Diana Kethi Kilonzo v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 2 others [2014] KECA 353 (KLR)

IN THE COURT  OF APPEAL AT NAIROBI

(CORAM: KARANJA, MWERA & M’INOTI, JJ.A)

CIVIL APPEAL (APPLICATION) NO 309 OF 2013

BETWEEN

DIANA KETHI KILONZO.………..……………….………..……………. APPLICANT AND

THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL  & BOUNDARIESCOMMISSION……….………......................1STRESPONDENT

THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL

& BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

DISPUTES RESOLUTION COMMITEE..………………………2ND  RESPONDENT

SALAD  BORU  GURACHA

MAKUENI COUNTY RETURNING OFFICER………………..3RD  RESPONDENT

(Application to  admit  additional  evidence in   an   appeal from the Judgment and  Decree of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Mwongo, Ngugi and   Korir, JJ.)  dated 19thJuly,

2013   in

Constitutional Petition No. 359 of 2013)

****************

RULING OF THE COURT

The applicant, Diana Kethi Kilonzo, has moved the  Court under Rule

29  of the  Court  of Appeal Rules  to  take additional evidence in  her  appeal challenging a decision of the  High  Court  that found her  ineligible to  contest the  Makueni Senatorial Seat  in  a by-election held  on  26th  July  2013. She asserts that  the  additional  evidence is  necessary for the  just and  proper determination of her  appeal. The respondents, the  Independent Electoral

and  Boundaries Commission (the  IEBC), the   Independent Electoral and  Boundaries Commission Dispute Resolution Committee  (the Committee)   and    Salad    Boru    Guracha  (the   Returning   Officer) vigorously oppose the  application as misconceived and  without merit. They contend, among others things, that the  discretion of the  Court under Rule 29 cannot be invoked in this  case,  firstly because the  applicant’s appeal arises from the  supervisory rather than  the  original jurisdiction of the  High  Court, and  secondly because the  applicant was  aware  all  along  of the  existence of the  evidence that she now seeks to adduce in this  Court.

The  background to  the  application is  fairly straightforward. Following the   death  of  the   duly   elected  Senator  for  Makueni  County, the   Hon Mutula Kilonzo   on  27th  April,   2013, the  applicant was  nominated by  the Wiper  Democratic  Movement-Kenya  (Wiper  Party)  to   contest  the ensuing by-election, which the  IEBC had  scheduled to  be  held  on  22 nd   July,

2013. On  27th  June,  2013, the  applicant presented herself to  the  Returning Officer, Makueni County, as the  duly  nominated Wiper  Party candidate, upon which a nomination certificate was  issued  to  her,  effectively clearing her  to contest the  by election.

Soon   thereafter  matters  took    a   rather  dramatic  turn  when    two complaints were  registered with the  IEBC challenging her  nomination. The gist of the  complaints was  that the  applicant was  not a registered voter as required by  Article 99(1)(a) of the  Constitution and  section 24(1)(a) of the  Elections Act, 2011 and was therefore not qualified to be nominated as a candidate in the  by-election. The complaints were  heard by the  Committee

which  took   evidence  from  among  others,  two   of  the   complainants, the applicant,   the    returning   officer   and    the    IEBC’s    Director   of    Voter Registration and  Electoral Operations. Those  witnesses were  subjected to  cross-examination and  in  addition the  Committee called for and  perused the  principal register as well  as the  ‘green books’ that contained the  original entries  of  all   registered  voters  in   Langata Constituency, where  the applicant alleged to  have  registered. On 8th  July  2013, the  Committee held that the  applicant’s name  was not in the  register of voters in Langata Constituency;  that   her    voter   registration   acknowledgement  Slip    No.

0002058624  bearing Elector No. 0007331112141125-6  was  suspect;

that the  applicant was not consistent regarding the  station in which she had registered as a voter and  that she  could  not have  registered as a voter, as she  alleged,  using   an  expired passport  and  a  photocopy of her  national identity card.  Ultimately the  Committee concluded that the  applicant was not a registered voter and  revoked the  nomination certificate issued  to  her  by the   retuning  officer.  The  Committee  also   ordered  that  investigations  be launched to establish how the applicant had obtained her purported acknowledgement  slip  from a  booklet that  had  been   used   exclusively to register  the   immediate  former  president, and  which  was  not among the booklets distributed to voter registration centers.

