National Cereals & Produce Board v Erad Suppliers & General Contracts Limited [2014] KECA 473 (KLR)

IN THE  COURT OF APPEAL

AT NAIROBI

CORAM:  (NAMBUYE,  KIAGE  & GATEMBU,  JJ.A)

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2012

BETWEEN

NATIONAL  CEREALS & PRODUCE BOARD.................................APPELLANT

AND

ERAD SUPPLIERS & GENERAL CONTRACTS LIMITED..........RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the ruling and order of the High Court of Kenya at

Nairobi  (Njagi, J) given on 28th June, 2011 in

MISC.  CIV APPLICATION NO. 639  OF 2009)

*************

RULING  OF THE  COURT

1.      The   appellant/applicant,    National   Cereals    and    Produce Board, (hereafter referred to as “the Board”) seeks leave of the Court  under  Rule  29(1)(b)(2)  of  the  Rules  of  the  Court  to adduce  further evidence in support of the appeal.  It proposes, if  leave is  granted, to present the further  evidence  by  filing and  serving  a supplementary record. The additional evidence that the Board proposes  to adduce  is a special  report of the Public  Investments Committee adopted  by  the National Assembly    on   12th    November   2013   (“the   report”)  on   the contract between  the Board and  the respondent, which is the basis  of the relationship  between  the parties in  this appeal. The Board says that the report contains new and important evidence that is necessary for the fair and  just  determination of the appeal.

Background

2.      The  Board  is  established under  section   3  of  the  National Cereals  and  Produce  Board Act,  chapter 338  of the Laws  of Kenya.  It is mandated under that statute  to buy,  store, sell, import or otherwise  acquire and  dispose  of maize  and  other cereals in order to fulfill the requirements of producers and consumers in Kenya.

3.      Sometime  in  the year 2004  the Board invited tenders for the supply of imported white  maize.  The respondent successfully bid  and was awarded the tender to supply 40,000 metric tons of white maize.

4.      On 26th  August 2004,  the parties entered into a Maize Import Contract (“the  contract”) under which the respondent agreed to sell and  ship  to the Board, which agreed to purchase from the respondent the 40, 000  metric tons of white maize on the terms and conditions set out in the contract.

5.       A   dispute    arose   between   the    parties     under    the    contract.

Clause 12.0 of the contract provided that:

“All  disputes  arising  out  of  or  in connection  with  this Agreement or  for  breach hereof  that cannot be settled amicably by the parties   hereto,  shall   be   settled   by   a   sole arbitrator and  such arbitration to be held in Nairobi,  Kenya,    under  the  Arbitration   Act. The arbitrator shall be appointed by Agreement between the parties or in default of Agreement by the Chairman of the Kenya  Chapter of Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.”

6.      In  accordance with that clause,  the dispute  was  referred to Mr.  E.  T.  Gaturu  advocate   for  arbitration.  Based  on  the pleadings presented before the arbitrator, it was admitted that the  parties  entered   into   the  contract   under   which   the respondent was to supply the Board with 40, 000 metric tons of white maize at a price  of USD 229  per metric ton; that the contract value  was  USD9,  160,000; that  the Board was  to make payment by an irrevocable/confirmed sight letter(s) of credit to be established by the Board.

7.      The crux  of the dispute  as pleaded  by the respondent before the arbitrator  was that “in breach  of the above said  contract, the respondent [the Board] failed to establish the letter of credit as stipulated. On account of this failure, the Claimant [the respondent] was  unable  to perform  the  contract  as  required.” As a result of that alleged breach on the part of the Board, the respondent claimed loss of profit and storage costs.

8.      The  Board in  its pleading before  the arbitrator  averred that the respective obligations of the parties were clearly set out in the contract; that payment was independent of delivery  of the consignment; that delivery  should have  been  done  within  4 weeks from  the date of the contract; that payment was dependent   on   the  respondent  delivering  the  consignment which it failed  to do; that the Board was not obliged  to open a letter of credit  before the shipment of the goods; that the respondent  did   not  ship   the  goods  and   was  therefore   in breach of the contract. The Board contended that as a result of the respondent’s breach  of the contract it suffered loss and counterclaimed for commissions it would  have earned but for the breach by the respondent from the Government of Kenya amounting  to Kshs.  67,654,980.62.  The  respondent denied that it was in breach of the contract.

