Susan Otieno v Lilian Awuor Athoo &4 others [2020] KECPT 15 (KLR)

Susan Otieno v Lilian Awuor Athoo &4 others [2020] KECPT 15 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE CO-OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL

AT NAIROBI

TRIBUNAL CASE NO.205 OF 2019

SUSAN  OTIENO..............................................................CLAIMANT

VERSUS

LILIAN  AWUOR  ATHOO.................................1ST  RESPONDENT

MICHAEL  SARUNI ............................................2ND RESPONDENT

BILLY  BRIAN  OMONDI....................................3RD RESPONDENT

SHIRIKA SACCO  SOCIETY LIMITED...........4TH RESPONDENT

RULING

What is before us for consideration and determination is the Claimant’s Application dated 8.4.2019. It seeks, for the following Orders:

1. Spent;

2. That the 4th Respondent  herein  be  restrained  from further  deducting  the Claimant’s  salary  in recovery of the loans guaranteed  by the Claimant and advanced  by the  4th  Respondent  to the 1st, 2nd  and 3rd Respondents pending  interparties  hearing and/or  final determination  of this Application;

3. That  the  4th Respondent  herein be restrained  from further  deducting  the Claimant’s  salary  in recovery  of the loans  guaranteed by the Claimant and advanced  by the  4th  Respondent to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd  Respondents pending final determination  of the claim herein; and  

4. That costs of this Application be provided for.

The Application is supported by the grounds on its face and the following Affidavits:

a. Supporting  Affidavit  sworn by  the Claimant on 8.4.2019; and

b. Further Affidavit sworn by the Claimant on 17.7.2019.

The Respondent has opposed the Application by filing a Replying Affidavit sworn by Grace Nyangi, the 4th  Respondent’s  Credit  Manager on 21.5.2019.

 Vide the directions  given  on  4.8.2020,  the Application  was canvassed  by  way of written  submissions. The Claimant filed  hers on  15.9.2020 while the 4th  Respondent  did so  on  15.9.2020.

Claimant’s Contention

Vide the  Instant  Application,  the Claimant  contend  that since  she has  instituted  the instant  claim  to seek recoveries  of monies  deducted  from her  by the  4th  Respondent be restrained  from further  effecting  the said deductions. She avers  that she  guaranteed  the  1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents for  loans applied  for on diverse  dates in the years, 2017 and 2018. That  the breakdowns  of  the loans  applied  by then  in as  follows:

1. 1st  Respondent     - Kshs.1,500,000/= on 15.12.2017

  • Kshs. 900,000/= on 11.1.2018

b. 2nd Respondent                - Kshs.   500,000/=

c. 3rd Respondent                - Kshs.   500,000/=

                   Total                               Kshs.3,400,000/=

4th Respondent’s Case

On its  part,  the 4th Respondent  avers  that the Application is incompetent  and fatally  defective  since the prayer  for a temporary  injunction  is not  supported  by a prayer  of a permanent injunction in the main claim.

That  the Claimant  is  a guarantor of the  1st , 2nd and 3rd  Respondents. That the said  Respondents have defaulted  in repayment  of the loan  they  took aggregating  to Kshs.3,400,000/=. That having  failed to repay the said  loan,  the 4th  Claimant  is within  its rights  to recover  the said  loan  from the Claimant. That  if the  court were  to grant  the prayers  sought,  then  the same  would amount  to re-writing  the contract  for the parties. That  it therefore seeks  for the Application  to  be dismissed  with costs.

Claimant’s further Affidavit  sworn  on 17.7.2019

Vide this Affidavit, the Claimant  has faulted  the  4th  Respondent  for discriminately  recovering  the defaulted  amount from  her  and leaving  the  other two  guarantors. That the  4th  Respondent has  attached the  entirely  of her salary.

Issues for determination

We have framed the following issues for determination:

a. Whether  the Claimant  has established  a proper basis to warrant  the grant  of a temporary  injunction;

b. Who should meet the costs of the Application?