Aggrieved that her  nascent political ambitions had  been  so  abruptly nipped in  the  bud,  the  applicant and  Wiper  Party  lodged Petition No. 359 of 2013 in the  High  Court challenging the  decision of the  Committee. On her part,  the   applicant  sought  declarations that  the   proceedings before the

Committee were   unconstitutional; that her  rights and  freedoms had  been violated by  the  Committee; that the  Committee had  acted ultra vires;  that she  was  indeed  a  duly   registered voter;  and   that she  had   been   validly nominated  as  a  candidate. Additionally  the   applicant  sought an  order of certiorari to quash  the  decision of the  Committee and an order of mandamus to  compel the  IEBC to  include her  name  in  the  Register of  Voters and  to restore her  as  a  candidate in  the   Makueni senatorial  by-election.    Wiper Party,  on  the  other hand,  sought an  order that it was  entitled to  nominate another  candidate in  lieu   of the   applicant,  should her  disqualification  be upheld.

The  petition was  heard by  a  three Judge  bench   empanelled by  the Chief Justice, comprising Mwongo, Ngugi and Korir, JJ. The learned judges, as far as the  applicant is concerned, framed four issues  that were  raised for determination in the  petition, as follows:

i)         Whether the High  Court had  jurisdiction to hear  and determine the petition, and  if so the extent of the jurisdiction;

ii)        Whether the Committee had  jurisdiction to hear  and determine the complaints leading to the petition;

iii)     Whether  the  respondents had   violated  the applicant’s constitutional rights; and

iv)     Whether  the  respondents had   violated  the applicant’s legitimate expectation.

On  19th  July  2013  the  High  Court  found in  favour of the  respondents and  dismissed the  applicant’s petition. It however allowed Wiper  Party  an opportunity to  nominate another candidate in  lieu  of the  applicant. Against

that  decision, the   applicant  filed  Civil   Appeal  309   of  2013,  which is pending for hearing before this  Court. She  followed it up  with the  present application for the  taking of additional evidence.

The  main   grounds upon  which the  application is  based  are  that the evidence is necessary for the  just and  proper determination of the  appeal; that the  evidence was  in  the  possession of the  IEBC but  was  not timeously availed to  the  applicant; that the  evidence was  relied upon  at the  hearing before the  Committee but   it was  not available to  the  applicant; that the applicant was  ambushed with that evidence; that due  to  limited time, the applicant was  not able  to  seek  the  evidence earlier; and  that the  applicant had only  managed to obtain some  of the  evidence pursuant to a court order.

The additional evidence sought to be admitted is “all the reports  of the

respondent   (sic)   referred   to   and   produced   by   its   witnesses    in   the proceedings before  the Nominations Dispute  Resolution Committee: Makueni Senatorial By-Election  during  the  hearing  of Complaint No 1 and  3 (consolidated)  of  2013  against  Diana  Kethi  Kilonzo”,  all  and   any   reports touching on  the  matter of Kethi  Kilonzo  in  the  custody of the  respondent (sic),  a certified copy  of the  voter registration booklet of acknowledgement slips  produced by  the  IEBC before the  Committee; a  certified copy  of the inventory and  serial  numbers of all  the  acknowledgement slips  made  by  or on behalf of the  Respondent; and a certified copy  of the  distribution list of all acknowledgement slip booklets.

The respondents resisted the  application on the  basis of grounds of opposition filed on 7th  April,  2014  and  a replying affidavit sworn  on 3rd   April,

2014, by  Moses  Kipkogei, the  IEBC Legal  Officer. The gist of the  response was  that the  additional evidence was not relied upon  before the  High  Court; that the   evidence  would  have   been   available  to  the   applicant after  the exercise  of  due   diligence;  that  the   applicant  had   not  applied for  the additional evidence during the  High  Court  hearing; that the  application for that evidence was made  only  after the  judgment of the  High  Court; that the additional evidence is not relevant to  the  fair and  just determination of the appeal; that  the   application does   not lie  because  the   pending  appeal  is against a judgment of the  High  Court in the  exercise of its supervisory rather than   its   original  jurisdiction;  and   that the   applicant  has  made   a  similar application before the  High  Court.

With  the  consent of all  counsel, the  application was  heard by  way  of written submissions.