9.      After hearing the parties, the arbitrator  in  an  arbitral award dated  7th  July 2009  found  that  the Board was  “in breach  of the contract  for failing to open a letter of credit for the claimant as agreed on 26th August  2004…”and that the respondent was entitled to a claim  for loss of profit of USD49  per ton of white maize.    The    arbitrator    awarded   the   respondent   USD1, 960,000.     The    arbitrator     also   awarded   the    respondent    an amount of  USD1,  146,000 for storage  charges  on  the basis that       the           respondent’s            supplier’s      had    already     stored     the 40,000 metric tons of maize.  The total award in  favour of the respondent was  therefore  USD  3,106,000 on  which he  also awarded interest  at 12%  p.a  from 27th   October  2004  “being the  date  by  which   the  claimant would  have  performed   the contract had the respondent played  its part of the deal.”

10.    The  arbitrator  was  not  satisfied  that  the  Board’s counter claim had been proved.  He dismissed it.

11.    The Board was dissatisfied with the arbitrator’s award. On 5th October 2009,  it presented an application to the High Court at Nairobi under section  35 of the Arbitration  Act,  1995  seeking to have  the award set  aside  on  grounds that  the arbitrator dealt with a dispute not contemplated by the parties; that the award smacks   of  mischief, corruption and/or  pure  theft of public funds  against  public policy.  Specifically the Board asserted that the respondent had no maize for delivery  within the contract  terms; that  the respondent was  importing the maize   at  USD   221   and   selling   it  at  USD   229   and   the respondent could  only have earned USD 8 per ton and not the amount of USD49  awarded.

12.    Other  complaints by  the Board were that the arbitrator  was openly  biased and did not consider its case in the award; that the Board subsequently established that the company the respondent had  contracted to supply it with maize,  namely Ropack  CC International does, not in fact deal in maize but is registered with  the South African Department of  Trade and Industry as offering financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and  business services; that the company allegedly claiming the storage charges, namely  Chelsea Freight,  is registered for air  transport;  that  the entire  arbitral process was a circus; that the arbitrator  admitted having  been approached by the respondent’s directors to Rule in its favour and   ought  to  have   resigned;  that   the  amount  awarded together with interest is to be borne by the tax payer when the respondent had  no  maize  at all or the capacity to supply it and that the award is against  public policy.

13.   That application was opposed. After hearing the parties the learned Judge  of the High  Court, the Honourable Mr.  Justice Njagi  was  not persuaded that  a  case  for  setting  aside  the award had  been  made  out. In  his  ruling  dated  28th  October 2011  the learned Judge  dismissed the application with costs. The  learned Judge  however  set  aside  part of  the award in which  the  arbitrator   awarded the  respondent  interest  on costs.  That part of the award was  set­aside  on  the grounds that “the  arbitrator had  no jurisdiction to tax  the costs  of the arbitration.”

14.   Dissatisfied with the ruling of the learned Judge,  the Board instituted   the  present  appeal   on  27th    January  2012.   The grounds of appeal are that the learned Judge  did  not comprehend the  nature  of  the  application;  that  the  Judge failed  to appreciate  that the award involved  public funds  for which  public  policy   demands   proper accounting; that  the learned Judge  wrongly took the view that he could  not revisit the  evidence  before  the  arbitrator;  that  the  learned Judge should have re­opened and re­evaluated the evidence as the award sanitizes theft of public money;  that the learned Judge ignored or glossed over the facts presented that demonstrated that the award smacked  of mischief, corruption  and  theft of public   funds;   that   the   learned  Judge    ignored   a   clear aberration  of  well   known  legal   principles  of  law   by   the arbitrator  which on  grounds of  public policy   demanded   an order for setting aside the award; that the learned Judge erred in  upholding  the arbitrator’s  award on  storage  charges  that was  remote  to the contract and  that the learned Judge  took inordinately long to deliver  the impugned ruling.

15.    We have  set  out that background in  considerable detail  so that the context in which the present application is made may be appreciated. Against  that background the Board says that the new and important evidence, namely  the report should be admitted in  evidence  in  this appeal  in  order that a fair and just  determination of the appeal  may  be achieved.  According to the Board, the report reveals  that the respondent was not worthy to be awarded the tender for the supply of maize; that it presented  an invalid and  unenforceable bid  bond;  that the respondent did  not have maize nor the capacity to supply the maize;  that the entities the respondent cited as its business partners may be non-existent.

Submissions  by learned  counsel

16.    During  the hearing of the application before  us,  the parties were represented by learned counsel.  Mr.  Mohammed Nyaoga and  Mr.  Nyawara  O.J  appeared for  the  Board.  Mr. Ahmednassir Abdullahi,  SC and  Mr. P. Saende  appeared for the respondent.

