Prosecutions will be  presenting  before the trial court and  or review  the defence  of the exparte  applicant and determine the outcome of the criminal  trial through Judicial Review  proceedings.

48. It  was  also submitted that there  was no demonstration that  the Director of Public Prosecutions had abused  his powers  as stipulated  in Article   157  of the Constitution  and Section 4,5 and  6  of  Office Director of Public Prosecutions Act.

49. Consequently, the court   was urged to refrain from interfering with the powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

 50. Mr Nderitu further submitted that the applicant recorded not less than 2 statements with investigators hence he had an opportunity to be heard and that he denied any involvement in the commission of the offences.

51. the Director of Public Prosecutions has powers   to review  his decision by relooking  into the  matter even  after he had  proposed  closure of the original  investigations and that there is no prejudice  in the reopening  of investigations.

52. That the defence will have  an  opportunity   to challenge  the evidence during the  trial since  the Criminal  Procedure  Code provides various  stages  at which guilt  or innocence  of an accused  person  may be  determined  and that if  there  was   any minor  procedural defect  which is  denied  then the  remedy  does not lie in the  prohibition which is  hereby sought  by the applicant  but in the applicant putting up a defence or seeking for  damages for  malicious  prosecution.

 53. Counsel for the respondents distinguished  this case from the Githunguri case where the Attorney General  had undertaken  in writing not to  prosecute the applicant  but changed  his mind  which the court  found  to be an abuse of the court process,  unlike this case where 6  months  had not lapsed   from the  time that the Director of Public Prosecutions had  advised  that  the file to be closed.

54. It was further submitted that there  was criminal  conduct  and  criminal  trials  are issues  of  public interest  and the Director of Public Prosecutions acts in  the public  interest  and so it  is in the public  interest   that the criminal  trial be  concluded.

55. That the Director of Public Prosecutions has the discretion to call any witness and that the applicant is jointly charged with other persons not that he was   singled out.  That the applicant will have an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who are lined up.

56. That what is  before  the court is  an attack  on the merits of the criminal  trial pending  in the lower  court which  court is the  best forum  for challenging evidence.  Mr Nderitu relied in several  authorities  including the case of Thuita Mwangi  & Another  Vs EACC & Others   where  Majanja  J held that the High Court  was not  the right place to  tender  justification  concerning  the subject  transaction  or test  the nature and  veracity  of allegations  and that proof  of the charge is  made at the  trial hence  the Director of Public Prosecutions cannot  be asked  to prove the charge against an accused  person at  the commencement  of the trial.

57. Further reliance   was placed on Republic Vs commissioner of Police   & Another   exparte Michael Monari & Another [2012] eKLR:cited in Kibiwot &2 Others Vs Director of Public Prosecution & 7 Others [2014] eKLR where the court held   inter alia  that the police had  a duty to  investigate on any complaint  once a  complaint  is made…and  that as  long as the Director of Public Prosecutions and  those  charged  with the  responsibility  of making  decisions   to charge  act in a reasonable   manner, the  High Court  would be  reluctant  to intervene.

58. respondents  also  relied  on Republic Vs Attorney  General & Others Exparte Diamond Hashim Lalji &  Ahmed  Hashim  Lalji   (supra) where Odunga  J noted   that the court ought  to be  extremely cautious in its  findings  so as not to  prejudice  the intended  or pending  criminal  proceedings  -hence  the applicant  should appear  before  a competent  court where  he will be  accorded  a fair  trial and a fair  hearing  and  if dissatisfied  he could appeal, as was held  in the above  Diamond  Hashim  Lalji (supra) case.

59. It   was further submitted  that having a  good defence  in the  criminal process  is a  good ground  that  ought not  to be relied  upon by a court in order to halt criminal process  undertaken bona fides  since that  defence is open  to the  applicant  in those proceedings  as was held  in Eric  Kibiwott &  2 Others  Vs Director of Public Prosecution & Others(supra).

60. On instances  in which  a court can  declare  a prosecution improper, reliance  was placed on Paul Imisson  & Another   V Attorney General  & 2 Others, Macharia  & Another  V Attorney General & Another & Bennet Vs Horseferry  Magistrate’s Court, which circumstances, it was submitted,  were absent   in this case.

61. In a brief  rejoinder, Mr Ojiambo  Senior Counsel  submitted that it is not  true that  the powers of the Director of Public  Prosecutions under  Article  157 of  the Constitution are  absolute  and or that once  he decides  to prosecute  then the court  cannot  intervene.  Further, that those powers must be exercised reasonably, justly and not oppressively.

62. It  was also  submitted  on behalf of the applicant that  the  applicant  is not seeking to be  declared  innocent  by these  proceedings  but is challenging  the flawed  process of charging  him which is  in violation of his constitutional rights  and not a minor procedural  error.  That being a Permanent  Secretary and Accounting Officer  is not prima  facie  evidence  that he is  guilty but that  there must  be mensrea  and actus  reus.

63. In addition, Senior Counsel  submitted that all statements  made by the  applicant   were  prior  to closure  of the investigations  by the Director of Public Prosecutions and that since reviving those charges, the applicant has never  been called upon to record any further statement after Senior Counsel Mr  Muite’s  advisory.

64. Further, it   was submitted that where  there is  a violation of rights , the issue  of  willingness  to stand  trial does not  arise  and that the issues   being raised  came to the  knowledge  of the applicant  after  the commencement  of the trial  in the subordinate  court.

 65. It was further submitted on behalf of the applicant that the Director of Public Prosecutions had  over reached  his mandate hence the court  has the power  to  intervene  especially in the glare of the  evidence that those who made  decisions   in the inter ministerial committee and  Eric Mutua   who received  the money and who denied   paying any money to the  applicant have not  been charged. 

66. And that public  interest  is only  one of the  considerations that the  Director of Public Prosecutions takes  into account in charging  a person  but that  in this  case there   was gross  abuse of  duty.

Analysis and  Determination.

67. From the pleadings, affidavit  evidence, exhibits  tendered  and submissions of both parties ably represented  in this judicial  Review  application, supported by a plethora  of decided  cases as well as statutory and constitutional provisions, this court  acknowledges that the criminal justice system, and  therefore, criminal trials, are a matter of  public interest  and are conducted  in the public  interest, to ensure  that the  Rule of law, one of the pillars  of  good governance   is promoted and protected.  It is for that reason that the makers of  the Constitution of Kenya  2010  deemed  it fit to enshrine  therein several  state  institutions such as the  office of  the  Inspector General of Police and the Director of  Public  Prosecutions, to  be the custodians of the criminal justice  system  in ensuring  that the Rule of Law is protected  and promoted. 