On  behalf of the  applicant, Ms  Soweto, learned counsel, submitted

that the  additional evidence was  in  the  possession of IEBC and  despite the applicant’s   best   efforts,   including   seeking  a   court   order   to    compel production, IEBC had  declined or  stalled in  availing the   evidence. It was counsel’s argument that although that evidence was  produced before the Committee, the  applicant had  not had  time to  peruse it and  had  thus  been ambushed. Learned counsel further contended that due  to limitation of time, the  applicant’s petition  before the  High  Court  was  heard and  determined without the  additional evidence, which she considered critical to her  case.  It was  only   after the   petition was  determined, counsel submitted, that the

applicant obtained the  evidence which she now  seeks  to be admitted in this

Court.

Ms Soweto relied upon  the  ruling of this  Court  in  ESTHER NJOGU &

ANOTHER      V      INDEPENDENT       ELECTORAL      AND      BOUNDARIES     

COMMISSION, Civil  Appeal No  238  of 2013 on the  principles that guide the   Court  in  determination  of applications for leave   to  adduce additional evidence  and   submitted  that  the   application  before  us   satisfied  those principles. The fact of filing of suit to compel IEBC to avail  the  evidence was cited as evidence of reasonable diligence on the  part of the  applicant, while on relevance of the  evidence, it was  submitted that the  additional evidence would show  that the  applicant was  denied a fair hearing and  administrative action that was  lawful, reasonable and  procedurally fair. Counsel  further contended that evidence which had  come  to  light after the  decisions of the Committee and  the  High  Court showed that there were  three “green books” instead of one  and  several discrepancies in the  number of registered voters in  the  polling station where the  applicant  alleges to  have  registered as  a

voter. Relying on  the  decision of this  Court  in  THE ADMINISTRATOR, H H

THE AGHA KHAN PLATINUM JUBILEE HOSPITAL VS MUNYAMBU (1985) KLR   127,  learned  counsel  urged  us   to   admit  the   additional  evidence because  some   assumption  basic   to   both    sides   had   been   falsified  by subsequent events, and  that refusing the  application would affront commonsense or a sense of justice.

Counsel  concluded by  submitting that to  be  admitted, the  additional evidence need   not be  decisive; it only   needs   to  be  shown   that it would probably have  an important influence in the  case.

For the  2nd   respondent, Ms Omuko  submitted that the  application was

incompetent  because the  High  Court  was  sitting in  its  supervisory rather than  original jurisdiction. In learned counsel’s view,  an application under Rule

29  lies  only  in  an  appeal from a  decision of the  High  Court  exercising its original jurisdiction. Counsel  urged that under Article 165  of the  Constitution, the  High  Court  has  original, appellate and  supervisory jurisdiction and  that under Rule 29,  adduction of additional evidence is allowed only  in an appeal arising  from  the   exercise  of  the   original  jurisdiction  of  the   High   Court.

Counsel  relied on the  ruling of this  Court in  PENINAH NANDAKO KILISWA

VS IEBC & 2 OTHERS, CA No 201  of 2013 in which this  Court declined to entertain an  application under Rule  29  in  respect of an  appeal arising from the  exercise of the  review jurisdiction of the  High  Court.

The application was opposed on the  further ground that the  decision of the  High  Court, the  subject of the  appeal, had  been  arrived at without the evidence  in  issue   and  by  seeking  to  introduce that  evidence before this Court,  the  applicant was  merely seeking to  reconstruct her  case  or  to  have

the  same  heard afresh. Learned counsel relied on the  decisions in  PENINAH

NANDAKO  KILISWA  VS  IEBC  &           2   Others    (supra),      ELIZABETH  

CHEPKOECH SALAT VS JOSEPHINE CHESANG SALAT, CA (APP)  No 211

of  2014, KARMALI TARMOHAMED & ANOTHER VS I H LAKHANI & CO

LTD  (1958) EA 367and CENEST AIRLINES LTD VS KENYA SHELL LTD

(1999) eKLR  for the   principles that  guide the   court  in  applications  for additional evidence and  to make  the  point that an appellate court will  admit additional evidence only  in exceptional circumstances.

Ms  Omuko further  contended that  the  applicant had  not shown   due diligence in  seeking the  evidence  because she  had  not sought the  same during the  High  Court hearing, and  that she had  filed Misc  Application No.