17.    In a bid  to demonstrate that we should allow  the application, learned counsel  for the Board Mr. Nyaoga submitted that the appeal involves  a public body; that the National Assembly conducted an  investigation on  account of the public interest in  the dispute and  prepared the report that was forwarded to several   bodies;   that   the  application  meets   the  tests  for adducing additional evidence  as set out in  Mzee  Wanjie vs. Saikwa (1982­88)  1 K A R 462;  Joginder Auto  Service  Ltd vs.  Mohammed  Shaffique and  Anor  Civil Appeal  No.  Nai

210  of 2000 among  other authorities;  that the report could not have been obtained when  the application to set aside the award in the High  Court was heard as it was not in existence; that  the  application  in   High   Court  sought  to  impugn  the arbitral  award on  grounds of public policy  and  that had  the report, which is credible, been available when  the application for setting aside  the award was  heard, it is  likely it would have influenced the outcome. Mr.  Nyaoga went on to say that the report is  evidence  for purposes of the Evidence  Act  and that  the report confirms part  of  the grounds on  which the Board sought to impugn the award.

18.    Turning   to  the  contention   by   the  respondent  that   the application does  not lie under  Rule  29  of  the Rules  of  the Court   as   the   High    Court   was   not   exercising  original jurisdiction when dealing with the application for setting aside the award, Mr.  Nyaoga  submitted  that  there is  no  right  of appeal  against  the decision  of an arbitrator unless  parties to an arbitration agreement agree on the right of appeal;  that the High  Court was  exercising original  jurisdiction  conferred by section    35    of   the   Arbitration    Act;    that   in    exercising jurisdiction under that provision, which is neither civil  or criminal,  the  High   Court  does  not  sit   on  appeal  over  the decision  of the arbitrator;  and  that the learned Judge  of the High  Court was mindful that he was not sitting on appeal.  For those reasons Mr.  Nyaoga submitted that the contention that this Court has no power  to hear the matter on the basis  that it did not emanate from  original jurisdiction has no merit.

19.   Opposing  the application, Mr. Ahmednassir Abdullahi, SC submitted  that  the  intention   of  the  Board  in   seeking   to introduce the report  is  to intimidate  the Court and  procure the setting aside  of the arbitral  award by  scaring the Court; that intention, according to counsel, is borne out by the fact that  one   of   the  recommendations  in   the  report   is   that members    of   the  Judicial   Service   Commission   should   be investigated for bench  fixing, corruption and abuse of office in connection with the handling of this case; that the report  is designed to cast aspersions and scandalize  the Court; that the application is not specific  with regard to what evidence  is intended to be admitted; that in  any  event  there is  nothing new  in  the report; there is  nothing new  to be introduced  as the material that was placed  before the National Assembly  on the  basis   of  which  the  report  was  compiled  is  the  same material that was before the High  Court; that the report is an attempt by the National Assembly  to direct and  interfere with the independence of the Court which is against  Article 160  of the Constitution.

20.    Regarding the competence  of  the application,  Mr. Abdullahi submitted that under Rule  29  of the Rules  of the Court, the power to take additional evidence or to order the taking of additional  evidence  exists   when   the  Court  is  seized  of  an appeal from  the decision  of the High  Court when  acting  in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; that in  this case, the High Court, when  dealing with an  application under section  35  of the  Arbitration   Act   was   exercising  appellate   rather  than original  jurisdiction;  that  accordingly the application  under Rule 29 cannot be entertained when the High  Court was exercising appellate  jurisdiction; that under Article 165(3)(e) of the Constitution the jurisdiction  of the High  Court includes “any  other jurisdiction,  original or appellate,  conferred on  it by  legislation”, and  in  this case  the High  Court could  only have been exercising the appellate jurisdiction.

21.    Referring us  to the decision   of  this Court in   Anne  Mumbi Hinga  v Victoria Njoki Gathara  [2009]  eKLR  Mr.  Abdullahi submitted that the respondent has faced endless  applications in  court yet,  there is  no  appeal  pending against  the decree; that the applicant is merely  seeking  to delay  the execution of the decree when it has not appealed against  it.

22.    In  reply Mr.  Nyaoga stated that there is  no  intention on  the part of the Board to either  intimidate or scandalize  the Court by introducing the report; that what the Board seeks is a fair decision; that  the Board is  not interested in  the part of the report that deals  with Judges  and  that paragraphs 4 to 8 of section  7.2  of  the report containing  conclusions reached by the  Public   Accounts  Committee   of  the  National  Assembly contain the crux  of evidence,  which was not before  the High Court.