68. The above   two state agencies/independent offices function in the broader society and not in isolation.  The courts  exist to administer  justice  in their exercise  of judicial authority  which  is donated  by the people of Kenya, to administer  justice  to all  irrespective  of status;  to ensure expeditious  justice; to  administer  justice without undue regard to  procedural  technicalities and to  ensure that  the purpose and principles  of the Constitution  shall be  protected  and promoted.

69. All stated organs, offices and persons are subject to the authority of the Constitution.  The Director of  Public  Prosecutions  exercises power  donated by Article  157  of the Constitution and the Office of Director of  Public  Prosecution Act  to among  others:-

a) Institute  and undertake  criminal  proceedings against any person before  any court (other than a Court Martial) in respect  of any offences  alleged to  have been  committed;

b) Take over  and continue  any criminal  proceedings   against any  person before  any court that have been  instituted  or undertaken by another  person or  authority, with the permission of  the  person or authority;

c) With permission of the court, discontinue  at any stage  before  judgment  is  delivered any criminal proceedings instituted  by the Director of  Public  Prosecution under paragraph b of  Article  157(6)  of the Constitution.

70. And in the exercise of the powers conferred  by the Constitution, the Director of  Public  Prosecutions shall  have regard to the public interest, the interests of the administration of  justice and  the need  to prevent  and avoid abuse  of the legal  process.

71. The Director of  Public  Prosecutions is also empowered to work without  being under  the direction of or control of any person or authority and to apply all principles  and values  of the Constitution and to be  subject  only to the Constitution.

72. Non discrimination is one of the values and principles of governance espoused in Article 10 of the Constitution.  In addition, Article 27 of the Constitution commands   that   every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.  Further, the latter Article bars discrimination of any person whether directly or indirectly by any other person.  The Constitution under Articles 50 and 51 guarantee every person and  an accused person a fair trial and a fair hearing.

73. In addition, Article  28  of the Constitution  guarantees  every person  inherent  dignity  and the right  to have that  dignity  respected  and protected.

74. Freedom and security of the person and secure protection of the legal and Constitutional law are also guaranteed by the Constitution. 

75. Against  the above  background, the  applicant  herein  claims that his continued  prosecution by the state  through  the Director of  Public  Prosecutions is discriminatory  and therefore  an abuse of power which is  in  violation of his constitutional rights. 

76. From the proceedings  conducted  in the  subordinate  court, this court notes  that the exparte  applicant did  not resist   his prosecution or at all  and that on each  of the occasions  that the matter   therein  came up for   trial, him and his  counsel, Senior Counsel  Mr Fred  Ojiambo  were eager to have  the trial concluded expeditiously, but that the  exparte  applicant’s co-accused  resisted  the trial  either  because  they  had challenged their  prosecution before   the High Court, or were  appealing against the decision of the High Court  rejecting  their stay  of proceedings  and it  was not until much  later that  the exparte  applicant  filed these  Judicial  Review  proceedings   challenging  his continued  prosecution, after learning  that  the Director of  Public  Prosecutions, after closing  the investigations file  relating to charges that had been  preferred   against  the applicant, on advise   of Ethics and Anti- Corruption  Commission which is the key investigating agency  in the matter, changed  his  mind and  revived  those  charges. 

77. It is alleged  that the decision to revive  those charges  in Criminal ACC No 19/2014  is oppressive, malicious and an abuse   of court process; is selective  prosecution; and violates the applicant’s rights  to  freedom and security of the person and the right to security and protection of the law  hence the  court should  intervene  to prevent abuse  of the criminal justice  system.

78. The  exparte  applicant  claims  that the authority  upon which   the exparte applicant’s prosecution  is grounded  is an  advisory  by Senior Counsel  Paul Muite, who,  from the alleged selective manner  in which  he picked out  the exparte applicant and left out other  suspects  like Kamotho  Waiganjo and Eric Mutua, it is  apparent that  the intention  was malafides and intended  to shield  the key suspects  and therefore  sacrifice the exparte applicant.

79. Further, that the applicant herein  was  never asked  to  respond  to the new  evidence  forming  the basis of the fresh charges  that  were  preferred  against  him hence  he was  denied  the right  to a fair hearing since Mr Muite’s  advisory  was clear  that even  the investigations   were not  completed  by the CID  who were  on the ground,  before he   was summoned to appear  in court and  take a plea. 

80. Mr Ndemo further complains that  Mr Eric Mutua  who is now being  shielded  from prosecution   and being used  as a prosecution witness admits that he is the one who  was paid  all the purchase   price  on behalf  of his client  Malili  Ranch  and that he admits  in his statement to have disbursed  the  said money  to his clients  who are Directors  of Malili  Ranch  as instructed  by his client  but that   despite  Mr Eric  Mutua’s  express  statement  that he did not pay any  money whether  directly  or indirectly  to any  official  of the Ministry  of  Information and Communication, out of the proceeds  of sale of the Malili Ranch   land; and that despite  Mr Muite  Senior Counsel  concluding that Mr Eric Mutua  had incriminated   himself  in the case, nonetheless,  Mr Mutua  had   co-operated  and therefore   he should  be used as a prosecution witness to  sustain a conviction  against the applicant, which  Mr Bitange   Ndemo  considers  to be selective  and discriminatory   prosecution.

81. Mr Ndemo believes that his continued   prosecution is intended to vex him and to embarrass and demean him rather than to achieve any criminal justice for the public   hence the prosecution is malicious, false and misleading.  He also laments that members of the inter ministerial committee who procured the land are not charged and that the Government of Kenya never lost any money as the sale has never been voided. 

82. applicant is apprehensive that his  constitutionally guaranteed  rights and  freedoms  are being  violated  by the continued prosecution  and therefore  the court should  issue  declaratory  orders  and also prohibit  the prosecution  as commenced.

83. On the other hand, the respondents  maintain that they  are exercising  constitutional  functions  and powers in  preferring   criminal charges  against the  applicant  and that  what the applicant   is seeking  is  to have this  court determine the veracity of the evidence before the trial court  which this court must guard  against.

84. Further, that the charges facing the applicant and evidence gathered   show a prima facie case against him.  In addition, that this court cannot stop the Director of Public Prosecutions from exercising his constitutional mandate in the absence of any bad faith. 

85. According to the respondents, the applicant   should face the trial and be vindicated after which he can  if  dissatisfied with the outcome appeal. 

86. That criminal trials  are in  the public interest hence the courts should be slow to  interfere  with the powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions  since the applicant  is before a court  of competent  jurisdiction and is assured of fair trial, having recorded  more than two statements  denying the charges  hence he  has   nothing to fear.

 87. Further, that the   applicant  can also sue for malicious  prosecution  in the event  that the trial  court finds him innocent  but that  he should not  interfere with  the trial  which is going.

88. The two main  ancillary questions that this court must   answer are

1) Whether the applicant is entitled to the declarations sought.

2) Whether the applicant is entitled to a prohibition sought   in the application.