Temporary injunction

We have  jurisdiction  to make  an order  regarding  temporary  injunctions  by dint  of order 40  of the Civil  Procedure  Rules. Order  40  Rule 1  (a) provides  thus:

      “ Where  in any suit  it is proved  by Affidavit or otherwise –

a. That  any property  in dispute  in a suit is  in  danger  of being  wasted,  damaged, or alienated  by any party to  the  suit, or wrongly sold in execution of a decree,  the court may  by order  grant  a temporary  injunction to  restrain  such  act, or  make such  other  order  for the purpose  of staying  and preventing  the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale,  removal, or disposition of the property  as the court thinks fit, until  the disposal  of the  suit  or until further  orders.

Before  exercising  the above  jurisdiction,  we are  guided  by  the Principles  enunciated  by the court in  the case of  Giella – versus-  Cassman  Brown [1973] EA. They  include:

a.  A prima facie case  with a probability  of success;

b. Irreparable  damage; and

c. Balance  of Convenience.

The court   in the  case of Mrao  Limited  versus  first  American Bank  of Kenya  Limited (2003) eKLR explained what  Constitute  a Prima Facie  case  in the following terms:

“.......A Prima Facie  case is  more than  an arguable  case. It is  not sufficient  to  raise  issues.  The evidence  must show  an infringement  of a right  and the probability  of  the Applicant’s case  upon trial.  It is a case which  on the material  presented,  to the  court,  a Tribunal  properly  directing  itself  will conclude  that there  exists  a right  which  has apparently been infringed  by the  opposite  party as to call  for an explanation from  the latter......”

The  question  that arises  is whether  the Claimant  has established  a prima facie case  with a probability  of  success. The Claimant  borne  of  contention  is that the  4th  Respondent  has maliciously attached  a bigger  chunk  of  her  salary  in a bid  to recover  the loans defaulted  by the  1st, 2nd and 3rd  Respondents. That  the  4th Respondent  has only opted  to recover  the said loans from  her and leaving behind  two of the  1st, 2nd and  3rd Respondents other guarantors.  That having  lodged  this claim  with the Tribunal, it is only  fair that the said  deductions  be halted.

We have  perused the loan  Application  forms annexed  to the  Replying  Affidavit sworn by Grace  Nyangi  on  21.5.2019.  We note  that the Claimant guaranteed  the 1st, 2nd and 3rd  Respondents as follows:

a. 1st Respondent    - Kshs. 300,000/= for the loan of  Kshs.900,000/=

b. 3rd Respondent   - Kshs.250,000/= for the loan  of Kshs.500,000/=

The Claimant  has annexed  the said  forms to her  Supporting  Affidavit sworn on 8.4.2019.

What  we deduce  from the  said forms  is that the amounts  guaranteed  by each  guarantor  is expressly indicated  in the loan Application  form and signed  for by each  of the guarantors. In the event of default,  the guarantor will be liable  for attachment  to the  extent  of the amounts  guaranteed. What  then is the Claimants contention? We  have not  heard the Claimant  allege  that whatever  is being recovered  is more and  above  what she  guaranteed. All she aver is that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd  Respondents  have defaulted  in repaying  the loan  and that since she has lodged the instant  claim,  then an Order  of injunction  should automatically issue. Put it  the other way round, the Claimant  contends  that the  4th  Respondent  should not  commence  attachment  of her salaries  unless  it does so for the other  guarantors. Better still,  the  Claimant  contend that  the 4th  Respondent  has raided  on her payslip over and above  what is limited  by law.  We find that  the summation of all these grounds  do not  warrant  the issuance  of a temporary  injunction.  The Claimant  knew  very well  the arena  she ws getting laid when  she accepted  to guarantee  the Respondents the said  loans.  She  cannot now  seek refuge  in this Tribunal  now that  chicken  have come  home to roast.

Conclusion

The upshot  of the foregoing  is that we  find that the  Claimant  has not established  a Prima Facie  case  with  a probability  of success.  With this conclusion  we stop  at  this principle  and down our tools. We find  no need  to consider the  other two  limbs  of the  principles enunciated  in  the Giella  -vs- Cassman Brown case.  We therefore dismiss  the Claimant’s  case with  costs  in the cause.

RULING SIGNED, DATED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 3RD DAY OF DECEMBER, 2020

Hon. B. Kimemia                Chairperson                    ...........................

Hon. F. Terer                       Deputy Chairman             ............................

Mr. P. Gichuki                     Member                             ..............................

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