23.    On jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 29 of the Rules of the Court to take additional evidence,  Mr. Nyaoga submitted that Article  165(3)(e) of the Constitution  makes  reference  to “any other  jurisdiction” and  maintained that  the High  Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction when  dealing with an application under section  35 of the Arbitration  Act.  Referring to  Anne Mumbi  Hinga  v Victoria Njoki Gathara   (supra) Mr. Nyaoga  stated that  under section  39  of  the Arbitration  Act, appeals from  an arbitral award lie only with the consent of the parties and even then, only on questions of law and that when dealing  with   an    application   under   section    35    of   the Arbitration Act  the High  Court exercises  original as opposed to appellate jurisdiction.

Determination

24.    We have considered the application, the affidavits in  support and in reply, the submissions by learned counsel  and the authorities cited.  The relevant part of Rule 29 of the Court of Appeal Rulesprovides as follows:

“29. (1)  On  any   appeal  from   a  decision  of  a  superior court acting in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court shall have power­

(a)  to  re­appraise  the  evidence  and   to  draw inferences of fact; and

(b)  in its discretion, for  sufficient reason,   to take additional evidence or  to direct that additional evidence be taken by the trial  court or  by a commissioner.

(2)  When  additional evidence  is taken  by  the Court, it may  be oral or by affidavit  and  the Court may  allow the cross­examination of any  deponent.

(3)  When  additional evidence  is taken by the trial court, it shall certify such evidence to the Court, with a statement  of  its  opinion  on  the  credibility  of  the witness  or  witnesses  giving  the additional  evidence; when  evidence  is taken by a  commissioner,  he shall certify the evidence to the Court, without any  such statements of opinion.

(4)   The   parties  to  the  appeal  shall   be  entitled  to  be present when  such additional evidence is taken.”

25.    Learned  counsel   are  in  agreement  regarding the  principles that guide this Court when  exercising the discretionary power under Rule 29 of the Rules of the Court. Those principles are were well summarized by Chesoni Ag JA in  Mzee  Wanjie and

93  others  v A K Saikwa and  others  (1982­88) 1 KAR  462 where he stated:

“The principles upon which an appellate court in Kenya  in a  civil case  will exercise  its discretion in deciding whether or not to receive further  evidence  are   the  same  as  those  laid down  by Lord  Denning  LJ,  as  he  then was,  in the case of Ladd  v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 at 1491 and  those principles are:

(a)  It  must be  shown  that  the evidence  could not  have  been  obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;

(b) The  evidence  must be such  that, if given,  it would probably have  an  important influence on the result of the case,  though it need  not be decisive;

(c) The  evidence  must be such  as is presumably to be believed,  or  in other words,  it must be apparently credible, though it  need  not  be incontrovertible”.

See   also    Joginder   Auto   Services    Ltd   v   Mohammed Shaffique and  another Civil Appeal  (Application)  No.  Nai 210  of  2000 (2001) eKLR  and  also  Kuwinda   Rurinja Co. Ltd v Kuwinda  Holdings Ltd Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2003

26.    Before we consider whether the applicant’s application is one befitting  of  favourable  exercise   of  discretion,  there  is  the question whether the appeal  before  this Court is  an  appeal from a decision  of the High  Court “acting in the exercise of its original jurisdiction…” within  Rule  29  of  the  Rules  of  the Court. In other words, is the application before us competent on account of the fact  that the appeal before  the Court is an appeal   from  the  decision   of  the  High   Court  made   under section   35   of  the  Arbitration   Act?   Or  differently  put,  in exercising its power  under section  35  of the Arbitration  Act does  the High   Court exercise  original jurisdiction  so  as  to render  an   appeal   from  such   decision   an   “appeal   from   a decision of superior  court  acting in the  exercise of its original jurisdiction” within the meaning of Rule 29 of the Rules of this Court?