89. On whether  the applicant is entitled  to the declarations sought  in the notice of motion, it is  important to appreciate  what   a declaration seeks to do.

90. A declaration is a formal statement  by the court  pronouncing  upon the existence or non  existence  of a legal   constitutional state of affairs.  It declares what the legal  position is and what  are the rights  of the parties.  It does not  contain  an order which can  be enforced  against the respondents, as it   only  declares  what is the legal position.  It is not a coercive remedy, and  can be carefully couched or  tailored so as not  to interfere  with the activities   of public authorities more than is necessary   to ensure  that those  public authorities comply with  the law.

91. However, a declaration can also be  used to  pronounce upon the  legality  of a  future  situation and in that  way the occurrence  of illegal action is avoided.  In Bass V Permanent  Trustee  Company Ltd[ 1999] 161 ALR 399 at paragraph 89, Kirby J held that:

“The Declarations’  development  “is one  of the most  important   and beneficial   adventures  in the administration of justice  during  this century.”

92. The tests to be  satisfied  to warrant   grant of Declarations in Judicial Review  proceedings were set out in the case of Aussie  Airlines  Pty  Ltd V Australian Airlines Ltd [1996] 139 ALR  663  at  670-671 that:

“ For  a party to have  sufficient  standing  to seek  and obtain  the grant of  declaratory relief  it must  satisfy  a number  of tests which  have  been formulated by the  courts; some in  the alternative   and some   cumulative.  I shall formulate then in summary form as follows:-

a) The proceeding must involve the determination of a question that is not abstract or hypothetical.  There must be a real question involved, and the declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies.  The answer to the question must produce some real consequences or the parties.

b) The applicant   for declaratory relief  will not have   sufficient  status if  relief is “ claimed  in relation to circumstances  that (have)  not occurred  and might   never happen  or if the   court’s  declaration  will produce no  foreseeable  consequences  for the parties.

c) The party   seeking declaratory   relief   must have a real interest to raise it.

d) Generally there must be a proper contradiction.

e) These other rules should in general be satisfied before the court’s discretion is exercised in favour of granting declaratory relief.”

93. The above  decision is only a persuasive  guide  in this court’s  determination of the question of whether the applicant  on evidence  availed, is entitled  to the Declarations  sought in  this Judicial Review  application.

94. Applying the above guiding principles to this case, the  applicant seeks  Judicial Review  Declaration orders that:

1. The institution, maintenance and prosecution of the applicant  in the CMC ACC  Criminal  case No, 19/2014  is an  abuse of  the criminal  justice  system  and a contravention  of his constitutional Rights to Freedom and  security of the person and the right to secure  protection of the law.

95. Article 27  of the Constitution guarantees  every person  equality  before the law and the right to equal protection  and  equal   benefit  of the law.  The freedom  and security  of the person   is guaranteed under Article 29 of the Constitution which  includes  right not  to be

a) Deprived  of freedom arbitrarily  or without  a just cause;

b) Subjected  to torture  in any  manner, whether  physical  or psychological.

 96. The real question involved is what the declaratory relief sought is directed  to answer  and the legal controversy in this case is whether  the prosecution of the applicant  is an abuse of  the criminal justice  system and a contravention of his constitutional rights as stipulated above.

97. It is  now established law that  a court ought  not to usurp  the constitutional  mandate  of the Director of Public Prosecutions  to investigate  and undertake  prosecutions  in the exercise  of the discretion conferred  upon that  office.  And the mere  fact that   the ongoing  criminal  prosecution   is bound to  collapse  is no ground for halting  those proceedings  by way of Judicial Review proceedings, since Judicial Review  proceedings  are not concerned with determination of the merits  but with the decision  making  process.

98. That an  applicant  has a good defence  in the criminal  process is  a ground that ought not to be relied  upon  by a court in order to halt  the criminal process  being  undertaken  bona fides since that defence  is open  to the applicant  in those  proceedings.

99. However, if the applicant demonstrates  that the criminal  proceedings   that the Director of Public Prosecutions  or the police  have commenced  or intend to  commence against  him constitute  an  abuse  of the legal process, the court  will not  hesitate  to put a halt  to such proceeding(s)  or declare the  proceedings as being  in breach of  the law.

100. In Republic Vs  Attorney General  Exparte Kipngeno  Arap  Ngeny HC Civil Application 406/2001 the court made  it clear and I agree that: 

“Criminal prosecution which is commenced in the absence of proper factual foundation or basis   is always suspect for ulterior motive or improper purpose.”

101. The above  position of the court  is informed  by the fact  that criminal proceedings  are to be  impartially  conducted  in the interest   of the general  public  and when  a prosecution is not  impartial  or when it is  being used   as a  machinery to cause  an injustice, or to shield the real perpetrators of crime,  the court  will not  hesitate  to find that that is an abuse of the court process, oppressive  or vexatious.  This is because, in criminal  law  a person  is put in  jeopardy  and his  personal  liberty  is involved.  And if the object of the prosecution is to over awe the  accused suspect by brandishing  at him the sword of punishment  there under, such an object is unworthy to stay the least  and cannot  be  countenanced  by any court.

102. The  prosecution should never  be seen to be actuated  by the desire to punish the applicant or to oppress him into  acceding  to their demands  by brandishing  the sword  of punishment  under the  criminal law, than  a genuine desire  to punish  on behalf  of the public  a crime committed. And if it is demonstrated that the predominant  purpose  of the prosecution is to  further  that ulterior  motive, then  the High  court will  intervene  ( See Republic Vs chief Magistrates court at  Mombasa  Exparte  Ganijee  & Another [2002] 2 KLR  703. 

103. The High Court  in its exercise  of Judicial  Review jurisdiction is forever  reminded  that it must only  exercise  such power of reviewing  decisions  taken  by the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute  very sparingly  and with circumspection.  The  rationale is that  it  was never the intention of  the makers of the Constitution that the  courts  superintends  every move  that the Director  of Public Prosecutions makes. 

104. The supervision and  superintending should only  occur where   there is evidence of patent  abuse and  where the  criminal justice  system is likely  to be brought  into disrepute  because of the heavy misconduct  of the parties  or institutions  involved  in the criminal justice  system.  (see Onguto J in Titus Barasa Makhanu V Police Constable  Simon Gitau  & 3 Others  [2016] e KLR.

105. In the instant  case, I have  no doubt  in my mind that on the evidence  available, the issues  raised by the  applicant  raise  real questions and the Declaratory  relief sought  is directed to the  determination of  legal controversies  whose answer  is capable  of producing   some real  consequences  for the parties.

 106. Issues of  abuse of the criminal justice  system and contravention of the  applicant’s  constitutional  rights to  freedom  and security  of the person and also the right  to  secure protection of the law and to be free from any discrimination whether directly or indirectly are real  questions that are  not abstracts or hypothetical.

