Kandara Residence Association & another v Ananas Holdings Limited & 4 others; Director of Survey & 3 others (Interested Parties) [2020] KEELC 1238 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN  THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT  AT THIKA

ELC CASE NO.37 OF 2020

KANDARA RESIDENCE ASSOCIATION.........1^ST PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

KARIRA KIMARA.............................................2^ND PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

VERSUS

ANANAS HOLDINGS LIMITED..............................................1^ST DEFENDANT

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR LANDS;                                           

COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF KIAMBU.................................2^ND DEFENDANT

DIRECTOR OF PHYISCAL PLANNING                                                             

COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF KIAMBU.................................3^RD DEFENDANT

JAMES MAINA.........................................................................4^TH DEFENDANT

NICK WAWERU.......................................................................5^TH DEFENDANT

AND

DIRECTOR OF SURVEY.............................................1^ST INTERESTED PARTY

CABINET SECRETARY LAND AND                                                                     

PHYSICAL PLANNING..............................................2^ND INTERESTED PARTY

THE NATIONAL LAND COMMISSION....................3^RD INTERESTED PARTY

DEL MONTE (K) LTD...................................................4^TH INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

There are three Notices of Preliminary Objections, for determination. The first one is the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 17^th June 2020 by the 2^nd to 5^th Defendants based on the following grounds;

1. THAT  the present suit amounts to subjudice.

2. THAT, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit herein by virtue of the express  provisions of section  6 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3. THAT there has been another suit  and that there have been previous proceedings  in Muranga ELC Suit No. 53 of 2018,  between the parties  of the suit premises Land reference  No. 13169  now Block  14/102, and the Defendants concerning  the same subject matter  and the cause of action relates to the Plaintiff named in  the Plaint.

4. The whole suit is ill conceived, fatally defective and incompetent and should be struck out and/or dismissed.

They urged the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs/Applicants Application and dismiss the entire suit.

The 2^nd Preliminary Objection is the one dated 17^th June 2020, by the 4^th Interested Party and sought  for dismissal of the suit on the grounds that;

1. THAT the suit is incompetent as the 1^st plaintiff, being an unincorporated body has no capacity to sue in the manner it has purported to do. The 2^nd Plaintiff has not set out any independent cause of action.

2. This Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim herein which is based on alleged historical injustices dating  back to 1895.

3. The suit is time barred.

The 3^rd  Notice of Preliminary Objection is the one dated  23^rd June 2020, by the 1^st Defendant  on the grounds that;

a) That this Honourable Court  has no jurisdiction  to hear  this Application and

b) The Application is inherently bad in law.

The Preliminary Objections were canvassed by way of written submissions. The Plaintiffs through the Law Firm of Okatch & Partners filed its submissions dated 20^th July 2020, and submitted  that while  it is indeed the position  that the 1^st Plaintiff on its own does not have the  legal capacity  to sue, Courts have reiterated that  Societies can  only sue in a representative  capacity. It was further submitted that the 1^st Plaintiff instituted the suit through its chairman, a fact that is deponed under paragraph 2 in the Verifying Affidavit of the 2^nd Plaintiff. Further that the Plaintiffs have attached the 1^st Plaintiff’s Certificate of Registration and Authority to the 2^nd Plaintiff to swear Court documents and institute the instant suit on behalf of the 1^st Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs further submitted  that the objection  based on Section 7 of the  Limitation of Actions Act  is misconceived  and that the instant suit does not fall  within the purview of the actions envisaged under the Limitations of Actions Act, as the suit stems from the provisions of  Article 67(2) (e) of the Constitution.   Further, the Plaintiff’s submitted that  the instant suit  springs from  the determination of the  National Land Commission, and the actions of the 1^st Defendant and the 4^th Interested Party in the  ensuing period after the determination of the 3^rd Interested Party.

It was further submitted that the objection on whether the suit is subjudice as raised by the 2^nd, 3^rd 4^th and 5^th Defendants does not meet the threshold of a Preliminary Objection as was held in the Mukisa Biscuit Case. Further that Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for stay of a subsequent suit, if the same is found to be subjudice. The Plaintiff relied on the case of Muturi Investments…Vs… NBK (2006) eKLR  where the Court held that;-

“Where two actions have a common question of law and fact  in that documents which will be relied on  shall also require similar  interpretation from the Court  then if the other suit is heard separately , would mean that the evidence  submitted by the parties will be duplicated in both.”