27.    The  Arbitration Act,  Act  No. 4 of 1995  is  based  on  a Model Law on international commercial arbitration adopted  in  1985 by the United Nations Commission on International Law (UNCITRAL).  One of the principles underlying the Model  law and in turn the Arbitration Act is the severe restriction on the role of the court in  the arbitral  process.  That principle finds expression  in   section   10   of   the  Act.   Section   35   of   the Arbitration Act  is  itself underpinned by  that principle. Our courts  have,   since   the  coming   into  force   of  that  statute, observed  and  given  effect  to that principle. In  Anne  Mumbi Hinga  v  Victoria  Njoki Gathara  [2009]   eKLR  for instance the  Court,  in   reference  to  the  right  of  appeal  against   an arbitral award under section  39 of the Arbitration Act stated:

“It is clear from the above provisions, that any    intervention  by   the  court  against   the arbitral proceedings   or the award can  only be valid with the prior consent  of  the parties to the arbitration  pursuant to Section 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act 1995.   In the matter before  us there  was   no  such   advance  consent   by  the parties.   Even    where     such    consent    is   in existence the consent  can  only be on questions of  law and   nothing else.  Again an  appeal to this Court can only be on matters set out in Section  39  (2)  with leave  of  the High  Court or with leave of this Court. All these requirements have  not  been complied  with and  therefore the appeal is improperly before us and  is incompetent.”

28.    The  Court  went  on  to  say  in   that  case  that  one  of  the principles underlying the Arbitration  Act is the recognition of an important public policy  in  enforcement  of awards and  the principle of finality.

29.     In  Kenya  Shell  Ltd vs. Kobil  Petroleum  Ltd [2006]  2 KLR 251  while  declining leave  to appeal  the decision  of the High Court  emanating from arbitration  proceedings, this  Court underscored the principle of finality of arbitral awards and “a severe  limitation of access  to the  Courts”  as a pointer to the public policy  the country takes.

30.    Section  35  of the Arbitration  Act  permits the setting aside  of an arbitral award. It does not permit an appeal.  Setting aside is          a  narrower  avenue   for  challenging  an   award  than  an appeal.  The grounds for setting aside an award are restricted under the Act.  Section  35 of the Arbitration  Act was however not in its present form when  the Act was first enacted.  At the time, the grounds for applying to set aside an arbitral award were    confined   to   incapacity   of   a   party   to   arbitration agreement;  invalidity of arbitration agreement;  failure  to give notice of appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or  failing  to  accord opportunity  to  a  party  to present his  case; exceeding  of the mandate by the arbitrator and  composition of the tribunal  not according with the agreement of the parties. In addition the High  Court could  set aside  the award if it found  that the dispute  is not capable  of settlement by arbitration  under the law of Kenya or the award is in conflict with public policy  of Kenya.

31.    In  the year 2009,  under Act  11  of that year, the grounds for applying  to  set  aside  an  arbitral  award were  expanded   to include circumstances where the making of the arbitral award was induced or affected  by fraud, bribery, undue influence or corruption.  That amendment was done  for a good reason: to enhance  the credibility of the arbitration  process.  In  order to arrive at a decision  whether an arbitral award was induced or affected  by fraud, bribery, undue influence or corruption, the High  Court must, in our view, be guided  by evidence. For that purpose, it is open for parties to present evidence  before  the High  Court and  for the High  Court to take and  consider such evidence.  In  doing   so  and  to that  extent, we  consider  for purposes of  Rule  29  that  the High  Court is  called  upon  to exercise original jurisdiction.  That view of the matter accords with  the  definition  of  the  phrase  ‘original  jurisdiction’   in Black's  Law  Dictionary 4th  Ed.  Rev.  6­1971  where  it is defined  thus: “Jurisdiction in the first instance; jurisdiction to take  cognizance  of a  cause  at  its inception, try  it, and  pass judgment upon the law and facts.”

32.    Section  35 as amended  by Act 11 of 2009  clearly provides  for the setting aside  of  an  arbitral  award on  grounds of  fraud, bribery,  undue   influence  or  corruption.  As  we  have  said whether an award is tainted by any of those vices is a matter of  fact,  on  which  the High   Court must be  satisfied before passing    ‘judgment’.   For   that   purpose,  the   High    Court exercises original jurisdiction. In the same vein,  it is also open for this Court, where  a decision  of the High  Court emanating from such  challenge  is appealed,  to take or order the taking of additional evidence should circumstances permit.

33.    We think one object  of restricting the operation of the powers of the Court under Rule 29 to circumstances where  the court whose decision  is appealed  from  was acting  in  the exercise of its original jurisdiction is  to avoid  a  situation where,  when this Court is dealing with a second  appeal it is asked  to take additional evidence  which the first appellate  court would  not have had an opportunity to consider.