107. Equally, issues of  selective  prosecution and gross  abuse of  court process  and claims of oppression and malice  are not  hypothetical  abstract  questions.

108. The applicant in his application and his counsel’s  submissions  has elaborately  detailed  the circumstances  under which  the applicant   was charged  in court  with the various  offences and how  he came  to learn  that he  was , in the first place, not  meant to  be charged but  that  he read  malice, discrimination  and abuse of the court process  of the  criminal justice  system when Senior Counsel  Mr Paul Muite  purported to  review the evidence and advise that the applicant should be  charged with the relevant  criminal offences following  discovery of  new evidence, while exonerating persons who are clearly said to have implicated themselves in the commission of the alleged crimes.

109. What  is clear  on record  and what  is not  controverted  by the respondents  is that  when the decision to review  the earlier  decision of the Director  Public Prosecutions as advised  by the investigators  not to prefer charges against  the applicant  was made as advised  by Senior Counsel  Paul Muite, the  applicant   was never  called upon to respond   to the new evidence  which  had been  unearthed, and that to date, he  has not  been formally notified of  the new evidence to enable him respond  thereto.

110. Article  50(2)  (b) (c) of the Constitution  guarantees  every person the right to fair  trial which includes  the right-

i. …….

ii. To be  informed of the charge, with sufficient  detail to answer it;

iii. To have  adequate  time and  facilities  to prepare  a defence.

iv. To be  informed in advance of the defence  on the prosecution intends  to rely on, and to have  reasonable  access  to that  evidence.

111. From the applicant’s  depositions and  his  counsel’s  submissions, it is clear  that on  the charges  for which Senior Counsel  Muite  prepared  summons to be served  upon  the applicant  to appear  in court  to answer, the new  evidence   was never  brought to the knowledge of the applicant  and that is the  reason  why the applicant  humbly  submitted to the jurisdiction of the Chief Magistrate’s Court to answer  to those charges  believing that  the said charges  were based  on  the earlier  allegations  which the  applicant  had responded  to and  recorded  statements  denying  his involvement  in the alleged crimes.

112. In other words, the Director of Public Prosecutions  kept as  a secret  the new evidence  which  counsel for  the respondents  maintained, was sufficient  to nail the applicant  to a conviction by the court.

113. To that  extend, I find that the decision by the Director of Publi8c Prosecutions violated  the applicant’s right  to a fair  hearing and that violation is  amenable   to a declaration. 

114. The respondent’s counsel submitted that the court should  not interfere  with the constitutional and statutory  mandate  of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  I agree and add that Article  157 of the Constitution is clear that  (a)  the Director of Public Prosecution and may-

(a) Institute, and  undertake  criminal  proceedings  against  any person  before  any  court ( other than a Court’s  Martial  in  respect of  any offence  alleged to  have been  committed.

115. Further, the decision  to institute  criminal  proceedings  by the Director of Public Prosecutions is  discretionary  and is not subject to the direction or control any authority because Article 157(10) of the Constitution stipulates that:

“ The Director of Public Prosecutions shall not  require the consent of any person or authority for the commencement  of criminal proceedings  in the exercise of his or  her powers  or functions, shall not  be under the direction or control of  any person  or authority.”

116. The above  provisions  are replicated  in Article  6 of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions Act  No. 2 of 2013.

117. The Office of Director of Public Prosecution is an independent  office and  the court will  therefore  in an  ideal  situation  be reluctant  to prohibit   that office  from  exercising  its statutory and constitutional powers except  in the clearest  of cases. In Rosemary Wanja Mwagiru & 2 Others V Attorney General &  2 Others  Mumbi J stated  that:

The process of the court must  not be  misused  or otherwise   used  as an   avenue  to settle  personal  scores.  The criminal  process  should not  be  used to  harass  or oppress any person  through  the institution of criminal proceedings  against him or her.  Should the court be satisfied  that the criminal  proceedings  being challenged  before it  have been  instituted   for a purpose other than  the genuine  enforcement  of law  and order, then  the court  ought  to step in and stop such  maneuvers in their tracks  and   prevent  the process  of the court  being used  to unfairly wield  state power   over one  party to a dispute.”

118. The ancillary   question  that must  be answered  is  whether  the Director of Public Prosecution acted  independently  in this matter, in  deciding  to charge the  applicant. This court  notes that  the Director of Public Prosecutions vide  his letter  dated  2nd October  2013  BK 14 to the Chief Executive Officer Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, in response to the recommendations of the latter  and upon  review of the evidence, he  directed  that the  inquiry file be  closed  and  that appropriate  administrative/disciplinary  action should  be taken   against the  suspects for  dereliction of  duty.

119. Later, after the National Police  Service  Director  of Criminal Investigations opened  an inquiry  following  persistent  complaints  by several shareholders  of Malili  Ranch  and upon completion  of their investigation, vide letter of    10th Match  2014   the Director  of Criminal Investigations recommended  to the Director of Public Prosecutions that the applicant herein  with others  including  Mr Eric Kyalo  Mutua  and Kamotho  Waiganjo  should be  charged with several  criminal offences, as per  BN 12 and  BN 13  dated  10th March  2014  and 22nd April 2014  respectively. 

120. And despite  the Director  of Criminal Investigations recommending  that  Mr Eric  Kyalo  Mutua  be charged  with the specific  offences, PK Muite  Senior Counsel  (as a consultant)  and on instructions by the DPP in his letters of  28th July  2014  and  26th August  2014  after reviewing  the files and   decisions   earlier  made by the DPP and the EACC,  gave an opinion  that the applicant herein and  4 others  including  Senator  Johnstone  Muthama, Mr Mabea – Commissioner of Lands, Mr Musengi Director of Gateway Logistics and Directors of Malili Ranch  Limited be charged.

121. In that   advisory, there is  a  rider that 

“ Mr  Eric Mutua  whose evidence  is critical  in securing convictions  is willing to be a prosecution  witnesses, although clearly implicated himself”  and that Kamotho  Waiganjo, Peter  Kalua  and Peter  Mutua   Kanyi be  prosecution witnesses  because  their evidence  as per the statements   which  were  voluntarily  given  is crucial to securing  convictions of those being charged.

122. Senior  Counsel  Paul Muite  then  proceeded  to draft charges  and planned to register  those  charges  on 29th August  2014  and to apply for summons, and that  is what   was actioned  upon by the DPP.

123. What  is strikingly  strange  about  the exercise  of these powers of the DPP by Senior Counsel Paul Muite in an “independent  manner” is that  the DPP enlisted the advice  of Senior Counsel  Paul Muite   who even  proceeded to draft  charges on behalf of the  DPP and he appeared  in court  on behalf  of the DPP to prosecute  the  applicant   and others right   from the  time of  plea taking until when questions  were raised  as to whether  Senior Counsel  PK Muite was  a gazetted  prosecutor  for purposes of that  prosecution, is when Mr Muite, Senior Counsel,  chickened  out of those criminal proceedings, and yet  nothing    has been said about  his role  in the matter  by the respondents.