It was further submitted that there are several distinguishing elements that have to be established determining whether a subsequent suit offends the doctrine of subjudice.

It was the Plaintiffs’ further submissions that the parties in Muranga  ELC 53 of 2018, are  not the same parties  as in the instant suit. That the subject matter in the said suit is not the same and the two suits have different issues of law and fact.

Further that  the question as to whether a suit discloses a reasonable cause of action  is not a question to be determined  by way of a preliminary objection,  since the same is a question  of fact and evidence  that can only be ascertained through the perusal  of the evidence and pleadings  on records . That the Court’s power to strike out pleadings is to be exercised sparingly and cautiously as the Court exercises its powers without being fully informed on the merits. The Court was urged to dismiss the Preliminary Objections.

The 1^st Defendant filed its written submissions through the Law Firm of J. Louis  Onguto  Advocates,  dated 3^rd July 2020,  and submitted that the Plaintiffs have no locus standi, to file the claim and further that the this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiffs Application  and suit. It was its submission that its Preliminary Objection falls within the boundaries of a Preliminary Objection.  Further  that a non-existent person cannot sue and is incapable of maintaining the action. That the Plaintiffs have in their Plaint alleged that the 1^st Plaintiff is a Society duly registered under the Societies Act.   However, it is now settled law that these entities have no capacity to sue or be sued on their own. It was further submitted that the Plaintiffs have not established that a Society by the name Kandara Residence Association, exists or was registered. Further that the 1^st Plaintiff has instituted the pleadings in its own name.

The 1^st Defendant further submitted that the 2^nd Plaintiff has no written authority  allowing  him to swear an Affidavit on their behalf  as to meet the legal test of the  party swearing the Affidavit  must file a written  authority from  the party on whose behalf they are swearing the Affidavit. That the Court of Appeal in  Research International  East Africa  Limited…Vs… Julius Arisi & 213 others stressed that non-compliance with the basic requirement would entitle a Court to strike out the offending pleadings.

Further that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter as the complaints that the Plaintiffs have advanced fall within the planning laws of Kenya and that matters relating to Planning, use, regulation and development of land are now governed by the Physical Planning Act and that the preamble is clear on the aspect, as it requires any person who is aggrieved by the decision of a Planning Authority has recourse under the framework established by the Act. It was further submitted that Section 76 of the Physical Planning Act establishes the County Physical and Land Use, Planning Liaison Committee and the appropriate procedure by the Plaintiffs would therefore be to seek redress from the Committee as under Section 80 of the Act, the Committee since obliged to hear and determine any appeals  regarding a decision handed  down by a Planning Authority. The Court was urged to uphold the 1^st Defendant’s Preliminary Objection.

The 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th Defendants also filed their submissions dated 8^th July 2020, through Keziah Mbugua, Legal Counsel for the Kiambu  County Government. It was their submissions that the Court is barred by the doctrine of subjudice and res judicata from entertaining the present suit. It was further submitted that Paragraph 7 of the Plaint clearly states that there has been another suit and previous proceedings in another Court, between some tenants of the suit premises and the Defendants and therefore parties cannot be litigating over the same matters in different Courts. Further that if the Court was to find that the Parties in ELC 53 of 2018,  Muranga, are both the same as the ones in this Court, then the suit is still barred by issue of estoppel. It was further submitted that the matter has been determined at interim stage by another Court and therefore the suit is Res Judicata. They relied on various decided cases and the Court was urged to uphold the Preliminary Objection.