400  of  2013, to  ask  for the  evidence from IEBC only  on  5th  August, 2013,

which was after the  Court had delivered its judgment.

On the  relevance of the  additional evidence, learned counsel submitted that the  same  was not relevant for the  determination of the  appeal because the   applicant  was  seeking  to  adduce  evidence  on  reports  and acknowledgement slips  from all the  290  constituencies in the  Republic whilst the  issue in the  appeal related to Langata Constituency only.

The last two  submissions by learned counsel were  that the  documents that the  applicant wanted the  IEBC compelled by this  Court to produce were not in its  possession, but  were  instead in the  custody of the  courts handling the   election  petition  against  the   Governor,  Nairobi  County,  which  was pending before the  Supreme Court  and  that the  applicant was  abusing the process of the  Court  because she  had  filed another application in  the  High Court  seeking the  same  documents, which application had  been  heard and determined.

Mr   Mwangi    and    Mr     Somane,  respectively        for     the    1st      and    3rd

respondents filed joint written submissions in which they adopted in entirety the  submissions made  on behalf of the  2nd  respondent.

We   have    considered  the    motion,  the    affidavits  in   support  and opposition,  the   grounds  of  objection,  the   ruling  and   proceedings of  the Committee,   the    judgment   and    proceedings   of   the    High    Court,   the illuminating  submissions of learned counsel, the  authorities cited to  us and the  law.

The principles that guide this  Court in determining applications for additional evidence under Rule 29 are fairly clear,  having been  discussed in a long  line  of cases in this  jurisdiction. In 1958, the  predecessor of this  Court in K. TARMOHAMED & ANOTHER  VS LAKHANI & CO  (1958) EA  567, adopted the   judgment  of Lord  Denning in  Ladd   vs  Marshall (1954)  1

WLR, 1489,  and   stated that  except in  cases   where  the   application  for

additional evidence is based  on fraud or surprise:

“To  justify  reception  of  fresh  evidence  or  a  new   trial, three conditions must be fulfilled: first, it must be shown that the evidence could  not have  been   obtained with reasonable  diligence  for  use  at  the trial; secondly, the evidence must be  such  that, if  given, it would probably have   an  important  influence on  the result of  the case, though it need  not be decisive; thirdly, the evidence must be   such  as  is  presumably to  be   believed,  or  in  other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need  not be incontrovertible.”

Since  then  these   principles have  been  repeated and  applied in  such cases  as  WANJE & OTHERS VS SAIKWA & OTHERS  (1984) KLR  275;

THE  ADMINISTRATOR, H H THE  AGHA  KHAN  PLATINUM JUBILEE

HOSPITAL VS MUNYAMBU (supra);  EDGAR OGECHI & 12 OTHERS VS

UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN AFRICA, BARATON  (CA  No  130   of  1997); CENEAST AIRLINES LTD VS KENYA SHELL LTD  (CA  No. 174  of  1999); JOGINDER  AUTO  SERVICES  LTD  VS  MOHAMMED  SHAFFIQUE  &                                             ANOTHER  (CA No  Nai  210   of  2000); KUWINDA RURINJA CO LTD VS

KUWINDA HOLDINGS LTD & OTHER   (CA  No   8   of   2003);  JUDITH

DEBORAH CAVE SHAW VS FRANCIS ROBER SHAW  (CA No Nai  361  of

2005; JOHN WAGURA IKIKI & 3 OTHERS VS LEE GACHUIGA MUTHOGA

(CA No 196  of 2009 (Nyeri); PENINAH NANDAKO KILISWA VS IEBC &

2  OTHERS    (supra);     ELIZABETH CHEPKOECH  SALAT V JOSEPHINE

CHESANG  CHEPKWONY SALAT   (supra);  and   as   late   as   this   July   in

NATIONAL CEREALS & PRODUCE BOARD VS ERAD SUPPLIES &

GENERAL CONTRACTS LTD (CA No 9 of 2012).