124. In my humble   view, the DPP did not  act independently  in that he accepted  to be directed   by Mr Paul Muite  Senior Counsel  who was   not even  an investigating officer  in the matter, in deciding  who to  charge and who not to  charge  and with  which offences, even when the investigations that would determine the actual charges were apparently still being undertaken by the Director of Criminal Investigations.

125. This court  reads mischief  in the  advisory   given by  Mr Paul Muite Senior Counsel  in that although  he found that   there  was  incriminating   evidence against  some suspects, like Mr Eric Mutua and others,  his  reasoning for excluding those other suspects  from prosecution is not only irrational but  without  foundation and although this court  shall not  make  any adverse  orders against  those  individuals, no doubt  the advisory  by Senior Counsel Mr. Paul K. Muite was  couched  in a manner that suggests  monkey business  and guided by  extraneous   matters. I find that the  decision by Paul Muite Senior Counsel, (which decision was adopted by the DPP without any question) to charge the applicant herein to the exclusion of self incriminated suspects like Mr Eric Mutua  was arrived at  in an  arbitrary, skewed, discriminatory and selective  manner. That is not acceptable. It amounts to abuse of legal process and abuse of power to prosecute.

126. In George Joshua Okungu  & Another Vs The Chief  Magistrate’s Court  ACC Nairobi  & Another  [2014]  e KLR, the court  held and  I agree that:

“ …….where therefore  the prosecution  has been commenced  or is  being  conducted in an arbitrary, discriminatory  and selective  manner  which cannot be  justified, that conduct    would amount to an abuse   of the legal process….”

127. Similarly, where, like in this case, it is crystal clear that the prosecution’s strategy  adopted is meant   to selectively  secure  a conviction  against the  exparte applicant  by ensuring that  certain  individuals  from whom the exparte applicant  derived  his decision making  power are  unjustifiably  shielded  from, it  is my considered  view that such  prosecution will not  pass  either  the Constitution or statutory  tests  decreed  herein above.

 128. It  is even worse  where from the circumstances of the case, the same  persons  being shielded  could have   been  potential  witnesses  for the exparte applicant since Mr Eric Mutua clearly says that he never paid any money of the proceeds of sale of Malili Ranch Land to the  exparte applicant.

129. What I find the respondents doing in this case and what I consider to be highly decadent is    trying to  render Mr Eric Mutua an  incompetent  potential witness  for the exparte applicant  by enticing him to be a prosecution witness.  That strategy,  I hold, constitutes  an unfair  trial under  Article  50  of the Constitution see (George Joshua Okungu  & Another Vs The Chief  Magistrate’s Court  ACC Nairobi  & Another(supra).

 130. In such  an event   the DPP cannot  be said  to have  been  guided  by the  requirement to promote constitutionalism as mandated  under the Constitution and the Office of Director  of Public Prosecutions Act.  To the  contrary, I find that the Director  of  Public Prosecutions  would be  breaching  the Constitution which inter alia bars in Article  27  discrimination “ directly or  indirectly  against any  person on any  ground”

131. In George Joshua Okungu  & Another Vs The Chief  Magistrate’s Court  ACC Nairobi  & Another(supra) the court went further and stated : “accordingly, it is my  view that where such opinion is given by  persons who are  legally  authorized  to give the same   and  acted   upon by  persons  under their authority, it would  amount to  selective   application  of the law to charge   the persons  to whom the opinion  or advise   was given  while treating  the persons   who gave that opinion  as a prosecution witness.”

132. In the instant  case,  whereas the court is  alive to the fact of  the DPP having the discretion on  who to charge and who not to charge,  that discretion  and exercise  of power must   be judicious and in so doing, must take  into consideration the law  and circumstances  of each case. In the  present case, the  DPP  failed to  act in accordance with the statutory  requirements  to act independently  in reviewing the decision to charge the applicant  after closing the  inquiry file. He relied on the opinion of Paul Muite Senior Counsel without questioning the reason behind exclusion of other suspects who had given self incriminating statements and even exculpated the exparte applicant from wrongdoing.

133. In Republic V Attorney General & 4 Others Exparte  Diamond  Lalji  and Ahmed  Hasham  Lalji  (supra)  the Learned  Justice Odunga  held :

  “ where a  decision   had been made  to close   an inquiry  file, it is my   view that   before reopening  the investigations  resulting    from discovery  of new evidence, the people  sought  to be   charged ought  to be given an opportunity  to comment  on the fresh  evidence.

134. Furthermore, the advisory  by Mr  Muite  Senior Counsel  is riddled  with uncertainties and ambiguities such as-  Dr. Bitange  Ndemo  purchased a plot  or plots  which  were then  on –sold   to the  Government of Kenya.  Details of these are subject to the ongoing Criminal  Investigation  Department  investigations  on the ground…..”

135. And noting that it is the  advisory of  Senior Counsel Paul Muite that  was the basis of the charges  against the  applicant and  not the “ongoing  Criminal  Investigation  Department  investigations  on the ground,” the question  that the court must  pause is, was  there any  foundation  for issuing  summons to the applicant  and rushing him to court  to answer  to charges  when investigations  into the said  charges   were still  ongoing?  I am in agreement  with the decision in Williams  Vs Spautz   [1992] 66 NSWLR  585 at (600) where  the Australian High  Court held:

“……if the proceedings obviously lack any proper foundation in the sense that there is no evidence capable of sustaining a committal, they will obviously be vexatious and oppressive.  In such a case, the proceedings  themselves  are an abuse of the process of the local court and  will lack  any such  foundation, the Supreme Court would be justified in interfering  to halt  the proceedings  in limine  in order to prevent  the defendant  from being subjected to unfair  vexation and oppression.  For a man  to be  harassed  and put to the  expense of  perhaps  a long trial  and then  given an absolute  discharge is hardly from any point  of view an  effective  substitute  for the  exercise by the courts  of its inherent  power to prevent  abuse   of the process….”

136. In  Republic Vs  Attorney General  Exparte  Kipngeno  Arap Ngeny (supra) the court  was categorical  that:

 “ a criminal prosecution   which is  commenced  in the absence  of factual  foundation or basis is always  suspect for ulterior  motive  or improper proceedings, there must be  in existence  material  evidence   on which the prosecution can  say with certainly  that they  have the prosecutable  case. A prudent  and cautious  prosecutor  must be  able to demonstrate  that he has a  reasonable  and probable  case for  mounting  a criminal prosecution otherwise  the prosecution will be Malicious  and actionable.

137. And in Githunguri Vs  Republic [1986] KLR  1 page 22  the court held that:

“A prosecution is not to be made good by what in turns up.  It is good or bad when it starts.”