The 4^th interested Party filed  its submissions dated 1^st July 2020, and further submissions  dated 14^th  August 2020, through the Law Firm of  Njoroge Regeru & Company Advocates  and submitted that the 1^st Plaintiff being an unincorporated  body  has no capacity  to institute the suit. It relied on the case of Kipisiwo SelfHelp Group….Vs…. Attorney General & 6 others (2013) eklr where the Court held that;

“I think the issue is not really whether unincorporated entities may commence action but the manner in which unincorporated entities may commence proceedings. A number of individuals may come together and form an identifiable group. They can bring action as the group, but it does not mean, that the group is now vested with legal capacity to sue and to be sued. In such instance, the members of the group have to bring action in their own names, as  members of the Group, or a few can bring action on behalf of the other members of the group, in the nature of a representative action. Unincorporated entities have no legal capacity and cannot therefore sue in their own names. They can however sue through an entity with legal capacity. Just because the Constitution allows unincorporated bodies to sue, does not vest such bodies with legal capacity, and such bodies do not become persons in law, and cannot be the litigants or sue in their own standing. They still have to use the agency of a person recognized in law  as having capacity to sue and to be sued.”

The 4^th interested Party further submitted that the 2^nd Plaintiff has failed to establish an independent cause of action as the issue of capacity to sue is critical. It was its submissions that the Court must be able to identify the parties with precision. Further that it stands to suffer immense prejudice if a party which has no capacity to sue is allowed to sue as they would not know who to pursue for costs in case the suit is dismissed.  Further that the 2^nd Plaintiff has not complied with the law that distinctively sets out the procedure for instituting a representative suit. Most specifically Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

It was further submitted that the suit is time barred by the provisions of Section 7 of the Limitations of Actions Act  as the cause of  action is  the alleged eviction of  the Plaintiffs ancestors from the suit property and that such a claim ought to be instituted  within 12 years of the accrual of the cause of action . The 4^th Interested Party further submitted that the suit offends the doctrine of  subjudice  as there exists two other cases,  which  deal with the issues connected  to those raised in the instant suit .

In its further submissions, the 4^th Interested Party  submitted that it was wrong for the Plaintiffs to respond to a Preliminary Objection  through an Affidavit as a Preliminary Objection is usually based on law and not facts. It was submitted that the Plaintiffs argument that the suit has been instituted by Mr. Karira Kimara, on behalf or as a Representative of the 1^st Plaintiff has no basis, as the Plaint does not state that the suit is being instituted by Mr. Karira on behalf of the 1^st Plaintiff and that such information is being supplied through an Affidavit. Further that the Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to rely on an Affidavit purporting to plead their case in a manner that is different and indeed contradictory to the case as pleaded in the Plaint. It was further submitted that the Authority of Kamiti Forest Squatters Association, as quoted by the Plaintiffs, the Court rightly spared the suit of the 1^st Plaintiff because it had not sued on its own name. However the 2^nd and 3^rd Plaintiffs were Societies suing in their names instead of their officials and they were struck out.

The 2^nd Plaintiff filed a further Affidavit sworn on 17^th July 2020 in which he averred that he was the Chairman of Kandara Residence Association and that the same is fully registered. He further averred that on 5^th June 2020, the Board of Management resolved that its Chairman was to proceed and take requisite steps to institute a suit against the Respondents herein.

The Court has now carefully read and considered the Preliminary Objections  together with the rival written submissions and renders itself as follows;-

A Preliminary Objection was described in the Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd…Vs…West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696 to mean:-

“So far as I am aware, a Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit.  Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration”.

Further Sir Charles Nebbold, JA stated that:-

“A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer.  It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct.  It cannot be raised if any fact had to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.  The improper raising of points by way of Preliminary Objection does not nothing but unnecessarily increase costs and, on occasion, confuse the issue.  The improper practice should stop”.

The above being the description of a Preliminary Objection, it is not in doubt that a Preliminary Objection raises pure point of law, which is argued on the assumption that all facts pleaded by the other side are correct.  However, it cannot be raised if any facts has to be ascertained from elsewhere or if the court is called upon to exercise judicial discretion.

In the case of Quick Enterprises Ltd..Vs..Kenya Railways Corporation, Kisumu HCCC No.22 of 1999, the Court held that:-

“When preliminary points are raised, they should be capable of disposing the matter preliminarily without the Court having to result to ascertaining the facts from elsewhere apart from looking at the pleadings.”    

In determining a Preliminary Objection, the Court will also take into account that the Preliminary Objection must stem from the pleadings and raises pure point of law. See the case of Avtar Singh Bhamra & Another…Vs….Oriental Commercial Bank, Kisumu HCCC No.53 of 2004, where the Court held that:-

“A Preliminary Objection must stem or germinate from the pleadings filed by the parties and must be based on pure points of law with no facts to be ascertained.”