In    THE  ADMINISTRATOR, H  H  THE  AGHA  KHAN  PLATINUM

JUBILEE HOSPITAL VS MUNYAMBU (supra),  this  Court  emphasized that the  principal rule  in  admission of additional evidence is that there must be exceptional circumstances to  constitute sufficient reason for receiving fresh

evidence at the  appellate stage.  And  in  WANJE & OTHERS VS SAIKWA &

OTHERS  (supra) this  Court  considered at length the  rationale behind the obvious restriction  of  reception  of  additional  evidence in  rule   29,   in  an appellate court. Chesoni, JA., as he then  was,  observed as follows, at page

280:

“This  rule  is not intended to enable a party who has discovered fresh evidence to import it nor  is it intended for  a  litigant who  has  been   unsuccessful at  the trial to patch up the weak points in his case  and  fill  up omissions in  the Court of  Appeal. The  rule  does  not authorise the admission of  additional evidence for  the purpose of removing lacunae and filling in gaps in evidence. The appellate  court  must  find   the  evidence  needful. Additional evidence should  not be  admitted to enable a plaintiff to make out a fresh case  in appeal. There would be   no  end   to  litigation  if  the  rule   were  used   for   the purpose of allowing the parties to make out a fresh case

or  to improve their case  by  calling further  evidence. It follows  that  the  power  given  by   the  rule   should   be exercised very  sparingly and  great caution should  be exercised in admitting fresh evidence.”

For his part, Hancox, JA., as he then  was,  stated that the  requirement of reasonable diligence is meant to discourage litigants from leaving until the appeal  stage    all   sorts    of  material   which  should  properly  have    been considered by the  trial court.

Justice  Opio  of the  Court  of Appeal of Uganda, in  GENERAL PARTS

(U) LTD VS KUNNAL  PRADIT KARIACA   No  266   OF  2013,  saw   the restriction in the  equivalent of rule  29 as one calling for a delicate balance. In his words:

“The need  to adduce additional evidence has been  a long time common law  practice. The  courts of  law  have  long championed the  doctrine that  “interest republicease ut sit finis litium” – it is the interest of the State that there be an end  to litigation.  The   background  of  the  above doctrine  is  that  courts should   not be  mired by  endless litigation  which  would occur  if  litigants were allowed to adduce fresh evidence at  any  time during and  after trial without any  restrictions. On the other hand, courts must administer justice and  in exceptional circumstances, new evidence should  be allowed. The  appellate court should weigh these two interests when  determining whether a party can  adduce additional evidence not present at  the original trial.”

We  are  alive  to  the  fact that in  exercising the  discretion donated by rule  29 and  in considering whether the  conditions for reception of additional evidence  have   been   satisfied, each   case  must be  considered on  its  own merit. Thus  in  WANJE & OTHERS VS SAIKWA & OTHERS  (supra), the application was  declined among other reasons, because most of the evidence sought to  be  admitted on  appeal was  not new,  having been  used

before the  trial court and  because, as the  Court  put  it, the  applicants were

merely trying to  have  a second  bite  at the  cherry. Similarly in  ELIZABETH

CHEPKOECH  SALAT  V  JOSEPHINE CHESANG  CHEPKWONY SALAT

(supra), the  application was  dismissed because the  evidence sought to  be admitted was  in  the  possession of the  applicant at the  time of the  hearing

before the  High  Court. On the  other hand,  in  JOGINDER AUTO SERVICES

LTD VS MOHAMMED SHAFFIQUE & ANOTHER  (supra), the  application was  allowed due  to  deliberate suppression of evidence by  the  respondent,

and   in   KUWINDA RURINJA CO LTD VS KUWINDA HOLDINGS LTD &

OTHER  (supra), additional evidence was  admitted to  prove death of some

of the   parties after  the   date   of judgment  in  question. In  the   GENERAL

PARTS (U) LTD VS KUNNAL PRADIT KARIA (supra), and  in  NATIONAL

CEREALS & PRODUCE BOARD VS ERAD SUPPLIES & GENERAL

CONTRACTS  LTD   (supra)  the   application  was   declined  because the additional evidence sought to  be  adduced was  found to  be  unnecessary for the  determination of the  appeal.

In  the  application before us,  the  respondents contend that under the terms of rule  29,  the  same  is  incompetent and  misconceived because the Civil Appeal 309  of 2013 is not an appeal from a decision of the  High  Court acting in  the  exercise of its  original jurisdiction. There  is  no  doubt in  our minds that, subject to satisfying the  conditions we have  outlined above, rule

29  allows   for  adduction  of  additional  evidence only   in  appeals from the exercise of  the   original jurisdiction  of the   High   Court. This  was  also  the

conclusion of this  Court  in   PENINAH NANDAKO KILISWA VS IEBC & 2

OTHERS  (supra), NATIONAL CEREALS & PRODUCE BOARD VS ERAD

SUPPLIES & GENERAL CONTRACTS LTD (supra) and,  albeit in a criminal law context, in  ROBERT MWANGI NJOROGE VS REPUBLIC (Crim. App No

111  of 2006).