138. In this case, although the respondents  urged the court to find that  the  veracity   of the evidence  and its sufficiency   should be  considered by  the trial court, with clear admission by Mr Eric  Mutua  who is said  to be a key prosecution witness and who  allegedly ‘ incriminated’ himself  in the matter  according to Senior Counsel Muite’s advisory, and  that he did not  make any payment to any official  of the Ministry  of Information and Communication directly or indirectly  out of the  proceeds  of sale,” this court   wonders  how such evidence would found a charge and or sustain a conviction  as contemplated by Senior Counsel.

139. I find, very humbly that this is one of those cases where the prosecution of the exparte applicant is nothing but a setback to the criminal justice system. It is a mockery, scorn and ridicule of justice for the public who have an interest in the outcome of criminal prosecutions which are initiated in the name of the Republic.

140. It is  statements such as those contained in the advisory of Senior Counsel Paul Muite and which statements are bought by the DPP at a heavy price in the name of consultancies that  invite   this court to find that  there is  absolutely  no foundation upon  which the  respondents  are mounting  a prosecution against the  applicant   since the  applicant cannot  be charged  with theft    or conspiracy to steal when  the person who is said to  be  holding the  key to  the success of the prosecution and who is his co conspirator,  and  who received   the whole purchase price which is alleged to have been stolen from poor landowners of MALILI RANCH Limited denies making any payments to the applicant/accused  person.

141. In my humble view, Senior Counsel  Paul Muite’s   advisory  falls  short  of any logic  when he  concludes that because  Eric Mutua  and  2 others  who are  said to be key prosecution  witnesses  gave voluntary statements  then they are the key to securing  convictions  of those being   charged.  It should be noted that the advisory of Senior Counsel Paul Muite  in itself  is not evidence, for  a prosecutor cannot be a witness  in the case that  he is mounting a prosecution.  Therefore, this court  in faulting the advisory  given by Senior Counsel  Paul Muite  is  not faulting  the sufficiency or veracity of the available   evidence  to mount a prosecution, but the selective, biased, discriminatory, irrational, opinionated  and oppressive manner  in which  Senior Counsel made  the decision that the applicant  be charged with offences  for which the ‘star’ witness  had clearly  exonerated  the applicant from blame  yet that  star witness  who is also  said to  be a suspect  who had  incriminated  himself  was   being used as a  prosecution  witness to  secure  a  conviction   against the applicant! And the DPP who is in charge of prosecution does not assess or question that opinion before dragging and arraigning the applicant to court.

142. It is not  in doubt  that one  who shields  a suspected  criminal is  himself  culpable  for  aiding  and abetting  crime.  It therefore  follows that the decision to charge the applicant  with a criminal  offence(s)  when on the face of it the key (star) prosecution witness  exonerates him  from blame  is in itself  an abuse of  discretion and an exercise of  discretion for  an improper  purpose meant to achieve nothing but playing to the public gallery. 

143. By such conduct, I find that the Director of Public Prosecutions  is also  in breach  of  the  duty to act   fairly; he has  failed to  exercise  statutory  discretion  reasonably; has  acted in a manner to frustrate  the purpose of the  Constitution and the Act donating the  power; he has  impeded his discretion; has   failed to  exercise  discretion and has acted   irrationally  and unreasonably. (See Republic Vs   Minister for Home Affairs and Others Exparte Sitamze Nairobi HCC 1652/2004 [2008] 2 EA 323.

144. In Ronald Leposo Musengi V Director of Public Prosecution  & 3 Others [2015] e KLR, Odunga J in a case arising  from the same  facts  as this  case, and while referring to  the decision  by the Director of Public Prosecutions  not to  charge the exparte  applicant then  making an about turn  observed that:

“It does not require forensic evidence for one to see that the subject of that letter is the subject of the criminal proceedings  being challenged  in these  proceedings.  No attempt  has been made  by the respondents  to explain what  led to the change  of view and the  decision  to charge the petitioner with the offence  whose subject  the prosecutor, albeit  now wearing  substantially  the same hat albeit  with a  different  color, found  untenable ………..where the petitioner had been given   an assurance that he is not  going to  be  prosecuted, to make   an abrupt  about turn    without any  convincing  reasons, to decide  to prosecute  the petitioner  based on the same facts  cannot be countenanced  in any  judicial system that adheres to the rule of law.  Where such  a move is  to be  taken, the prosecutor  must place   evidence  before the  court  that due  to fresh  evidence  or a consideration  of a different  angle of the evidence, his  change  of decision  is justified.  To permit  the prosecutor to  exercise  his constitutional powers arbitrarily  would amount to the court  abetting  abuse of  discretion and power.  It   was  therefore held in Regina  V Ihoshat  [1970] 10 CRNS 385  at  389 that:

“ This court not only has the right  but a duty  to protect  citizens  against  harsh  and unfair  treatment.  The  duty of this court is not only  to see the law is applied  but also, which is of equal importance, that the law is  applied in a just  and equitable manner.”

145. In  the instant case, the exparte applicant, like in the Ronald Musengi (supra) case, complains  that  albeit  he  was the Accounting Officer  in the Ministry of Information  and Communication, the  procurement  process for the  Malili Ranch land which  has not  been voided, was  conducted  by the  Inter ministerial  Tender Committee on whose advise he relied  on and moreso, that none of those  members of the said tender committee  who  participated  in the tendering  and  procurement  process  have been charged  which is  further evidence  of arbitrariness  and bad faith  and witch-hunt against  the exparte applicant since the Government  has not lost  any money  as a result  of the said  procurement and if it has, then it has not complained as he is not facing any charge related to loss of Government funds as the then Accounting officer.  In response, the respondent simply said that they have enough evidence against the applicant to warrant a prosecution.  As earlier  stated, this court  is not  concerned  about the  sufficiency  of evidence  but whether  the  decision to charge  the applicant  and in  a selective, discriminatory  and arbitrary manner  can be  left to  stand. I hold that such a prosecution cannot be allowed to continue for it is only intended to pull the wool over the public eyes that action is being taken against corrupt people when in essence there is nothing being done.

146. In Paul Imison V Attorney General & 3 Others HCMCA 1604/2003 the court stated and I concur that.

“I do think that our Constitution which is one of a democratic state would   condone or contemplate abuse of power.  The Attorney General in some  of his constitutional  functions  does perform  public duties  and if he   were to be  found to be  wanting  in carrying  them out  or failing  to perform  them as empowered  by the Constitution  or any other  law, I see no  good  reason for  singling   him out  and  failing to subject him to judicial review  just like  any other  public official.  I find nothing unconstitutional in requiring him to perform his constitutional duties.  A monitoring   power by the court by way of Judicial Review would have the effect strengthening the principles and values encapsulated by the Constitution.