Before the Court embarks on determining the merit of the Notices of Preliminary Objections, it will first determine whether what have been raised by the parties herein satisfy the ingredients of a Preliminary Objection.   In this determination, the Court will be persuaded by the findings in the case of Oraro…Vs…Mbaja(2005) 1KLR 141, where it was held that:-

“Anything that purports to be a Preliminary Objection must not deal with disputed facts and it must not derive its foundation from factual information which stands to be tested by rules of evidence”.

The 2^nd to 5^th Defendants have in their Preliminary Objection averred that the suit herein is Subjudice to another suit and further that the suit is Resjudicata as it relates to ELC 53 OF 2018, in Muranga, which has already been decided in the interim stage. The Plaintiffs in their submissions have disputed that fact that the suit herein is Subjudice or that the same is Resjudicata.  It is the Plaintiffs contention further that the issue of whether or not the suit is Subjudice will require the ascertaining of facts. In the case of Henry Wanyama Khaemba…Vs…Standard Chartered Bank Ltd & Another (2014) EKLR, the Court held that:

“That re-statement of the limited scope of a Preliminary Objection brings me to the point where I hold that the Preliminary Objection by the 1^st Defendant is not a true Preliminary Objection in the sense of the law.  The issues of res judicata, duplicity of suits and suit having been spent will require probing of evidence as it is already evident from the submissions by the 1^st Defendant.  They are incapable of being handled as Preliminary Objections because of the limited scope of the jurisdiction on preliminary objection.  Court of laws have always had a well-founded quarrel with parties who resort to raising preliminary objections in improperly”.

Further in the case  of George Kamau Kimani & 4 Others…Vs…County Government of Trans Nzoia & Another  (2014), eKLR, where the Court held that:-

“I have considered the points raised by the 1^st Defendant.  All those points can be argued in the normal manner.  They do not qualify to be raised as Preliminary Points.  One cannot raise a ground of res judicata by way of Preliminary Objection. The best way to raise a ground of res judicata is by way of Notice of Motion where pleadings are annexed to enable the court to determine whether the current suit is res judicata.  Professor Sifuna did not raise the issue of res judicata by way of Notice of Motion.  Professor Sifuna only annexed a ruling in respect of a case which was struck out. This is not a proper way of issues which require ascertainment of facts by way of evidence.  They cannot be brought by way of Preliminary Objection”.

For the Court to determine whether the issues herein were directly and substantially in issue with the other suit, it is this Court’s considered view that it will have to ascertain facts and probing of evidence. Further the issue on whether or not the same is Subjudice, facts have to be ascertained and a Preliminary Objection cannot be raised on disputed facts.  Therefore, this Court holds and finds that what has been raised by the 2^nd to 5^th Defendants does not amount to a Preliminary Objection, hence the same is dismissed.

On the 1^st Defendants   Notice of Preliminary Objection that the Court has no jurisdiction and that the Application is inherently bad in law, it is not in doubt that without jurisdiction a Court of law has no option but to down its tools. A question of jurisdiction is based on a pure point of law and therefore the Court finds and holds that the said objection meets the description of what amounts to a Preliminary Objection.

Further the  4^th Interested Party raised its Preliminary Objection and alleged that the  suit is incompetent as the 1^st Plaintiff has no capacity to sue  in the manner that it has sued.   That the 2^nd Plaintiff has not set out any independent  cause of action, and thus the Court has no jurisdiction  and the suit is time barred. As already held above, the issue of jurisdiction is a Preliminary Objection properly raised as it can dispose off a suit preliminarily and does not require the ascertainment of facts. Equally the question of whether the Plaintiffs have locus standi to file this suit goes to the jurisdiction of this Court. Without locus, a suit cannot stand and therefore the Court also finds and holds that the same is a properly raised Preliminary Objection. See the case of Law Society of Kenya …Vs… Commissioner of Lands & Others, Nakuru High Court Civil Case No.464 of 2000, where the Court held that ;-

“Locus Standi signifies a right to be heard, A person must have sufficiency of interest to sustain his standing to  sue in Court of  Law”. Further in the case of Alfred Njau and Others ..Vs.. City Council of Nairobi ( 1982) KAR 229, the Court also held that;-

 “the term Locus Standi means a right to appear in Court and conversely to say that a person has no Locus Standi means that he has no right to appear or be heard in such and such proceedings”.