The  respondents contend that the  jurisdiction of the  High  Court  from which  Civil   Appeal  309   of  2013  arises   is  its   supervisory rather  than original jurisdiction. This view  appears to be based  on the  following passages from the  judgment of the  High  Court:

“71.  In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over  the respondents, the Court must ensure that the respondents have  complied with the spirit and  letter of the law. In our view, where the respondents fail  to do  that which  is demanded  of  them by  the  Constitution, this Court will step in, at  the request of  an  aggrieved party, to provide appropriate relief as required by Article 23(3).

72. On reading the pleadings in this matter we have  come to the conclusion that  we  have   two disparate petitions before  us.  On   one   hand,  Ms   Kilonzo challenges the constitutionality of  the decision of  the respondents. She appeared before the Committee and  her  case  was  heard and   determined.  In  our   view,  her   case   calls   for   the exercise  of  our  jurisdiction  as  specified  by  Article 165

Clauses  (3)(d)(ii) and  (6). Doing  anything more  would amount to granting her  another opportunity to present her   case  afresh. We  would  be  stepping into the  shoes given to the IEBC by the Constitution.”

Since  we apprehend that this  may  be a substantive issue  in the  appeal where jurisdictional issues  are  raised, we  shall  refrain from expressing any views   lest  we  prejudice  the   appeal.  We  shall   accordingly  determine  this application on the  basis of the  other considerations.

From   the   material  before  us,  there  is  no  doubt that  most of  the evidence, at least the  most important evidence, that the  applicant seeks  to be admitted at the  hearing of the  appeal is evidence that was in fact before

the  Committee and  was  duly  considered in  arriving at the  decision of the Committee. Thus for example, the  IEBC Director of Voter  Registration and Electoral  Operations  produced   before   the    Committee,  and    was   cross examined on several documents that the  applicant seeks  to  be admitted as new  evidence. These  include the  registration booklet from which the applicant’s  acknowledgement  slip   had   come   (Defence  Exhibit  1);   the Gazette notices showing official polling stations which did  not contain the “Karen Polling  Station” where the applicant purported to have  registered (Defence Exhibit 2);  the  file in respect of the  loss of the  applicant’s acknowledgement slip  (Defence Exhibit 3); and the  Distribution Register of acknowledgement slips  (Defence Exhibit 4).

The three green books  relating to Langata Constituency, where the applicant maintains she registered as a voter, were  produced by  Teresia Wanjiru Mwai, (DW4) who  was also  subjected to cross-examination like  all the  other witnesses.  As far as  the  green books  are  concerned, it was  the evidence before the  Committee that DW4  had  in  her  possession one  of the green books  whilst the  other two  were  by  erroneously sealed  in a ballot box for  Langata Constituency. Pursuant  to  a  court  order, the   Committee was allowed  to  open   the   ballot  box   and   access   the   green  books   therein  for purposes of verifying whether the  name  of the  applicant was in any  of them. Three  green books  Serial Nos. 25516, 07612 and  26282 were  perused by the  Committee in the  presence of the  parties and  their counsel. Indeed, the record shows  that DW4  was  cross  examined on  the  three green books  not

only   by   the   applicant’s  lawyers,  but   also,   and   rather  unusually  by   the applicant herself.

In these  circumstances, the  applicant’s submission that evidence had come   to  light  after the   decisions of  the   Committee  and   the   High   Court showing that there were  three “green  books”  instead of one  is  to  say  the least curious because the  three green books  were  before the  Committee and the  applicant cross-examined on those  three green books.

As framed, the  applicant’s prayers also  confirm either by inadvertence or otherwise, that the  materials sought to be introduced at the  hearing of the appeal were  indeed before the  Committee. In her  application the  applicant expressly states  that  she   seeks   to   produce  reports  “referred  to  and produced by…witnesses in the proceedings before the Nominations Dispute Resolution Committee.”