34.    Indeed   even  before   the  amendment  of  section   35   of  the Arbitration Act  by Act  No. 11  of 2009  the Court appreciated that   there   may    be   circumstances   when    it  would    be permissible to intervene and decline  the enforcement of an arbitral  award on  grounds  of  violation  of  public policy.   In Anne   Mumbi   Hinga   v  Victoria  Njoki  Gathara  the  Court stated:

“One   of   the  grounds    relied  on   to invite the superior court’s intervention in not enforcing the award  was  that of  alleged violation  of  the  public  policy.     Again  no intervention should have  been tolerated firstly because of the underlying principles in the Arbitration  Act is  the  recognition  of  an important  public policy in enforcement of arbitral awards and  the principle of finality of arbitral  awards and  secondly  although public policy can never be defined exhaustively and should be approached with extreme caution failure of recognition on the ground  of public policy would involve  some element  of illegality or that it would be injurious to the public good or would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and  fully  informed member of  the public on whose  behalf the State’s powers  are exercised.”

35.    We are for those reasons satisfied that the present application is properly before us.

36.    The next issue for our consideration is whether the Board has satisfied the requirements necessary for us to exercise our discretion in  its favour. The first question is  whether the evidence could  have, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, been obtained for use in  the High  Court. The report was not in existence  at the time the application to set aside the award was heard in  the High  Court. It was made subsequent to the impugned decision  of the High  Court. It follows  therefore that it could  not have  been  produced at the time  of hearing the application in the High Court.

37.  However, the report includes summaries of testimonies of witnesses who appeared before the Parliamentary Committee, conclusions drawn by that Committee  and  recommendations made   by   that  Committee   and   adopted    by   the  National Assembly.  Counsel   for  the  applicant  submitted   that   the critical portion of the report  is  paragraphs 4 to 8 of section 7.2    of   the   report   that   is    titled   “Conclusions.”  Those conclusions are drawn from testimonies of the 28  witnesses who testified before the Committee among other material presented before that Committee. It is not manifest that those witnesses were not available or would  not have been available during  the  hearing  before   the  arbitrator   or  subsequently during the hearing of the application before the High  Court.

38.      There  is  also  the consideration that  the parties themselves may  not  have  had  an  opportunity  to  cross­examine those witnesses although the report says that the Committee closely examined them. We are alive to the provision under Rule 29(2) of  the Rules  of  this  Court to the effect  that  the Court may allow  cross  examination  when  additional evidence  is  taken and  that the respondent may,  should we allow  the taking of additional evidence, avail itself of that right. The object of Rule 29 would  not have been to convert an appeal into a full­blown trial whether the additional evidence is to be taken before this Court or before the High  Court.

39.    In  Mzee  Wanjie and 93  others  v A K Saikwa and others  the Court cautioned that the power to receive further evidence should be exercised  very sparingly and  great  caution should be exercised in admitting fresh evidence. The Court said:

“This   Rule   is  not   intended  to  enable   a party  who   has   discovered   fresh   evidence   to import it nor  is it intended for a  litigant who has  been unsuccessful  at the trial  to patch up the  weak   points  in   his    case   and    fill  up omissions   in  the  Court  of  Appeal.  The   Rule does not authorize the admission of additional evidence  for  the purpose  of  removing  lacunae and  filling in gaps  in evidence.   The  appellate court  must  find  the  evidence  needful. Additional evidence should not be admitted to enable  a  plaintiff  to make  out a  fresh  case  in appeal.  There  would be no end  to litigation  if the Rule were  used for  the purpose  of allowing parties to make  out a fresh  case or to improve their   case   by   calling   further   evidence.    It follows that the power given by the Rule should be exercised very sparingly and  great caution should  be  exercised  in  admitting  fresh evidence.”

40.    Given  those considerations, and  having  regard to the matters that  will  require  consideration  during  the  hearing  of  the appeal as captured in the memorandum of appeal,  we are not persuaded that  the  applicant  has   demonstrated that  the report would   probably have  an  important  influence on  the result of the appeal.    To use  the words of Chesoni  Ag JA  in Mzee Wanjie and 93 others  v A K Saikwa and others,  we do not find  the report needful.

41.    The   application   is   therefore   dismissed.      Costs of   the application shall abide the outcome of the appeal.

Dated and delivered at Nairobi this 11th  day of  July,  2014.

R. N. NAMBUYE

………………………..

JUDGE OF APPEAL

P. O. KIAGE

………………..………

JUDGE OF APPEAL

S. GATEMBU  KAIRU

…………………….

JUDGE OF APPEAL

I certify that this is a true copy of the original.

/ewm

DEPUTY  REGISTRAR