It is evident that locus standi is the right to appear and be heard in Court or other proceedings and literally, it means ‘a place of standing’. Therefore if a party is found to have no locus standi, then it means he/she cannot be heard even on whether or not he has a case worth listening to. Further if this Court was to find that the Applicants have no locus standi, then the Applicanst cannot be heard and that point alone may dispose of the suit. In the case of Quick Enterprises Ltd  …Vs...  Kenya Railways Corporation, Kisumu High Court Civil Case No.22 of 1999,  the Court  held that:-

“When preliminary points are raised, they should be capable of disposing the matter preliminarily without the court having to resort to ascertaining the facts from elsewhere apart from looking at the pleadings alone.”

On whether the suit is time barred or not, the Court finds tha the same would not require probing of evidence or ascertaining of facts and thus the same is also a Preliminary Objection properly raised.

Having held and found that what has been raised by the objectors herein fits the description of a Preliminary Objection, the Court will now embark on determining whether the Preliminary Objections are merited.

It is the 1^st Defendants contention that the Plaintiffs have no locus standi  to file this claim.   This contention is based on the fact that the 1^st Plaintiff does not exist and further that the 2^nd Plaintiff has no written authority and this has been submitted as much. The Court recognises that while determining issues via Preliminary Objection, the Court should not be required to probe evidence.  However, the 1 Defendant having alleged that the Plaintiffs did not exist, evidence of its existence was provided through a further affidavit together with a written authority which in the Court’s considered view  settles the matter.

Further, it is important to note that though over time, there has been a requirement for a written authority  to be presented,  the Courts have   pointed out that the said written authority is not necessary as long as the deponent has stated that he has the said authority. See the case of Bethany Vineyards Limited & Another v Equity Bank Limited & 2 Others [2020] eKLR where the Court held that;

“The decision has since been applied in Kenyan courts, for example, inFubeco China Fushun v Naiposha Company Limited & 11 others [2014] eKLR.

10. It does become apparent that there no requirement for a company to present a resolution of a company indicating that a company has authorized the filing of a suit or has authorized the swearing of an affidavit on its behalf nor, for that matter, confirming it has authorized an advocate to represent it. It suffices for the deponent to state that he has authority to do such act.”

Therefore, this court finds and holds that the Preliminary objection based on non-existence of the 1^st Plaintiff and lack of written authority are not merited and the Court dismisses the same.

The 4^th Interested Party on the other hand has raised an objection on the basis of the 1^st Plaintiff to sue on its own name and further that the 2^nd Plaintiff  lack of an independent cause of action. The Plaintiffs in their  submissions have acknowledged that the 1^st Plaintiff has no capacity to sue in its own name.  However, they submitted that the 2^nd Plaintiff has sued  on behalf of the 1^st Plaintiff. Section 41 of the Societies Act provides;

“Whereby a Society is charged with an offence under this Act or any rules made thereunder, the Society may appear by a representative, who may enter a plea on behalf of the Society and conduct the Society’s defence on its behalf.

(2) In this Section representative in relation to a Society means a person who the Court is satisfied has been duly appointed in writing by the Society to represent it.”

With regards to the 1^st plaintiff, the Court is satisfied that it does not have locus standi to sue the way it has sued and for that reason, it should be struck out from the suit.

As to whether the 2^nd Plaintiff has  an independent reasonable cause of action, this issue goes to the merits of the case and can only be ascertained at the trial. See the case of Wilmot Mwadilo, Edwin Mwakaya, Amos Nyatta & Patrick Mbinga …Vs…Eliud Timothy Mwamunga & Sagalla Ranchers Limited [2017] eKLR, where the Court held that:-

“Upholding the said Preliminary Objection at this stage would be draconian as there appeared to be substantive issues that had emerged that needed to be heard and determined at the time of the hearing of the said Notice of Motion application.

Indeed, the question of whether they have a cause of action against the Defendant and if they can sustain the same against him ought to be considered during the hearing of their Notice of Motion application when this court will consider whether or not leave should be granted for them to continue with the derivative action against him. The said question cannot be considered at this stage as there is potential of the court inadvertently delving into the merits or otherwise of their said application”.