Further  confirmation that  this   evidence  was  before  the   Committee comes   from  the   letters  from  the   applicant’s  advocates attached  to   her affidavit sworn  on 17th  February, 2014  in support of the  Motion before us. In those   letters, written after the  judgment of the  Committee, the  applicant informs  the   1st   respondent that  she   seeks   “all   the  reports  of   IEBC referred to and  produced by the witnesses before the Committee”.

Regarding  the    question  whether  the    evidence  could    have    been produced with due  diligence, it is noteworthy that the  applicant did  not seek production of any  other evidence that she  considered necessary and  in  the possession of the  Committee during the  proceedings before it. She also  did not seek any during the  proceedings before the  High  Court.

It is  true that the  applicant filed a suit, HCCC No. 400  of  2013, to access  some  evidence, but  that suit was  being filed on  5th   August, 2013, several weeks  after the  decision of the  Committee and  the  judgment of the High  Court.  During the  hearings before the  Committee and  the  High  Court, the  applicant was aware  of the  existence of the  evidence but  did  not ask for it then; she only  sought it after the  hearings “for the purposes  of lodging  an appeal.”  As we  have  noted, that evidence was  in  any  event produced and considered by the  Committee.

Lastly, and  with due  respect, the  relevance of some  of the  evidence sought to be admitted at the  hearing of the  appeal is very  questionable. Requesting admission of “all and any reports  touching on the matter of Kethi Kilonzo  in  the  custody   of  the  respondent”  sounds   more   of  a  request  in discovery before a court that is hearing issues  of fact, rather than  a prayer for leave  to present relevant and  focused evidence contemplated by rule  29 in an appellate court. In addition and  as the  respondents legitimately query, the  relevance of production at the  hearing of the  appeal, of evidence of acknowledgement slips  issued  in  all  constituencies throughout the  Republic is not apparent to us.

The  issues  raised in  the  memorandum of appeal in  Civil  Appeal No

309   of  2013  are   whether  the   Committee  had   jurisdiction  to   hear   the complaint against the  applicant; whether the  hearing before the  Committee was fair and in accordance with constitutional guarantees; the  veracity of the green books; whether  the   burden of proof  was  wrongfully shifted to  the applicant; whether an  expired passport  is a valid document for purposes of

voter registration; and  whether the  applicant’s legitimate expectations were violated. In our  view,  to  determine those  issues  does  not require production of hordes of election materials from all constituencies in Kenya.

The argument has been  made  that Article 159  (2) (d) can be invoked in

this   application  to   allow   adduction  of  additional  evidence.  In   ROBERT

MWANGI NJOROGE  VS  REPUBLIC (supra)   a   similar  argument  was addressed by  the  Court  when  it considered the  relationship between article

159  of the  Constitution and  rules  of procedure, although, in the  context of a criminal appeal. The Court expressed itself as follows, a view  which we affirm in this  application:

“Article 159 (2) of the Constitution sets out the principles that shall  guide  the  Judiciary   in   the  administration  of  justice. Among these is the principle that justice shall be  administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities.  From the outset, we  have no  doubt in  our minds that  Article 159 was never intended to do away with rules of procedure in the administration   of  justice.  The    use    of  the  phrase  “undue regard” in Article 159 does  not suggest that no regard shall be paid at all  to rules of procedure.  What the Constitution seeks to stop, in our view, is overreliance on procedure, as an  end  in itself.  In   MOSES ODERO  OWOUR &  OTHERS V ANDRONICO OTIENO ANINDO,  (CIVIL  APPEAL   (APPLICATION)  NO   248  OF

2011   (KISUMU),  this  Court  observed  as   follows  regarding

Article 159 of the Constitution and  rules of procedure:

‘In our view, the purpose of rules of procedure is nothing more than to facilitate  the realization of the   values  and    objectives  of  the   judiciary   as stipulated in  the Constitution and  the relevant legislation.  The  rules of procedure are not an  end in   themselves.  However,  their  value  and importance  cannot  be   denied. It  is   through  the rules of procedure to be  observed by  both the appellant and   the respondent that equality and fairness between contending parties is guaranteed. It is through rules of procedure which prescribe the period within which a  party should take specified action that expeditious disposal of disputes is assured; and  undue delay eliminated or minimized. It is through rules of procedure that a party knows the precise case  it has  to meet or answer, without