To illustrate   my point, Judicial Review  tackles  error of law and   unlawfulness, procedural  impropriety, irrationality, abuse of power and in not too  distant  future, human rights by virtue  of the  international  conventions  which  Kenya has  ratified.  In exercising  the Judicial Review jurisdiction, the court  would  not be sitting  on appeal on the  decisions of the Attorney  General, as he will still  make the decisions  himself  but the  lawfulness  etc. of his decisions  should be  within the purview  of the courts….”

147. This court, on the evidence   availed by the applicant  is satisfied that the  prosecution of the applicant  is a manipulation and misuse  of the court  processes  and is intended  to  deliberately  deprive the applicant  of protection of the  law  or  to take  unfair  advantage  of the applicant’s  humble  submission  to the jurisdiction  of the criminal court.

148. The failure to avail to the applicant  new  evidence that formed the subject of  fresh charges  in court  is in my view  not only prejudicial to him in the  preparation and conduct  of his defence  but clearly  violates his constitutionally  guaranteed  rights  to fair hearing  and fair trial  as espoused  in Articles  50(1) and 51  of the Constitution.

149. Iam fortified by the observation by Kuloba J (as he then was) in Vincent  Kibiego  Saina  Vs  Attorney General  Miscellaneous  Application 839/99  that:

“If a criminal prosecution is seen as amounting to an abuse of the process of the court, the court will interfere and stop it.  This power to prevent such prosecutions is of great constitutional importance. It has never been doubted.  It is jealously preserved.  It is readily used, and if there are circumstances of abuse of the process of the court, the court will unhesitatingly step in to stop it.”

150. I accept and adopt the above holding.  In this case, the Director of Public Prosecutions claims that in any case, the applicant has avenues for vindicating   himself if he feels aggrieved by the outcome of the criminal trial once concluded including appeal.  I agree but just to demonstrate how oppressive and arbitrary the decision to charge the applicant with criminal offences that have no foundation, it was, the respondents   go further to dare the applicant to file suit for malicious prosecution if he thinks that the prosecution is acting with malice!

151. That challenge by the prosecution is in my humble view clearly an indication of high handedness and evidence of the applicant’s prosecution being a  pasty wash and a public  stunt that fortifies  in  the face  of the public  interest  and public good.  Kenyan  tax payers  have never  been interested  in malicious  prosecutions  which are  orchestrated  and  planned  by the  prosecution which is also ready able and  willing to  pay damages  for malicious   prosecution. 

152. The public good and public interest for which criminal prosecutions are initiated will be lost.  It  is an  abuse of  court process  to  knowingly, maliciously  and oppressively prosecute  an  individual  and with  the intention of  vilifying  or  disparaging him and  parading  him in the public gallery  as the most wanted economic criminal in such  an honestly dishonest manner.  That is an abuse of the legal process which this court and any court of law which is ordained to be a temple of justice must intervene to stop in order to promote and protect the inherent integrity of the applicant and in this case, the exparte applicant.

153. In Meme vs Republic & Another, the Court of Appeal described    the phrase  abuse of court process as:

“An abuse of the court’s process would, in general, arise where the  court is  being used for improper  purposes; that is to say, court  process  is being misused.”

154. Majanja  J in Peter George  Anthony  D’costa  V Attorney General & Another Nairobi Petition No. 83/2010  in quashing a criminal prosecution mounted  against the   petitioner stated:

“The process of the court must be used properly, honestly and in good faith, and must not be abused.  This  means that  the court will not allow  its function as a court of law  to be misused  and will summarily  prevent  its machinery  from being  used as  a means  of vexation or  oppression  in the process    of litigation.  It follows  that where  there is an abuse of the court process, there is  a breach of  the petitioners fundamental  rights  as the petitioner  will not  receive  a fair  trial.   It is the duty of the court to stop such abuse of the justice system.”

155. I concur  with  the above  observations and  hasten  to add  that under  Article 157(1)  of the Constitution, the Director  of Public Prosecutions  is under  an obligation to prevent and avoid  abuse  of legal  process while exercising  his powers.

156. In Thuita Mwangi & 2 Others Vs Ethics and Anti-corruption  Commission & 3 Others  Majanja J  had this to say  concerning the powers of the Director  of Public Prosecutions and I  fully agree  with the learned judge:

“ The discretionary  power vested  in the Director  of Public Prosecution is not an open cheque  and such discretion  must be exercised  within  the four  corners  of the Constitution.  It  must be  exercised  reasonably, within  the law and to promote the policies  and objects  of the law  which are set  out in Section 4 of the Office of Director  of Public Prosecution Act. These  objects  are as follows: the   diversity of the people   of Kenya; impartiality and gender equity; the rules of natural justice, promotion of public confidence   in the integrity of the office; the  need to  discharge  the functions  of the office on behalf  of the people  of Kenya; the need d to serve the  cause of justice; prevent  abuse of legal  process  and public  interest, protection of  the  sovereignty  of the  people; secure the  observance of democratic values and principles and promotion of constitutionalism.  The court  may intervene  where  it is  shown that the impugned  criminal proceedings  are instituted for other  means  other than the honest    enforcement  of criminal law, or are otherwise  an abuse  of the court  process.”

157. On the material  placed before this court, I am  unable  to find that the  applicant has placed what he  considers  to be his  terse  defence  in the  pending  trial but he has  successfully  persuaded the   court  that there is clear  abuse of  legal and court process, and not  that the charges  are incompetent, which latter position  would be for the trial   court to  determine  under Section 89(5) of the  Criminal  Procedure Code  which empowers  the trial magistrate to refuse to admit  a complaint  or formal  charge  that  in his/her  opinion does not  disclose  an offence.

158. I also  find  no challenge  to the sufficiency  of evidence  but that in this case, it is trite that the criminal  justice  system is being  manipulated  with  a view to denying   the applicant  the right  to a fair  trial  and to be accorded   equal  protection of the law and to the  liberty  and security of the person.

159. For sure, where  is the   impartially  and honesty  of the Office of the Director  of Public Prosecutions if that Office can  subject  suspects  to the whims of  Senior Counsel  Paul Muite to determine  the culpability of the applicant  and  to ensure  that the applicant is  convicted?  Definitely  I have a lot of respect  for Senior Counsel Paul Muite  and  I do empathize with complainants,  majority of whom are Malili Ranch Shareholders  and who may have  been unfairly  and arbitrarily  deprived  of their proceeds of sale of  their parcels  of land.  But it is clear to me that the applicant herein cannot be used as a sacrificial lamb to shield the real perpetrators of the crime.

160. Although  the respondents  claim that the  applicant is seeking  some form of  illegal  unconstitutional  immunity  from  prosecution,  I do not agree.  The Constitution of Kenya 2010 lifts the persons’ rights   over and   above the powers that be on state agencies.  The  power vested  in the Director  of Public Prosecutions and other state machinery is the power and authority that emanates  from the people and that power, as espoused  in Article  73  of the Constitution is to serve  the people and not to rule them.

