Kabita & 4 others v Kariuki (Civil Appeal (Application) 33 of 2015) [2023] KECA 1551 (KLR) (15 December 2023) (Ruling)
Neutral citation:
[2023] KECA 1551 (KLR)
Republic of Kenya
Civil Appeal (Application) 33 of 2015
MSA Makhandia, FA Ochieng & WK Korir, JJA
December 15, 2023
Between
Angelica Kabisa Kabita
1st Applicant
Joyce Wambuku Ngangira
2nd Applicant
Boniface Kiratu Njogu
3rd Applicant
Mary Agnes Gathoni Gakuo
4th Applicant
Vitalis L Oloo
5th Applicant
and
Samwel Maina Kariuki
Respondent
(Being an application to reopen, re-examine or set aside the Judgment of the Court of Appeal at Nakuru, (Nambuye, Okwengu & Kiage, JJ. A) dated 18th October, 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2015)
Ruling
1.The application before us is dated 13th February, 2023. The application is brought pursuant to Section 3 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, and Rule 1(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules. The applicant prays for orders that; the court be pleased to have its judgment dated 18th October, 2017 reopened, re-examined, set aside and the appeal heard afresh.
2.The application is premised on the grounds that:
3.The application was further supported by the applicant’s affidavit in which he stated as follows:
4In opposition to the application, the respondent in his replying affidavit stated that:
5.When the application came up for hearing on 4th October, 2023, Ms. Njeri Njagua, learned counsel appeared for the applicant whereas Mr. Mbiyu, learned counsel appeared for the respondent. Counsel relied on their respective written submissions, which they briefly highlighted.
6.Ms. Njagua submitted that the applicant owned the suit land as the impugned judgment has not been executed. The applicant was acting in person, and after judgment, her firm filed a notice of appointment of advocates. It is trite that where a parcel of land is within the municipality, consent is not required. However, consent was obtained in this instance.
7.Mr. Mbiyu submitted that a court must only have one go at a matter, unless it is for the correction of an error. The annexed consent relates to the suit land, whereas the agreement before the trial court related to Block 22/982 which had no consent. The applicant has not filed an application to adduce additional evidence yet seeks to introduce new evidence. Counsel pointed out that the application has been brought six (6) years late.
8.Citing the cases of Raila Odinga & 2 Others v IEBC & 3 Others [2013] eKLR and Telkom Kenya Limited v John Ochanda & 996 Others [2014] eKLR the respondent reiterated that this Court was functus officio and it could not be called upon to re- engage in a matter it had already pronounced itself on.
9.We have carefully perused the application, the affidavits by both parties, submissions by counsel, the authorities cited and the law. The issue for determination is whether or not the application before us is merited.
10.The applicant has relied on the overriding objectives to invoke the residual jurisdiction of this Court to review its own judgment. The residual jurisdiction of this Court is limited in scope, and it is to be applied cautiously and sparingly in cases whose decisions are not appealable to the Supreme Court; and only where it will serve to promote public interest and enhance public confidence in the rule of law and our system of justice. In the case of Nyutu Agrovet Limited v Airtel Networks Kenya Ltd & Another [2019] eKLR the Supreme Court held thus:
11.Similarly, in Synergy Industrial Credit Limited v Cape Holdings Limited [2019] eKLR, the court stated that:
12.When called upon to exercise the residual jurisdiction of the court, two competing principles come to mind; the “principle on finality” of litigation on the one hand which does not support review and the “justice principle” on the other hand which favours limited review, predicated on the basis that the object of litigation is to do justice.
13.In the case of Taylor & another v Lawrence & Another [2002] 2 All ER 353, the lead judgment by the Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, dealt with both the justice principle and finality principle and held that the Court of Appeal:
14.This Court in the case of Benjoh Amalgamated Limited & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2014] eKLR held that; the residual jurisdiction of the court to review its own decisionsIn that case, the court, after reviewing decisions from different jurisdictions on the question of review had this to say:
15.The applicant’s main ground for seeking to reopen the appeal is the discovery of new evidence. In the case of Brown v Dean [1910] AC 373, the House of Lords affirmed a decision of the Court of Appeal and quoted the passage of Lord Loreburn, L.C. where it stated at pg. 374 that:
16.In Re Barrell Enterprises & Others [1972] 3 All ER 63, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, declined to open a concluded appeal and held that the discovery of fresh evidence was not a ground for allowing a further hearing before the Court of Appeal. The Court (as per Russel, L. J) stated (pg. 636 letters f to g that:
17.The applicant stated that he discovered new evidence in early 2021, that the original title to the suit land was in the custody of Kamere & Company Advocates. In our view, the mere stating that the applicant had discovered new evidence was not enough. He had an obligation to explain the effect of the new discovery on the impugned judgment. In this instance, the applicant has failed to demonstrate how this discovery will impact the impugned judgement.
18.In Flower v Lloyd (C. A. 1877) Law Reports, Ch D, the Court of Appeal (Chancery Division) emphasized that; it had no jurisdiction to rehear the appeal and that in the case of a decree or judgment being obtained by fraud, there was always power in the courts of law to give adequate relief.
19.The applicant also stated that the respondent had obtained the title to the suit land fraudulently. We note that there is a criminal case pending before court in this regard, and therefore we cannot pronounce ourselves on the issue.
20.The applicant has also pointed out that the impugned judgment was based on the fact that a consent from the Land Control Board had not been obtained in relation to the suit land; but he had also discovered that a consent had indeed been obtained. We find that the consent exhibited is doubtful. The applicant mentioned that the consent was not necessary, yet he had proceeded to obtain the same.
21.The respondent was of the view that the issues being raised by the applicant were new issues which were not raised before the trial court, hence the trial court did not have the opportunity to address itself on the issues. He also pointed out that the application had been brought six (6) years late. We find that the delay in filing the application has not been explained, the applicant having made the discoveries in the year 2021. The present application was filed in 2023, over a year after the said discovery.
22.In the case of Ushago Diani Investment Limited v Jabeen Manan Abdulwahab [2019] eKLR, this court while dismissing the application for review held that:
23.We are not satisfied that the grounds set out by the applicant are sufficient to invoke this court’s limited jurisdiction to review its own decision, as that window for reopening an appeal is limited.
24.In the result, we find that the application lacks merit and it is dismissed. As costs follow the event, the respondent will have the costs of this application.Orders accordingly.
DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023.ASIKE-MAKHANDIA……………………………………………………………… JUDGE OF APPEALF. OCHIENG……………………………………………………………… JUDGE OF APPEAL……………………………………………………………… W. KORIR……………………………………………………………… JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.signed DEPUTY REGISTRAR