Further, it is disputed as to whether the 2^nd Plaintiff has filed the suit on behalf of the 1^st Plaintiffs. The 4^th interested Party in its submissions submitted that the Plaint does not state that the suit is  being instituted by Mr. Karira on behalf of  the 1^st Plaintiff. It would seem in the Court’s considered view that the only issue is that, in the jurat the 2^nd Plaintiff does not indicate that he is suing on behalf of the 1^st Plaintiff.  Section 41((2) of the Societies Act provides that;

“In this Section representative in relation to a Society means a person who the Court is satisfied has been duly appointed in writing by the Society to represent it.”

The Court has seen the Authority given to the 2^nd Plaintiff to act on behalf of the 1^st Plaintiff.  Therefore, this Court is satisfied that the 2^nd plaintiff being the Chairman; that is an official of the 1^st Plaintiff and with Authority to represent it, has locus standi. Consequently, the Court finds and holds that  while the 1^st Plaintiff has no locus standi, the 2^nd Plaintiff has such locus standi .

On the issue of jurisdiction, it is the 1^st Defendant’s contention that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter as it is ripe for review. It is their contention that the Plaintiffs complaints fall within the planning laws of Kenya. However having gone through the Plaint, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are questioning the process of acquisition of the suit property and the subsequent sale of the same.  Even in its prayers, there is no prayer that involves the planning, use and regulation of the development as submitted by the 1^st Defendant. For the above reasons, the Court finds and holds that the objection on jurisdiction based on this fact is not merited and the same is dismissed.

The 4^th Interested Party has also submitted that the suit is time barred as the cause of action is the alleged eviction of the Plaintiffs’ ancestors from the parcel of land dating back to 1895. However, having carefully gone through the Plaint , it is the Court’s considered view that the said suit finds  its foundation from the determination of the National Land Commission that was  made on 7^th  February 2019. It is not in doubt that the National Land Commission is empowered to look at historical injustices and make a recommendation and that it is in the basis of the said determination that the suit was filed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is based on historical injustices and thus time barred. Again the Court  finds and holds that the objection on jurisdiction is not merited.

The Upshot of the foregoing analysis is that the 2^nd to 5^th Defendants Preliminary Objection dated 17^th June 2020, is not merited and the same is dismissed entirely with Costs.

With Regards to the 1^st Defendants’ Preliminary Objection dated 23^rd June 2020, the Court finds it not merited and the same is also dismissed entirely with costs. However, the 4^th  Interested Party’s Preliminary Objection dated 17^th June 2020, is merited in so far as the  1^st Plaintiff has no  locus standi and therefore the 1^st Plaintiff is struck out of the suit. With regards to the issue of locus standi for the 2^nd Plaintiff, the Court finds that the said Preliminary Objection is not merited and the same is dismissed.

On the issue of jurisdiction and on whether the suit is time barred, the Court having held that the same is not time barred, dismisses the said Preliminary Objection. Consequently, the Preliminary Objection by the 4^th Interested Party is upheld only in terms of the capacity of the 1^st  Plaintiff to sue, who has been struck out of  this suit.

It is so ordered.

Dated, signed and Delivered at Thika this 1^st  day of October 2020

L. GACHERU

JUDGE

1/10/2020

Court Assistant -  Lucy

ORDER

In view of the declaration of measures restricting court operations due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15^th March 2020, this Ruling has been delivered to the parties online with their consents. They have waived compliance with Order 21 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open Court.

With Consent of and virtual appearance via video conference (Microsoft Teams Platform)

Mr. Ikua for the 1^st and 2^nd Plaintiffs/Applicants

Mr. Abuya for the 1^st Defendant/Objector

No appearance for the 2^nd Defendant/ Objector

No appearance for the 3^rd Defendant/Objector

No appearance for the 4^th  Defendant/Objector

No appearance for the 5^th  Defendant/Objector

No appearance for the 1^st Interested Party

No appearance for the 2^nd  Interested Party

No appearance for the 3^rd Interested Party

Mr. Thuo for the 4^th  Interested Party/Objector

L. GACHERU

JUDGE

1/10/2020