161. The bearers of that power must exercise it in an   accountable and transparent   manner and in the manner that would bring dignity and integrity and build confidence in the offices that be.

162. Where it is clear like in the instant case that the decision to prosecute the applicant   was unreasonable and irrational, this court is called upon   to intervene.  As was   held in the  Republic Vs  Attorney General  exparte  Arap Ngeny case, that:

A  prudent  and cautions  prosecutor  must  be able to demonstrate that he  has a reasonable  and probable  cause for  mounting a criminal prosecution. Otherwise the prosecution will be malicious and actionable.”

163. In the view of this court, the decision to review the decision that closed the inquiry   file cannot be justified.  It was discriminatory, selective and therefore unconstitutional and unlawful. As was held in the Githunguri case (supra) “The people will lose   faith in the Constitution if it fails   to give effective protection to the fundamental rights.  The people    know and believe that to destroy the rule of law   you destroy justice thereby also destroying the society.”

164. In Republic V Commissioner of Co-operatives exparte Kirinyaga Tea Growers Co-operative Savings & Credit   Society Ltd CA 39/97 [1999] EALR 245   the Court of Appeal warned that:

“……it is axiomatic that statutory powers can only be exercised validly   if they are exercised reasonably.  No statute   ever allowed   anyone on whom it confers power to exercise such power arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith.”

165. In HC Miscellaneous Application  1769/2003  Nairobi  Republic Vs  Ministry  of  Planning  and  Another Exparte  Professor  Mwangi  Kimenyi, the court held, concerning  malafides:

“ So, where a body  uses its power  in a manifestly  unreasonable  manner, acted  in bad faith, refuse  to take  relevant  factors  into account  in reaching  its decision  or based  its  decision  on irrelevant  factors the court  would intervene that  on the ground  that the body  has  in each  case abused  its power.  The reason  why the court  has  to intervene   is because  there is  a presumption  that  where parliament  gave  a body  statutory  power  to act, it could  be implied  that Parliament intended  it to  act in  a particular manner.”

166. In my view, the power conferred on the DPP is not absolute power. Absolute power is open to abuse and that is why the Constitution found it fit to provide checks.

167. I find that the impugned decision was also shrouded in mystery and secrecy. The applicant was never confronted with the new evidence to respond to it. As  was held by Odunga J in Njuguna  S. Ndungu  Vs EACC & 3 Others  [2014] e KLR:

“Transparency is one of the national values and principles of governance enshrined   under Article   10 of the Constitution.  Section  4 of the office of Director of Public  Prosecution  enjoins that office in fulfilling  its mandate  to be guided by the Constitution and inter alia, the principles  of natural justice, promotion of public  confidence  in the  integrity  of the office, the need to  serve the cause of  justice, prevent  abuse  of the legal  process  and public  interest  and promotion of Constitution. The office cannot be   promoting public confidence when its   activities are shrouded in mystery and secrecy.   Anything  done  in contravening  of the Constitution must be   prohibited, to securing  fair treatment  for all persons  brought  before the court  and   to prevent  an abuse  of the court process.

168. On the whole, it is  from the foregoing that I find that    the exparte   applicant herein has established  sufficiently that he is  entitled  to the  Declarations  and prohibition Orders sought  in his Notice of Motion and I make  the following orders:

1) It is hereby Declared that the initiation, maintenance and prosecution of the petitioner/exparte  applicant  Dr Bitange   Ndemo  in the Chief Magistrate’s  court ( Anti corruption ) vide criminal  case No. 19 of   2014   is an abuse of the criminal justice system and in contravention of the applicant’s constitutional rights and freedoms  and security of the person and the right to secure  the protection of the law;

2) It is  hereby Declared that the  initiation and prosecution of the criminal case against the petitioner/applicant  in the Chief Magistrate’s  Court( ACC) vide criminal  case No. 19  of   2014    amounts to  selective  and therefore   discriminatory  prosecution and  a gross abuse  of the process of court.

3)  It is hereby  Declared that the initiation, maintenance  and continued  prosecution of the petitioner/applicant  in the  Milimani Chief  Magistrates  Court (ACC) vide criminal  case  No. 19/2014  is oppressive, malicious  and  an abuse of the process of court.

4) Orders  of Prohibition   be and are hereby  issued  prohibiting the continuance of the Chief Magistrate’s Court  (ACC) at Milimani vide criminal case No. 19 of 2015  in the manner  intended against  the  petitioner/applicant  Dr. Bitange Ndemo.

169. I order that each party shall bear their own costs of these judicial review proceedings.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 5th day of October, 2016.

 

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

 

In the presence of:

Senior Counsel Fred Ojiambo and Miss Githinji for the exparte applicant/petitioner

N/A for the Respondents

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1. Maina & 4 others v Director of Public Prosecutions & 4 others (Constitutional Petition E106 & 160 of 2021 (Consolidated)) [2022] KEHC 15 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (27 January 2022) (Judgment) 15 citations
2. Asha v The Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others (Constitutional Petition 2 of 2023) [2023] KEHC 25300 (KLR) (15 November 2023) (Judgment)
3. Karanja v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others (Petition 186 of 2019) [2022] KEHC 11095 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (31 May 2022) (Judgment)
4. Karumi v Director of Public Prosecution & another (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Petition E008 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 11946 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes) (19 May 2022) (Judgment)
5. Kigen v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others (Constitutional Petition E005 of 2022) [2022] KEHC 15396 (KLR) (15 November 2022) (Judgment)
6. Kimeu v Director of Criminal Investigations & 2 others (Criminal Application E024 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 3347 (KLR) (Crim) (20 April 2023) (Judgment)
7. Ndolo v Republic (Criminal Miscellaneous Application E108 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 3323 (KLR) (19 April 2023) (Ruling)
8. Ogada v Republic (Criminal Appeal E040 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 25308 (KLR) (16 November 2023) (Judgment)
9. Republic v Kairu (Criminal Case 5 of 2018) [2023] KEHC 24478 (KLR) (31 October 2023) (Ruling)
10. Talai & 4 others v Directorate of Criminal Investigations & 5 others (Constitutional Petition E004 of 2023) [2023] KEHC 26902 (KLR) (15 December 2023) (Judgment)
Date Case Court Judges Outcome Appeal outcome
21 October 2022 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ndemo (Civil Appeal 104 of 2017) [2022] KECA 1136 (KLR) (21 October 2022) (Judgment) Court of Appeal F Sichale, HM Okwengu, J Mohammed  
5 October 2016 Bitange Ndemo v Director of Public Prosecutions & 4 others [2016] KEHC 1384 (KLR) This judgment High Court RE Aburili